Summary
- E-Base Database Warehouse has a real public registry anchor: ARIN lists organisation handle
EDW-1, the name E-Base Database Warehouse, an address in Meridian, Idaho, a February 23, 2000 registration date and a September 24, 2011 last-changed date. - The strongest technical record is not a warehouse product page. It is a small active IPv4 assignment,
63.227.134.32/29, namedUSW-EBASE, with the range63.227.134.32through63.227.134.39and an upstream ARIN parent block rather than proof of independent data-platform scale. - Public exact-name domain checks did not reveal a current E-Base product surface. The obvious E-Base Database Warehouse domain variants had no useful public DNS records during review, while shorter "e-base" domains pointed to unrelated or ambiguous web properties.
- The article therefore treats "database warehouse" as an operating question, not a proven product category. The important issues are whether records remain fresh, governed, queryable, permissioned, recoverable and economically maintainable under repeated use.
- No public evidence establishes E-Base customers, database engine, hosting stack, storage location, backup interval, recovery objective, security controls, support process, pricing, migration path, data-retention policy or workload performance. Those gaps are material, and they should stay visible.
The registry row is narrow, but it matters
The most reliable public fact about E-Base Database Warehouse is a registry fact. ARIN's exact-name entity search returns organisation handle EDW-1 for E-Base Database Warehouse, with an address at 1304 West Clarinda Drive in Meridian, Idaho, and a United States country record. The matching ARIN organisation record gives the same handle and address, lists the organisation as registered on February 23, 2000, and shows a last update on September 24, 2011. That is enough to anchor the company name in a real infrastructure-adjacent record. It is not enough to turn the name into a product claim.
That distinction is important because "E-Base Database Warehouse" is a loaded name. It sounds as if it might describe an electronic base, an enterprise database, a warehouse system, a hosted repository, a records service or an analytical data store. In technology procurement, each of those phrases carries expectations. A database should preserve transaction integrity and queryability. A warehouse should integrate records across sources and support repeated analysis. A hosting service should explain access, locality, recovery and cost.
A managed platform should expose a support path, security model, service boundary and migration story. The public E-Base evidence does not expose those details.
The directory profile adds a public BTW surface for the same organisation. It presents E-Base Database Warehouse as an organisation profile in the United States, identifies the legal type as private company, and displays a latest freshness date of June 30, 2026. It also frames the record as appearing in the ARIN member directory and shows public sections for current status and people/contact coverage. That helps readers find the entity, but it does not solve the product question. A directory profile can say that the record exists. It cannot, by itself, prove that a database warehouse is operating today.
The ARIN record also places a useful ceiling on what should be inferred from registry evidence. The organisation record has canAllocate set to N, which means the public record should not be read as evidence that E-Base is an allocator-scale network provider. ARIN exposes one related network assignment, but the assignment is a small block rather than a footprint from which a hosted data platform can be inferred. It is an operating trace, not a scale metric.
This is the right starting posture for a thin company record. The fact that a name is real matters. A buyer, partner or investigator should be able to separate the organisation from keyword noise, unrelated "e-base" domains and generic data-warehouse explainers. But the same reader should resist the next leap. A real registry row is not a live product page, a technical white paper, a customer reference, a service-level agreement, a security audit or a backup report. The row gives a name, location, registration history and associated network clue. The work of evaluating the system begins after that.
A small assignment is a clue, not a warehouse claim
The most concrete technical artifact in the public record is the active IPv4 assignment 63.227.134.32/29. ARIN's RDAP entity record for E-Base includes the network name USW-EBASE, start address 63.227.134.32, end address 63.227.134.39, type ASSIGNMENT, status active, and parent handle NET-63-224-0-0-1. ARIN's REST resources endpoint for the organisation also returns that net reference. A third-party IP listing for E-Base Database Warehouse maps the same range to Meridian, Idaho.
