IRRA INTERNET SERVICE PRIVATE LIMITED's Hyderabad licence ended before its address block settled behind Netplus

Summary

• The strongest licensing fact is negative for the regional-ISP thesis. The Department of Telecommunications' surrendered and cancelled ISP list as of 28 February 2026 identifies IRRA INTERNET SERVICE PRIVATE LIMITED with a Category C Hyderabad internet-service authorisation and records that authorisation as surrendered or cancelled with effect from 24 September 2024. That does not erase the company's corporate existence, but it means the article cannot describe a presently authorised Hyderabad ISP on the public licence evidence.
• The number-resource trail is real but dependent. APNIC assigns AS150659, named IRRA-AS-IN, and the IPv4 range 103.77.238.0/23 to IRRA-linked records at a Hyderabad address. At the 10 July 2026 cut-off, RIPEstat marked AS150659 as not announced and showed zero observed neighbours, while 103.77.238.0/24 and 103.77.239.0/24 were originated by Netplus AS133661.
• Payment and biller surfaces still create a customer-service trace. Public pages such as Paytm's bill-payment listing, MobiKwik's listing, Bajaj Finserv's listing and Tripozo's listing indicate that the name has existed in broadband-payment rails. They do not prove current subscribers, serviceable addresses, field crews, a live help desk or active regulatory authority.
• No public source verifies IRRA-owned fibre, towers, last-mile electronics, a point of presence, ring topology, backup-power runtime, upstream diversity, current subscriber count, quality results, repair staff, spare stock or restoration targets. The defensible physical reading is a former or uncertain local Hyderabad broadband operation whose reachable address space currently depends on Netplus routing and whose service status cannot be confirmed from public evidence.
• Final network evidence grade: Weak. The company has a credible administrative and routing-resource trail, but the operating case is too thin for a positive regional-ISP profile. The evidence-bound downgrade is to treat the regional-ISP framing as a question under test, not as a claim of active regional coverage, and to treat every operating attribute as unverified unless a current licence, current retail surface and current network evidence appear.

The useful story is the gap between traces and operation

IRRA INTERNET SERVICE PRIVATE LIMITED is not a phantom name. The company appears in Indian internet-number records, bill-payment listings and corporate-information mirrors. Those traces matter because small local access providers often leave a shallow public footprint: a licence row, a resource registration, a payment biller, a few route collectors and little else. For a network-risk profile, though, the question is not whether the name ever existed. It is whether the evidence supports a current, physical broadband operation whose customers depend on a known access plant, power boundary, upstream path and repair system.

On that test, IRRA has to be downgraded sharply. The DoT surrendered and cancelled ISP authorisation list is the first control point. It places IRRA in the category of authorisations that had been surrendered or cancelled by the time of the list. It also anchors the geography: the relevant permission was Category C for Hyderabad, not a national or multi-circle licence. The current DoT active ISP authorisation list as of 28 February 2026 is therefore not the right place to inflate IRRA into a live regional carrier. The official status trail points the other way.

The route trail is more nuanced. APNIC's autonomous-system record names IRRA-AS-IN and IRRA INTERNET SERVICE PRIVATE LIMITED. APNIC's address record for the 103.77.238.0/23 allocation names IRRA and gives a Hyderabad contact surface. The IRINN current affiliate page also keeps IRRA in the wider affiliate universe for Indian internet-number resources. That is concrete infrastructure-administrative evidence. It says IRRA had or retained control relationships around an ASN and 512 IPv4 addresses.

But routing is what turns an allocation into a reachable internet path. At the cut-off, RIPEstat's AS overview for AS150659 marked the ASN as not announced. Its routing-status result showed no announced IPv4 or IPv6 space and no observed neighbours. Its announced-prefixes result showed only short late-June 2026 observations of unrelated-looking /24s, not a stable IRRA-originated service. The company-specific block itself was reachable, but as two /24s originated by Netplus AS133661, not by IRRA.

