Who holds the Internet’s address book? Why digital sovereignty may be a mirage

Who holds the Internet’s address book? Why digital sovereignty may be a mirage is profiled by BTW Media because public-source evidence links it to internet infrastructure, governance, operational dependencies, or market visibility.

• Debate over digital sovereignty risks misunderstanding the nature of global internet infrastructure and fragmenting connectivity.
• Experts question whether attempts to control regional internet policy through centralised mechanisms could harm openness and cooperation.

The address book that isn’t power

The global internet runs largely because of a set of technical systems that assign identifiers to computers and networks, known as IP addresses. At the core of this numbering system are the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), neutral entities that record who holds which ranges of addresses so that networks can communicate reliably across borders. In Africa, that registry is AFRINIC.

A recent commentary framed the RIR’s role as akin to “an address book” rather than a governing authority.

As the piece puts it,

“The person holding the address book does not own the houses. He does not control the streets. He does not control the residents. He simply records numbers.”

This metaphor captures a fundamental feature of internet governance: the internet functions through coordination, not top-down control.

That distinction matters in current debates about digital sovereignty — the idea that a state or region can exert complete authority over digital infrastructure and data flows within its sphere. In policy discourse, digital sovereignty has become a buzzword linked to national security, economic autonomy and regulatory control. Scholars note that digital sovereignty can cut both ways: while it may empower governments to protect citizens’ rights online, it can also extend state power into areas that restrict openness and innovation.

The question of sovereignty stretches beyond policy rhetoric into how the internet’s architecture actually works. The RIR model is built on multistakeholder cooperation — technical operators, civil society, governments and private companies all contribute to decisions about identifiers and resources. This system was designed to prevent any single actor from imposing control over the entire network, which is inherently decentralised by design.

Yet calls for greater sovereignty often attempt to reinterpret that decentralisation as a deficit to be fixed, rather than a strength to be preserved. In Africa, some political actors have advocated for a unified digital authority that could oversee internet policy across the continent. Critics counter that this misunderstands the internet’s inherently cross-border nature and risks reducing connectivity to fragmented national silos.

Also Read: Portability of internet number resources: Why ICP-2 revision must guarantee mobility
Also Read: Calls grow for overhaul of internet governance amid centralisation concerns

Sovereignty versus connectivity: a hard balance

The practical implications of claims to digital sovereignty raise real questions. State control over networks and data flows can be warranted in contexts such as law enforcement, privacy protection or critical infrastructure defence. However, scholars warn that overemphasis on territorial control may conflict with the global architecture of the internet, which was intentionally built without rigid physical borders. For example, efforts to restrict cross-border data flows solely on the basis of territorial sovereignty could undermine interoperability and economic integration.

Even proponents of stronger national digital policies acknowledge that legal frameworks alone cannot fully determine how networks operate. Technical infrastructures such as routing protocols and global addressing systems are inherently collective constructs that depend on international cooperation.

This tension — between the desire for autonomous control and the practical requirements for open connectivity — is not unique to Africa. Around the world, governments are grappling with how to regulate cloud services, platforms, artificial intelligence and cross-border data flows without stifling the very openness that makes the internet valuable. The term digital sovereignty itself can obscure these nuanced trade-offs when it is invoked without clear definition or context.

As discussions evolve, technical experts, policymakers, and multistakeholder forums such as those convened by the Internet Society and the RIRs will remain central to shaping how sovereignty is interpreted in practice. Rather than imposing control through centralised edicts, effective governance may require hybrid approaches that respect both legal authorities and the network’s decentralised design.