That is useful, but it has to be interpreted carefully. A /29 provides a very small address range. It can support a modest network function, legacy connectivity, a small hosted environment, a business site, a router handoff, a remote office, a local server or another narrow use. It does not, on its face, establish a data warehouse product, a cloud platform, a multi-tenant service, a storage cluster, a backup system or an analytics workload. The assignment name USW-EBASE also points toward a provider-side history, not necessarily a current self-operated E-Base infrastructure estate.
The related public point-of-contact evidence reinforces that caution. The ARIN RDAP entity record exposes Internet Operations U S WEST as a related contact group for administrative, abuse and technical roles. ARIN's POC remarks say that ARIN attempted to validate the contact but had not received a response since March 26, 2014. That does not prove that E-Base has no private contacts or no current operator. It does show that the public registry contact trail is old and provider-framed. For a system whose name implies records, hosting and access control, that age is not incidental.
In a healthy current service, contact and ownership are part of the technical control plane. Someone has to know who may request changes, who may authorize access, who owns the data inventory, who can perform recovery, who responds to abuse, and who can explain a retention decision. Public registry contacts are not the whole answer, but they are a visible signal. When that visible signal is stale or inherited from an old provider relationship, the burden shifts to current private documentation. A customer would need a named support route, escalation process and change-control owner before treating the system as dependable.
The network range also cannot answer the main database questions. It says nothing about the database engine, schema governance, index strategy, replication model, backup interval, restore testing, encryption configuration, logging, access review, data lineage, workload isolation or query performance. It does not reveal whether the stored records are transactional, analytical, archival or merely operational. It does not prove whether the system is on-premises, colocated, provider-hosted, cloud-migrated or dormant.
That does not make the network clue worthless. It makes it bounded. The assignment shows that the E-Base record has an infrastructure trace and that the trace can be checked against public registry and IP-location sources. In a thin case, that is better than a pure business-listing echo. But it should be used as a diligence hook, not as a verdict. The right question is not "does this address range prove a warehouse?" It is "what operating documentation would connect this old assignment to any current record-storage, hosting or database workload?"
The name creates expectations that the record does not satisfy
The term "database warehouse" compresses two different operating ideas. A database is usually the system of day-to-day record storage, updates and retrieval. A data warehouse is usually a repository assembled from multiple sources so that people can query historical records, reconcile business facts and run analysis without overwhelming the operational systems that created the records. Modern warehouse products often add managed storage, separated compute, SQL interfaces, identity controls, logging, snapshots, encryption and cost-management features. None of those features is proven for E-Base by the public company record.
This distinction matters because the name can mislead. "Database" suggests source-of-truth responsibility: each record should have a current value, an owner, a schema, a permission model and a way to resolve conflicts. "Warehouse" suggests integration responsibility: records from different systems should be cleaned, transformed, documented, refreshed and made queryable. A buyer or partner should not accept either responsibility as solved merely because the company name contains the words.
Public data-warehouse documentation from major vendors shows the scope of the category. AWS describes Amazon Redshift as a managed cloud data warehouse service whose managed tasks include provisioning capacity, monitoring and backing up clusters, and applying engine patches and upgrades. Its documentation also discusses point-in-time snapshots, restore paths, identity and access management, database users, network access controls and encryption. IBM describes a data warehouse as a central store that aggregates data from various sources and is optimized for querying and analysis.
NIST's glossary describes data integrity as the property that data has not been altered in an unauthorized way, covering data in storage, processing and transit.
Those references do not prove that E-Base offers any of those capabilities. They establish the standard of inquiry. If a company name points toward a database warehouse, the reader should ask about data integrity across storage, processing and transit; about ingestion and transformation; about access and query control; about backup and restore; about monitoring; about patching; about locality; and about cost. Public E-Base evidence does not answer those questions.