Those facts do not prove that every customer circuit disappeared. A small provider can buy a managed handoff from another network and let the upstream originate its addresses. A licence can be surrendered while a company remains legally active, changes its commercial arrangement, transfers customers, operates under another authorisation or keeps legacy billing identifiers alive during wind-down. The evidence simply does not tell us which of those possibilities occurred. The public record supports a cautious profile: IRRA is a real company/resource holder with uncertain current service, not a verified regional access operator.

Category C fixed a local boundary before the permission ended

The Category C designation is important because it limits the original operating frame. The Department of Telecommunications' internet-service portal explains that Category A covers all India, Category B covers a telecom circle or metro service area, and Category C covers one Secondary Switching Area. The Unified Licence agreement uses the same category logic and describes the legal scope under which an ISP may build or use last-mile infrastructure, lease bandwidth, share infrastructure and serve subscribers.

IRRA's authorisation therefore should not be read as a state-wide Telangana network or as a national regional carrier. The defensible public geography is Hyderabad. APNIC's records point to an address in the AC Guards and Lakdi ka Pul area of Hyderabad. Corporate mirrors such as IndiaFilings, Tofler and The Company Check also associate the company with Telangana corporate identity data. Those sources help with legal identity, but they do not expand the network footprint.

The licence status changes the interpretation of every later trace. A payment page in 2026 cannot by itself re-authorise an ISP. An APNIC allocation cannot by itself demonstrate local subscriber service. A route originated by Netplus cannot by itself show that IRRA still owns or operates access plant in Hyderabad. The surrendered/cancelled authorisation means a reader should ask what current permission, if any, supports any continuing retail broadband service under the IRRA name. No public source found for this article answers that question.

This is not a technicality. Internet access service is not just a brand and a router. It involves installation rights, customer terms, lawful interception and monitoring obligations, complaint handling, traffic records, emergency coordination and regulator-facing returns. The Unified Licence terms make the licensee the accountable party even when it uses leased bandwidth or shared infrastructure. Once the public licence trail says the ISP authorisation ended, the operating arrangement has to be re-established from fresh evidence rather than assumed from old resource records.

There is also a consumer-protection angle. If an old biller remains active after a licence ended, customers and bill-payment platforms need current service identity more than nostalgia. The same display name might represent residual billing, a transferred base, a payment-aggregator cache, a surviving non-ISP service, or an active operation under a different valid arrangement. Each possibility has different risk. Without a current licence number, service terms, complaint officer, address checker or regulator return, the safest public conclusion is not "closed" and not "active." It is "unverified after surrender."

The address block is real, but the visible origin is Netplus

The strongest network-resource fact is the 512-address IPv4 range 103.77.238.0 through 103.77.239.255. APNIC's RDAP address record identifies the allocation as IRRA, with NIXI as the Indian internet-number registry context and Hyderabad-linked contact records. For a small access provider, a /23 can be valuable. It can number customer connections, customer-premises equipment management, routers, monitoring systems, static-IP services or business circuits. It can also sit mostly unused.

The live public route, however, is not IRRA's own ASN. RIPEstat's prefix overview for 103.77.238.0/24 and prefix overview for 103.77.239.0/24 show both more-specific prefixes announced by AS133661. APNIC's AS133661 record identifies that ASN as NETPLUS-AS, Netplus Broadband Services Private Limited. RIPEstat's AS overview for Netplus marks it announced and visible, and PeeringDB's Netplus entry describes Netplus as a Cable/DSL/ISP network with exchange presence.

The RPKI data reinforces that boundary. RIPEstat's validation result for AS133661 and 103.77.238.0/24 is valid, as is the result for AS133661 and 103.77.239.0/24. By contrast, the same validator marks AS150659 with 103.77.238.0/24 and AS150659 with 103.77.239.0/24 as invalid under the current ROAs. That does not retroactively settle every historical routing state. It says that, on the cut-off check, the authorised public origin for the two /24s was Netplus, not IRRA.

