A visible network relationship can change how readers understand counterparties, dependency, exposure, or market structure across internet infrastructure.
Public relationship material links IRT-M21-AU and Abuse-C Role through a peer network relationship.
A visible network relationship can change how readers understand counterparties, dependency, exposure, or market structure across internet infrastructure.
Public relationship material links IRT-M21-AU and Abuse-C Role through a peer network relationship.
Public relationship material links IRT-M21-AU and Abuse-C Role through a peer network relationship.
Changes in registry, routing, service footprint, or public role can alter visibility, dependency assessment, and escalation paths for infrastructure readers.
A visible network relationship can change how readers understand counterparties, dependency, exposure, or market structure across internet infrastructure.
Changes in registry, routing, service footprint, or public role can alter visibility, dependency assessment, and escalation paths for infrastructure readers.
Several public sources
IRT-M21-AU - Abuse-C Role peer relationship
IRT-M21-AU - Abuse-C Role peer relationship appears in publicdata.caida.org (public_source) with a visible Network relationship context. Public relationship material links IRT-M21-AU and Abuse-C Role through a peer network relationship. The profile explains what is visible now and what would change the assessment.
Why It Matters
IRT-M21-AU - Abuse-C Role peer relationship matters because infrastructure decisions depend on knowing which organisations or people appear in the routing, registry, service, or governance map. The profile gives readers a scoped view of identity, visible operating role, and the facts that could change the assessment.
What Sources Show
Available material establishes baseline identity and operating context for IRT-M21-AU - Abuse-C Role peer relationship. Registry, routing, official, or operator-published material can show visibility in the internet ecosystem; ownership, customer, or decision-authority claims still need corroboration.
IRT-M21-AU - Abuse-C Role peer relationship appears in public evidence as a Network relationship within the internet infrastructure ecosystem. No ASN or prefix sample is attached yet; current material establishes identity, registry, or affiliation context. Contact coverage includes 0 operational channels that may help readers understand escalation paths. The public record is useful where it shows registry presence, routing or service footprint, operator-published channels, and official source material.
The article does not infer contracts from those signals. Its value is to identify the organisation's visible operating surface and the future events that would confirm or change relationship claims.
Operating Surface
Public relationship material links IRT-M21-AU and Abuse-C Role through a peer network relationship.
No ASN or prefix sample is attached yet; current material establishes identity, registry, or affiliation context. Contact coverage includes 0 operational channels that may help readers understand escalation paths.
The impact mechanism is the way registry, routing, service, or relationship changes can alter responsibility, reachability, escalation, or dependency assessments. The primary subject is Company; network identifiers and registry records provide context for the primary subject.
Watchpoints
Watch for source freshness changes, footprint expansion or withdrawal, contact churn, and disagreement between registry facts and operator-published material. Add clearer corroboration before making stronger relationship or control claims.
Sources
- publicdata.caida.org - supports the peer relationship evidence for IRT-M21-AU - Abuse-C Role peer relationship across AS38880 and AS60404.
Domain of operation
This entity represents a peer network relationship between two autonomous systems, AS38880 and AS60404, as observed in public Internet routing data.
- AS38880: One endpoint of the peer relationship, associated with IRT-M21-AU. Evidence basis: publicdata.caida.org dataset
- AS60404: The other endpoint of the peer relationship, associated with Abuse-C Role. Evidence basis: publicdata.caida.org dataset
- Relationship Type: Peer relationship, indicating direct interconnection between the two autonomous systems for traffic exchange. Evidence basis: publicdata.caida.org dataset classification
Timeline
- Peer relationship observed in CAIDA AS-relationships dataset
The dataset serial-1 for 20260601 includes a peer relationship between AS38880 and AS60404.
At A Glance
- Name: IRT-M21-AU - Abuse-C Role peer relationship
- Type: Network Relationship
- Base: Global
What It Does
- public operating records
- official service pages
- documented relationships updates
Why it matters
- Changes in registry, routing, service footprint, or public role can alter visibility, dependency assessment, and escalation paths for infrastructure readers.
- Operational criticality: Medium
- Time Horizon: Next quarter
What To Watch
- official company sources
- public registries
- operator-published records
Track verified source updates, role changes, and current public evidence.
Changes in registry, routing, service footprint, or public role can alter visibility, dependency assessment, and escalation paths for infrastructure readers.
Longer-term relevance depends on verified operating, policy, and relationship changes.
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BTW identifies a peer relationship between AS38880 and AS60404 based on the CAIDA AS-relationship dataset from June 2026. This relationship suggests direct network interconnection, which may impact routing, traffic exchange, and dependency analysis for these autonomous systems. The observation is limited to the data snapshot and may not reflect real-time status.
Watchpoints
- Changes in relationship status (e.g., transit, customer) could alter dependency assessments.
- Disappearance of the relationship might indicate network reconfiguration.
- Both ASes' operational status and ownership changes could affect the relationship.
Caveats
- The relationship is based on a single public dataset and may not be comprehensive.
- CAIDA's classification is algorithmically derived and may contain errors.
- The relationship status may have changed since the dataset snapshot.
FAQ
What is the basis for this peer relationship?
It is derived from the CAIDA AS-relationships dataset, which infers relationships from BGP data.
How reliable is this relationship classification?
CAIDA's methodology is well-regarded, but individual relationships may have misclassifications. Additional validation is recommended.
Why is this relationship tracked by BTW?
Because changes in network relationships can affect Internet infrastructure visibility and dependency chains.
What are the associated entities?
IRT-M21-AU and Abuse-C Role, though their specific organizational details are not provided in this profile.