The exact-name public web surface is also thin. Obvious domain variants tied to the full company name did not return useful public DNS records during review. HTTPS attempts against those exact-name variants did not expose a public product site. Shorter domains such as ebase.com and e-base.com have their own DNS and web behaviour, but the public evidence did not connect them to E-Base Database Warehouse. Treating those domains as E-Base evidence would be a classic name-collision mistake.
The same problem appears in general web discovery. The phrase "E-Base" collides with unrelated biomedical, asset-management and generic data-warehouse material. The phrase "database warehouse" collides with category explainers and unrelated software. The public article therefore cannot responsibly borrow detail from the category and paste it onto this organisation. It can only say what the actual E-Base record supports: identity, address, registration dates, a small active IP assignment, and uncertainty around current product operation.
For readers, this makes the article less flashy but more useful. The public record does not invite a product review. It invites a control review: what would a real E-Base database or warehouse have to demonstrate before a buyer trusted it with records?
Freshness is the first operational test
The core automation task for a database or warehouse is not merely to store data. It is to keep records fresh enough, governed enough and retrievable enough that repeated use does not slowly corrupt the business process. Freshness is the first test because stale data can look orderly. A table can have clean columns, valid keys and a successful query plan while the facts inside it no longer match the world.
For E-Base, the public registry timeline itself makes freshness a central question. The organisation registration dates to 2000. The organisation record's last changed date is 2011. The public provider contact record includes an unvalidated-contact remark dating to 2014. None of that proves that the business is inactive. Old registry records can remain accurate, and private support routes can exist outside ARIN. But for a database-warehouse name, the age of the visible trail should shape the diligence. The reader needs to ask how current the actual operating records are.
Freshness has several layers. There is identity freshness: is the organisation name still the name under which the service operates? There is ownership freshness: who controls the record, the network assignment, the database and the customer relationship today? There is data freshness: how often are records refreshed, corrected, expired or deleted? There is schema freshness: does the model still represent the business questions users ask? There is security freshness: are users, credentials, certificates, firewall rules and provider contacts still reviewed? Public evidence establishes none of those answers for E-Base.
In a database warehouse, stale ownership is particularly dangerous because it can hide behind successful storage. If no one owns a table, it may still load every night. If no one owns a field definition, analysts may still use it in reports. If no one owns retention, old records may remain because deleting them feels riskier than leaving them alone. If no one owns the backup procedure, snapshots may exist without anyone knowing whether they can be restored. The system looks alive because it keeps accepting records, but the governance has become archival drift.
The public E-Base evidence does not show a fresh product page, a current documentation set, a support portal or a public change log. That absence should not be overread as proof of failure. It should be treated as a missing artifact. A serious customer review would request current operating documents: responsible owner, service boundary, support contacts, data inventory, source-system list, refresh cadence, retention policy, access-review procedure, backup procedure and last restore-test evidence. Without those documents, "database warehouse" remains a name rather than an operational claim.
Freshness is also economic. Stale records create labour. Someone has to reconcile duplicates, correct bad imports, retire fields, clean source-system drift, audit access, answer user questions and rebuild broken reports. A warehouse that does not automate that work may still function, but its real cost shifts from software to staff time. For a thin public company record, the labour question is more realistic than a speculative architecture claim. The buyer should ask: does the system reduce record-maintenance labour, or does it merely move the labour to hidden exception handling?
Governance begins with who can touch the record
Access control is the second core question. A database warehouse is valuable because many people and systems can use the same records. That value is also the risk. The more central the repository becomes, the more important it is to know who can read, write, export, delete and administer each class of data.
Public E-Base evidence does not disclose an access model. There is no visible role list, identity-provider integration, audit-log description, administrative guide, encryption statement, customer tenant model or data-processing agreement. That means no public article should claim that E-Base implements modern access controls. The responsible claim is more limited: any system operating under the E-Base Database Warehouse name would have to prove those controls before the name had technical weight.