Routing history adds a time sequence. RIPEstat's history for 103.77.238.0/24 and history for 103.77.239.0/24 show AS150659 originating the two /24s in 2023, and AS133661 originating them through the 2026 cut-off. That sequence is consistent with a provider that once announced its own block, then shifted the block behind a larger network. It is also consistent with other commercial or operational changes. The public data cannot identify the contract.

This matters for resilience. If IRRA had a current, visible AS with two upstreams, route collectors could at least support a logical multi-homing claim. They do not. If both /24s are currently behind Netplus, then the public internet sees Netplus as the origin. Netplus may have its own upstream diversity and exchange reach, but that diversity is not automatically IRRA's local redundancy. The fragile point may be the private handoff between an IRRA customer edge and Netplus, a migration path, a managed service, a wholesale arrangement or an address lease. The route table reveals the origin; it does not reveal the access circuit, handoff building, commercial account, spares or repair responsibility.

Payment listings are a signal, not a subscriber count

The consumer-facing evidence is a set of bill-payment pages. Paytm, MobiKwik, Bajaj Finserv, Tripozo and similar aggregators present IRRA INTERNET SERVICE PRIVATE LIMITED as a broadband-bill option. That is not empty. Biller listings usually derive from payment-rail onboarding, aggregator catalogues or business relationships rather than arbitrary blog text.

But a biller page is not a network map. It does not show how many customers have paid recently, whether new orders are accepted, whether the biller is still active in the underlying payment system, whether invoices correspond to an ISP service, or whether the service is performed under the same company after the licence surrender. Public payment pages often persist long after a product changes, a payment connector is retired or a provider migrates customers. They are a reason to investigate, not a basis for declaring current operations.

The absence of a first-party website increases the uncertainty. The assignment and local directory data did not provide a company website, and public searches did not surface a maintained IRRA retail site with current plans, support contacts, serviceable addresses, installation rules or outage notices. Without that surface, a prospective customer cannot easily verify prices, terms, complaint escalation, technology, coverage or the entity behind the biller. The payment pages ask a user to enter account details, but they do not explain the network.

TRAI's public reports also do not rescue the operating case. The regulator's January-March 2026 performance indicators report gives national broadband context and lists larger providers, but it does not provide an IRRA-specific subscriber count in the public annexures available for this assessment. The TRAI performance-indicator index is useful for the reporting sequence, and the TRAI consumer ISP page is useful for complaint-contact context. Neither page establishes a live IRRA customer base.

For a network profile, that absence is decisive. Subscriber count is not trivia. It changes the economics of spare inventory, support shifts, upstream bandwidth, and route diversity. Ten customers in one building can be served with a different cost structure from 1,000 homes spread across a city. One leased-line customer can create more revenue and stricter repair obligations than many residential accounts. No public source for IRRA discloses any of those quantities.

The correct reading of payment listings is therefore bounded. They suggest that IRRA was or remains present in broadband billing channels. They cannot prove present service, customer scale, lawful operating authority, network availability or repair readiness. They should be treated as unofficial market signals unless the provider or a regulator connects them to current service.

The practical verification path would be modest. A current invoice, a current customer-care page, a working order or support number, a published complaint officer, an address-level availability result, or a payment receipt that identifies the authorised service provider would materially improve the operating picture. None of those would have to disclose sensitive network topology. They would only connect the name on the biller page to a current service relationship. In the absence of that connection, payment visibility remains weaker than the surrendered licence and weaker than the route evidence.

Hyderabad makes the physical problem dense, local and power-dependent

The physical dependency, if any IRRA broadband service remains active, is local rather than national. Hyderabad is a dense metro environment with apartment blocks, commercial buildings, municipal roads, underground utilities, aerial cable runs, building risers, landlords and heavy right-of-way coordination. A small Category C ISP could serve a compact group of buildings with very little visible public footprint. It could also depend on a wholesale access arrangement that leaves few assets under its own name.

