Intraserv Intraserv Kamil Schild
Intraserv Intraserv Kamil Schild is the holder name for AS211742, a dormant autonomous system in the RIPE NCC registry. The registration creates a latent attack surface: if compromised or reactivated, it could be used to announce prefixes and hijack internet traffic. However, no independent public evidence confirms the individual's identity, profession, or current authority beyond the static registry record, making the true risk difficult to assess.
Why It Matters
If the maintainer credentials for AS211742 are compromised or the registrant chooses to activate the AS, any announced prefixes could immediately disrupt routing paths or facilitate man-in-the-middle attacks. The absence of an operational footprint means that such a change could go undetected for hours or days, amplifying the incident's impact. The current dormancy limits immediate danger but increases the difficulty of rapid detection.
What Public Sources Show
Intraserv Intraserv Kamil Schild is the holder name for AS211742, a dormant autonomous system that announces no IP prefixes. Dormant ASNs are a latent threat. If someone obtains the registry credentials, they can reactivate the AS and inject bogus routes, potentially hijacking traffic or causing disruptions. The registration’s quiet existence conceals a risk that can materialize without warning.
The only public evidence for this subject comes from three RIPE NCC registry sources. A RIPEstat overview and an RDAP autnum record confirm that AS211742 is registered under the combined name Intraserv Intraserv Kamil Schild. A separate RIPEstat query shows that the AS originates zero prefixes, confirming its inactive state. No corporate website, PeeringDB profile, or other internet presence has been found for this entity.
Whoever controls the maintainer credentials for AS211742 can modify WHOIS and RDAP entries, create route entities, and issue RPKI Route Origin Authorizations. These actions directly affect how routers validate and accept prefixes from the AS. At rest, this authority is invisible, but it becomes consequential the moment any prefix is announced.
The registration gives the holder a key to the global routing table, and that key could be used legitimately or maliciously.
The true identity of Kamil Schild remains unverifiable. The holder name appears to combine a possible business, Intraserv, with a personal name, but no independent sources confirm the individual’s existence, employment, or current role. The registry record might be outdated, and the contact could be unreachable.
This gap between the registry’s formal authority and the person’s real-world obscurity creates a classic accountability vacuum: control exists, but the controller is a ghost.
Any change in AS211742’s status would demand attention. The appearance of new prefix announcements, alterations to the registrant name or contact details, or the registration of additional resources under the same holder are all indicators that the dormant registration is becoming active. Similarly, the discovery of a LinkedIn profile, a corporate filing, or a PeeringDB entry linking to Kamil Schild would help validate the identity and reduce uncertainty.
This profile is built solely on data from RIPE NCC’s public services. The three sources—RIPEstat AS overview, RIPEstat announced prefixes, and RDAP autnum—are the only verifiable records. In a landscape where registry data is often stale, these snapshots are the best available evidence. Until new information emerges, the risk rests in the gap between the ASN’s potential and the holder’s absence.
Operating Surface
The subject appears as the registrant of AS211742 in the RIPE NCC database. In this role, the person (or whoever possesses the maintainer credentials) can manage WHOIS/RDAP entries, submit route entities, and issue RPKI Route Origin Authorizations for the autonomous system. Currently, the AS announces no prefixes, so this authority is latent but could be exercised without network-operator scrutiny.
Dormant ASNs represent a persistent vulnerability in internet routing. They can be reactivated or hijacked by unauthorized parties to inject false routing information, potentially leading to traffic interception or denial of service. Monitoring AS211742 for any change—such as new BGP announcements, registry modifications, or associated infrastructure—provides early warning of such misuse and helps protect the global routing system.
Watchpoints
The presence of a dormant ASN registered to an unverifiable individual represents a classic internet governance gap. While the immediate risk is low, the potential for abuse is high because detection is difficult. Strategic response should include automated monitoring of registry changes and BGP announcements for AS211742, and any sudden activity should be treated as suspicious until proven otherwise.
Key watchpoints include: any change to the ASN's WHOIS/RDAP records, new BGP prefix announcements, registration of additional resources under the same name, and the appearance of corroborating public identity data for Kamil Schild. A legitimate network operator would likely have a PeeringDB entry or a corporate website; the absence of these is itself a warning sign.
Critical missing evidence includes a verified biography of Kamil Schild, business registration for Intraserv, historical BGP activity data, and any technical documentation of the AS's intended use. Without these, the registration remains a ghost resource whose true purpose cannot be assessed.
Sources