A useful governance review would begin with data classification. What types of records are stored? Are they customer records, business records, inventory records, billing records, event logs, marketing records, operational telemetry, document metadata or analytical aggregates? Are any of them personal data, regulated data, confidential business data or third-party licensed data? Without classification, access control becomes a flat permission problem: people are either in or out. That is rarely enough for a warehouse.
The next layer is permission design. A warehouse should distinguish administrators, data engineers, analysts, application users, service accounts, auditors and external partners. It should separate read access from write access, export access from query access, production access from development access, and schema-change authority from report-building authority. It should provide a path for temporary access, emergency access and access removal. It should also log material events so that a later review can tell who touched what and when.
The network record cannot answer any of that. A /29 can tell a reviewer where to start asking infrastructure questions, but it does not reveal whether database access is local, remote, VPN-mediated, cloud-based, web-based or no longer active. It does not reveal whether the public IPs host anything, whether private addresses carry the actual workload, or whether the assignment is simply a legacy artifact. That is why a technical review must not confuse IP ownership with data governance.
Access control also intersects with locality. The directory and ARIN records point to the United States, specifically Idaho for the organisation address. The IP listing maps the associated range to Meridian. That supports a U.S. registry and geography claim, but not a storage-location claim. A database warehouse could store data in another state, another provider region, another cloud, a colocation facility, a customer's own environment or an offline archive. Public evidence does not locate E-Base data at the Meridian address.
For data-sovereignty analysis, that uncertainty is decisive. A customer cannot satisfy locality obligations by pointing to a company address if the actual data location, processor chain and backup location are unknown. The questions should be concrete: where is production data stored, where are backups stored, where are logs stored, where do administrators operate from, which subcontractors can access the data, and how are cross-border transfers handled? The public E-Base record does not answer those questions, so the article should not pretend it does.
Queryability is not the same as storage
The third core question is queryability. Storage is the easier promise. Many systems can keep files, rows, logs or snapshots somewhere. A warehouse earns its name when stored records can be found, joined, filtered, explained and reused without turning each request into a manual archaeology project.
For E-Base, there is no public schema, API, query interface, sample report, metadata catalogue, ingestion guide or user documentation. That prevents any direct assessment of queryability. A review cannot say whether the system supports SQL, search, dashboards, exports, operational lookups, scheduled reports, ad hoc analysis or batch retrieval. It cannot say whether the data model is normalized, dimensional, document-oriented, flat-file based or something else. It cannot say whether the warehouse separates operational and analytical workloads.
The absence of public query evidence matters because a warehouse name can hide two very different realities. In one reality, the system is a governed analytical store: source systems feed controlled pipelines, transformations are documented, users query curated models, and results can be traced back to references. In the other reality, the system is a pile of historical exports: useful to the person who built it, opaque to everyone else, expensive to refresh and risky to rely on. Public E-Base evidence does not tell readers which reality, if either, exists.
Queryability depends on metadata. Users need to know what a field means, where it came from, when it was updated, whether it is complete, whether it is trusted, and what restrictions apply. A table named customer or account is not self-explanatory. A date field may mean creation date, update date, billing date, event date, file date or ingestion date. A status field may be current, historical, inferred or manually overridden. If metadata is weak, queries become socially transmitted knowledge rather than repeatable operations.
Data lineage is the companion control. A warehouse should be able to answer where a record came from, how it changed, which job loaded it, which rules transformed it, which users or systems consumed it, and which downstream report depended on it. Lineage is not a luxury in record-heavy systems. It is how a team investigates a bad report, reverses a bad import, answers an audit question, handles deletion or correction requests, and prevents one source-system change from poisoning every downstream view.
Public E-Base evidence cannot prove lineage. It can only make the lineage question more important. The company name invites a reader to imagine central record control. The actual public record shows an old infrastructure identity with thin current documentation. In that setting, a buyer should ask to see a lineage example before accepting a warehouse claim. Show one record entering the system. Show its source, transformation, permission, retention and export history. Show what happens when the source changes. Show how users know which field to trust.