The public records do not identify an IRRA point of presence. The APNIC address in the AC Guards/Lakdi ka Pul area may be an administrative or contact address. It should not be treated as a confirmed network room, fibre hut, office with live routers or customer aggregation site. The corporate address similarly fixes identity context, not physical topology. A broadband provider's real handoff might sit in a partner facility, a building basement, a rooftop enclosure, a local exchange, a cabinet, a reseller node or a Netplus-connected site.

India's telecom rules leave room for many such structures. The Unified Licence agreement allows authorised ISPs to establish fibre, radio or copper last mile, use authorised cable networks, share infrastructure and lease bandwidth from other authorised providers. Those permissions explain why a licence record cannot by itself prove ownership of poles, ducts, fibre, switches or radio equipment. With IRRA, the public record is even weaker because the licence appears in the surrendered/cancelled list.

The access-plant possibilities remain broad. A genuine small service could have used fibre drops from building to building, passive optical splitters, Ethernet distribution, rooftop wireless bridges, local cable-operator plant, or a managed wholesale handoff. Each option has different failure modes. Underground fibre is vulnerable to excavation, inaccurate maps and delayed splicing. Aerial cable is vulnerable to pole work, weather, clearance conflicts and unauthorised cutting. Rooftop wireless is vulnerable to power, interference, alignment and building access. Shared building equipment is vulnerable to locked rooms, small UPS units and customer-side power.

No public evidence lets us select among those options. The DoT Call Before u Dig portal shows the national policy direction for reducing damage to underground assets by connecting excavators and utility owners. The Telecommunications Right of Way Rules, 2024 describe permissions, notices and compensation for underground and overground telecom infrastructure. They define the environment in which a Hyderabad access network would operate. They do not identify IRRA's routes.

That distinction is important because a small ISP can look resilient or fragile depending on the hidden physical layout. Two customer buildings on separate ducts can survive a single cut. Two buildings fed through one riser or one aerial bundle cannot. A provider can buy two logical upstream sessions that share one metro tail. A local technician can know every splice, or a remote partner can hold the only keys. Without topology and maintenance evidence, the right response is not to imagine a network. It is to list the questions any active service would have to answer.

Power is not an abstract risk in a city access network

Every access design has a power boundary. Fibre itself can be passive for part of the path, but optical-line terminals, aggregation switches, routers, media converters, rooftop radios, cooling fans, monitoring equipment and customer Wi-Fi devices need electricity. A service can fail at the provider cabinet, the upstream handoff, the building switch or the customer premises even if the route table still looks normal.

Hyderabad's electricity context is public enough to set the outer frame. The Telangana State Southern Power Distribution Company is the distribution utility serving Hyderabad and surrounding districts. The Hyderabad district utilities page directs residents to utility services, and TGSPDCL publishes consumer, outage and service interfaces. These sources do not identify IRRA equipment or outages. They show that any local broadband node in the city sits inside a public distribution grid the ISP does not control.

Backup power separates a tolerable maintenance window from a customer outage. A provider may keep a router and upstream handoff alive on a UPS while a residential customer loses power at home. It may keep a building switch alive for 30 minutes but not for a four-hour outage. It may have backup at an office but not at a rooftop radio. It may rely on a partner's powered equipment without knowing the runtime. Each of those designs can be rational at small scale; none is visible in the public IRRA record.

The licence and routing facts sharpen the question. If the company no longer holds the relevant ISP authorisation, who owns the powered access equipment, if any, that still serves users under the IRRA biller name? If Netplus originates the address block, where is the powered handoff between the local access segment and Netplus? Does a Netplus outage, local IRRA equipment outage, building outage or customer-side outage produce the same customer symptom? A public route table cannot answer those field questions.

Power also interacts with support labour. A small provider can survive outages by telling customers exactly what failed, how long the UPS will last and when a technician can reach the site. A weak provider sends customers into a loop: the payment page exists, the address block is routed somewhere, the licence trail is old, and no current support page explains who is responsible. IRRA's public footprint is closer to the second condition. It gives no backup-runtime claim, no maintenance notices, no support staffing evidence and no active service-status channel.