Without that demonstration, queryability remains unverified. The risk is not merely that queries may be slow or inconvenient. The larger risk is that queries may be confidently wrong because the warehouse cannot explain itself.
Backup and recovery are the hidden promise
The fourth core question is recoverability. A database warehouse is only valuable if its records can survive ordinary failure: mistaken deletion, bad import, schema change, hardware issue, provider outage, credential compromise, ransomware, operator error, abandoned software dependency or lost institutional knowledge. Public E-Base evidence offers no backup or recovery details, so this article cannot claim any recovery posture. It can only define the evidence a real review would require.
Modern managed-warehouse documentation shows why recovery is central. AWS Redshift documentation, for example, describes snapshots as point-in-time backups and explains that a restore creates a new cluster and imports data from the selected snapshot. That is a vendor-specific implementation, not an E-Base fact. The broader point is general: a warehouse needs a tested recovery path, not merely a copy of data somewhere.
A credible recovery story begins with scope. Which records are backed up? Which databases, file stores, metadata stores, credentials, logs, configuration files and transformation scripts are included? Are derived tables backed up, or can they be rebuilt from source? Are backups immutable, encrypted and separated from the production admin path? Are they in the same location as the production system or in a separate region or facility? Are old backups retained according to policy, or do they persist because no one has cleaned them?
Then comes timing. What is the recovery point objective? What is the recovery time objective? How often are backups taken? How often are restore tests performed? How long does a full restore take? What happens when the most recent backup contains a corrupted import? Can the team restore to a point before the corruption? Can it replay clean changes after that point? Public E-Base evidence answers none of those questions.
Recovery is not only technical. It is organisational. Someone must know who can authorize a restore, who communicates with users, who validates the restored data, who decides whether a bad record is deleted or corrected, and who signs off before the system returns to use. If the public contact trail is old, the recovery ownership question becomes sharper. A system can have backups and still fail recovery because the people who know the procedure are gone.
The same logic applies to retention. A warehouse often contains historical records precisely because history is useful. But long retention increases liability, storage cost and governance burden. The system should explain why records are retained, who approved the retention period, when records expire, how legal holds work, how deletion requests are handled, and how backups reflect deletion or retention obligations. The public E-Base record contains no retention policy.
In thin-evidence cases, it is tempting to avoid backup and recovery because they are invisible. That is a mistake. Backup and recovery are the hidden promise of record infrastructure. If a database or warehouse cannot recover cleanly, its normal operation is less meaningful. A buyer should therefore treat recovery evidence as a threshold question, especially when the public record is old and sparse.
Hosting economics decide whether the system survives
The commercial question for E-Base is not whether a database warehouse is useful in the abstract. It is whether the storage, compute, migration, lock-in and data-quality labour beat the buyer's current stack. Public evidence does not expose E-Base pricing, contracts, workloads, support tiers or migration services. Therefore no public cost verdict is possible. The economics can only be framed as a decision model.
A warehouse cost has visible and hidden layers. Visible costs include storage, compute, support, bandwidth, licensing, managed services, backups and professional services. Hidden costs include data cleaning, schema repair, pipeline maintenance, user training, access reviews, incident response, report correction, vendor coordination, migration planning and exit work. Thin public evidence increases the importance of hidden costs because the missing documentation itself becomes labour for the customer to resolve.
If E-Base operated a current hosted record system, the buyer would need to know how costs scale. Are charges based on storage volume, query volume, compute time, seats, data sources, support hours, exports, retention period or custom work? Are backups included? Are restore exercises included? Is migration out included? Are support requests billed separately? Are schema changes treated as engineering work? Is there a minimum term? What happens to data at termination? Public evidence gives no answers.
Lock-in is not always bad. A managed service can be worth lock-in if it reduces operating risk, provides better support, improves recovery and makes records more useful. But lock-in without transparency is dangerous. A database warehouse can trap a customer through proprietary schemas, undocumented transformations, brittle exports, missing lineage, custom report logic, opaque backup formats or support knowledge that lives only with one vendor. The customer may be able to retrieve files but not reconstruct meaning.