The conservative conclusion is not that the network would fail in every power event. It is that the public record provides no basis for describing backup power as adequate. In a dense Hyderabad access network, that is a material gap.

Upstream loss is the most visible failure path

The most visible technical dependency is the current origin through Netplus. If Netplus withdraws 103.77.238.0/24 and 103.77.239.0/24, or if the arrangement carrying IRRA's address space changes, outside networks lose the route to those addresses unless another valid origin appears. Because AS150659 is not currently visible, there is no public evidence of IRRA-originated failover.

The difference between global origin and local handoff matters. Netplus may have a robust network. Its RIPEstat neighbour view shows multiple observed relationships, and PeeringDB lists exchange presence. That supports Netplus as a real network, not a paper origin. It does not show the private circuit, facility, port, switch, VLAN, route policy or service agreement through which IRRA-associated addresses would reach any Hyderabad last mile.

If IRRA were still serving users, the common outage could occur below the global route. The /24s might stay announced while a single local tail fails. Customers could be offline while RIPEstat still shows the prefixes. Conversely, Netplus could withdraw a route while the local access network remains powered, producing a different support problem. Customers would see the same result, no internet, but the repair path would be different.

This is why "Netplus has upstreams" is not an IRRA redundancy claim. The public question is not whether AS133661 is a larger ISP. It is whether IRRA's customers, if any, have physically and commercially independent paths into that origin or another origin. Two routes in a BGP table do not guarantee two cables. One origin can sit behind one handoff. Two handoffs can share one duct or one power source. Without location and contract evidence, diversity remains unverified.

The short late-June 2026 AS150659 observations make the picture stranger, not stronger. RIPEstat's announced-prefixes result shows 16.217.139.0/24 and 181.214.240.0/24 briefly associated with AS150659 during 26-29 June 2026. The ARIN RDAP record for 16.217.139.0/24 does not identify IRRA, and the LACNIC RDAP view for 181.214.240.0 points to an IPXO-related sub-allocation context rather than IRRA's Indian allocation. These route blips are not evidence of a stable Hyderabad retail network. They are reasons to keep the routing assessment narrow and current.

What would improve the upstream grade is simple. A current IRRA-originated route under AS150659, a valid ROA for that origin, named upstreams, a second physically diverse handoff, a clear role for Netplus, and an outage/failover record would turn dependency into an engineered boundary. Without those, the public evidence supports one visible route relationship: IRRA's registered Indian /23 is reachable through Netplus.

Local support labour is the missing operating system

Infrastructure fails in ways that do not appear in corporate records. A connector bends. A customer optical terminal dies. A rooftop radio loses alignment. A building guard will not open a cabinet room. A cheap UPS battery reaches the end of life. A road crew cuts a duct. A switch loses configuration. The difference between a short incident and a day-long outage is often not bandwidth. It is local labour, spare parts, access rights and documentation.

IRRA publishes none of that publicly. There is no visible current support rota, field office, technician count, spare-stock policy, restoration target, service-level agreement, incident page or customer notice archive. The bill-payment listings show how money might be collected, not how service is restored. APNIC contact records show who can be contacted for number-resource administration, not who will visit a building with a fusion splicer.

At small scale, the labour question becomes sharper. A two-person local ISP can be extremely responsive inside a compact neighbourhood. It can also be brittle if the same person handles billing, routing and field repair. A managed upstream can reduce technical complexity, but it creates supplier escalation. A cable partner can reduce civil-work cost, but it creates dependency on the partner's access to poles, risers and plant maps. None of these structures is inherently bad. What matters is whether the operator has enough people, records and spares to repair the actual fault.

The surrendered authorisation makes responsibility especially ambiguous. If an old customer still sees IRRA on a bill-payment page, who takes the call when a drop cable fails? IRRA, a successor provider, Netplus, a local cable partner, a building contractor or the payment platform? The answer matters because each party controls a different surface. A payment platform can process a bill but cannot dispatch a splicer. Netplus can manage a public route but may not own the last 100 metres. A building owner can open a riser but cannot fix BGP. A former licensee may know the customers but not have current authority to provide ISP service.

The article therefore cannot responsibly describe "24-by-7 support" or "field repair" for IRRA. It can describe the repair gates that would need evidence: a current help channel, a named complaint officer, a technician dispatch area, stocked optical terminals or radios, access agreements for buildings, escalation into Netplus, backup configurations, a route-object owner and a documented process for planned power or civil-work interruptions.

Those gates are not bureaucratic decoration. They are the operating system behind every local broadband bill. If the biller remains while the support surface disappears, customers inherit the hardest version of local connectivity risk: money can be collected through a familiar name, but responsibility for the physical fault is not visible.

Installed capacity and usable capacity are both unproven

Number resources can make a provider look larger than it is. IRRA's /23 contains 512 IPv4 addresses. That is meaningful for a local ISP, but it is not a capacity statement. Addresses can sit unused, be reserved for infrastructure, be assigned to business customers, be shared behind carrier-grade NAT, be used for management or be routed for another purpose. The count does not reveal bandwidth, customer count, installed ports or peak utilisation.

The same caution applies to AS150659. An ASN lets a network express an external routing policy. It does not prove a live customer base, a route map or multi-homing. RIPEstat's AS routing consistency result finds no current prefixes or routing-policy entries for the ASN at the cut-off. PeeringDB's query for AS150659 returns no network entity. Those absences are not proof that no private network exists, but they remove the public basis for claiming independent interconnection.

Capacity also has to be measured from customer to useful destination. TRAI's Quality of Service regulations focus attention on delivered speed, latency, packet loss, jitter, utilisation and related service measures. Those are the right categories for broadband performance. No public TRAI result identified IRRA's delivered speed or outage performance. No public speed-test dataset can be safely turned into an IRRA measure without address-level and subscriber proof.

This leaves only scenarios. If the /23 numbered active customers, the service might have had room for static IP accounts. If the /23 was routed by Netplus for a wholesale or transition arrangement, it might support a small base or no retail base at all. If the biller pages are stale, the addresses may be the only live technical trace. If the licence surrender followed a customer migration, the current service could be under another name. Every scenario is plausible enough to mention as a caveat and too unsupported to publish as a fact.

The economics follow the same pattern. A small Hyderabad ISP can make sense if customers are clustered, upstream is bought wholesale, installation costs are low and support is local. It struggles if customers are scattered, truck rolls are frequent, payment collection is weak and the operator has to maintain independent routing staff. Without subscriber counts, tariffs and serviceable addresses, there is no credible revenue case. The category "regional ISP economics" remains relevant only because it explains the questions, not because the answers are public.

The evidence grade therefore cannot move above Weak. IRRA has the administrative prerequisites of an access-provider story, but the public record stops before it reaches active installed capacity or usable capacity.

Six failure tests would expose the real service, if it exists

The first test is legal continuity. A current customer should be able to identify the authorised provider, licence or successor arrangement under which service is delivered. The DoT active list and surrendered list do not publicly settle a current IRRA authorisation after 24 September 2024. If a successor serves the customer, the bill, terms and complaint path should say so plainly.

The second test is local access. A fault on a customer drop, building switch, rooftop link or feeder cable should map to a responsible repair party. Evidence would include serviceable buildings, access technology, installation rules, support contacts and repair targets. IRRA's public footprint does not provide them. A payment page cannot answer whether the last mile is fibre, wireless, cable-partner plant or a managed service.

The third test is upstream continuity. The current public route for the /23's two /24s runs through Netplus. A credible active service would explain whether Netplus is the upstream transit provider, managed-router provider, acquirer, customer, origin-only partner or something else. It would also identify whether a second independent path exists. The route table alone cannot show that.

The fourth test is power. Any live aggregation point, radio site or customer handoff needs backup assumptions. Evidence would include UPS runtime, generator access, planned-maintenance notices, customer communications and outage records. The public IRRA record contains none. In Hyderabad's dense urban environment, power and building access can decide restoration time as surely as the upstream circuit.

The fifth test is congestion. If a surviving upstream or feeder is small, a partial outage can turn into high latency and low throughput rather than total loss. TRAI's quality categories show the right measurements, but no IRRA-specific public measurements exist. A current service would need busy-hour utilisation, delivered speed and packet-loss evidence before anyone could say the installed route is adequate.

The sixth test is administrative continuity. Old billers, old ASN records and old corporate pages can outlive active service. A resilient provider keeps identity surfaces aligned: licence, biller, support, routing, domain, terms and customer notices. IRRA's public surfaces are split. The licence trail is surrendered, the billing trail persists, the ASN is dormant, the address block is behind Netplus, and no first-party retail page explains the state.

These tests do not prove closure. They define the minimum evidence needed to lift the assessment. If IRRA is active through a valid successor arrangement, the missing materials should be publishable without exposing sensitive routes: current licence basis, current coverage area, current support path, role of Netplus, access technology, backup-power policy and customer complaint route.

They also define who is exposed when the facts are missing. A residential customer loses time and money when a biller still accepts payment but the repair path is unclear. A small business loses continuity when the public route remains visible but the access link into the building fails. A landlord or building manager loses leverage when no party publishes ownership of the cabinet, riser or rooftop device. Netplus could be blamed for a problem that sits below its handoff, while IRRA or a successor could be blamed for a route policy controlled elsewhere. The public evidence is too thin to allocate those responsibilities, which is exactly why the operating grade stays low.

The evidence-bound downgrade

The planned regional-ISP question is still useful, but only as a stress test. It asks whether a local connectivity bill depends on upstream routes and field repair. For IRRA, the answer is that public evidence can identify the upstream route dependency more clearly than the local field operation. The physical service itself remains unverified.

The strongest positive facts are administrative. IRRA is tied to a Hyderabad company identity by corporate mirrors and internet-number records. IRINN/APNIC records connect the name to AS150659 and the 103.77.238.0/23 address block. Payment pages keep the name visible as a broadband biller. Routing history shows that AS150659 did originate the two IRRA /24s in 2023 before the present Netplus-originated state.

The strongest negative facts are operational. The DoT surrendered/cancelled list records the Category C Hyderabad authorisation as surrendered or cancelled with effect from 24 September 2024. The company's own ASN is not announced at the cut-off. Its registered address block is currently originated by Netplus under valid ROAs for AS133661. No current first-party retail surface, subscriber count, active licence, access map, field-repair evidence, backup-power evidence, quality report or redundancy disclosure is public.

Those findings put IRRA below the threshold for a positive regional-ISP article. The article can say there was an authorisation and that number resources exist. It can say the current public route is via Netplus. It can say biller surfaces suggest a customer-facing history. It cannot say IRRA currently operates a resilient Hyderabad broadband network, owns last-mile plant, has live customers, maintains field crews, or controls redundant upstreams.

The final grade is Weak rather than Negative because the record is not empty. There is enough evidence to study the company as a former or uncertain local access operator with a real resource trail. Negative would be appropriate if every service signal were contradicted or fraudulent. Here, the correct caution is narrower: the public evidence fails the operating test.

The public treatment should therefore stay conservative. The regional-ISP framing remains a question under test, not proof of active regional coverage. If a future public record confirms that the surrendered licence ended the service entirely, the company should be discussed as a former or inactive ISP resource holder rather than as an active access provider. If the company or a successor supplies current licence, coverage, customer and route evidence, the profile can be updated around that new record. Until then, the local connectivity bill, if any bill is still being paid under this name, depends on an opaque access boundary, a visible Netplus route origin and repair facts that the public record does not show.