Migration is the practical test. A buyer should ask how E-Base data would be exported, in which formats, with which metadata, under which time frame, at what cost and with which validation steps. Can permissions, lineage, retention flags and audit logs be exported? Can historical snapshots be exported? Can the buyer verify completeness? Can another system reproduce key reports? If the answer is informal or manual, the commercial risk is higher.
Data-quality labour is the largest unknown. The main benefit of a well-run warehouse is not only faster queries; it is reduced confusion. If a customer spends less time reconciling mismatched records, chasing stale reports, recovering from bad imports and arguing over definitions, the system may pay for itself even without dramatic performance claims. Conversely, if the warehouse adds another layer that must be reconciled against every source system, it may increase total cost.
Public E-Base evidence does not allow a calculation. There are no customer examples, workload sizes, case studies, price sheets or service descriptions. That absence should shape procurement language. Do not ask "is E-Base cheap?" Ask "which labour does E-Base remove, which labour does it create, and how can those claims be tested before committing records?"
The strongest conclusion is uncertainty with a checklist
E-Base Database Warehouse is not a blank. It has an ARIN organisation handle, a United States address, a dated registration trail and a related active IPv4 assignment. Those facts make it more substantial than an SEO phrase. But the public record is not rich enough to treat E-Base as a current, tested database warehouse provider. The responsible conclusion is uncertainty with a checklist.
The checklist begins with identity. Is EDW-1 still the current public infrastructure identity for the company? Who owns the organisation record, the associated network assignment and any current service? Is the Meridian address still relevant to operations, or only to the historical registry record? Are the U S WEST contact references still meaningful, replaced by private channels, or purely legacy?
The second group concerns service boundary. What, exactly, is the system? Is it a database, data warehouse, hosting environment, records repository, archival service, internal business system, legacy customer environment or inactive registry artifact? Which users or customers does it serve? Which records does it store? Which functions are live today? Which functions are retired?
The third group concerns governance. How are records classified? Who can read, write, export and delete each class? How are permissions reviewed? How are service accounts controlled? How are administrative actions logged? How are abuse and security incidents handled? How does the system prevent old users, old vendors or old scripts from retaining access after their role changes?
The fourth group concerns data quality. How are records ingested? How are duplicates resolved? How are source conflicts handled? How are field definitions documented? How are stale records expired? How are transformations tested? How can a user trace a report number back to the references and rules that produced it?
The fifth group concerns recovery. What is backed up? How often? Where? Under whose control? When was the last restore test? What is the recovery point objective? What is the recovery time objective? How does the system handle corrupted imports, ransomware, accidental deletion and abandoned dependencies? How does retention apply to backups?
The sixth group concerns economics. How are storage, compute, support, migration, backup, restore and data-quality work priced? What is included in normal support? What happens at termination? How can the customer export data with meaning intact? What proof shows that the system reduces total operating labour rather than shifting it?
These questions are not hostile. They are what the name requires. A database warehouse is a trust position. If E-Base is active and useful, these questions should be answerable with operating evidence. If the record is historical, the same questions explain why readers should not infer a modern platform from an old name and a small IP assignment.
What can be said now
The public evidence supports a cautious, bounded profile. E-Base Database Warehouse is a United States organisation record in ARIN, associated with Meridian, Idaho. It has an old but real registry identity, handle EDW-1, and a small active IPv4 assignment named USW-EBASE. BTW's directory page exposes the entity as an organisation profile and routes it into a technology-company context. A third-party IP listing echoes the same Meridian range. These are the public facts that can carry weight.
The public evidence does not support a product score. There is no public product walkthrough, no live test account, no API documentation, no customer portal, no privacy or security statement tied to the entity, no backup report, no status page, no pricing page, no customer case study, no architecture diagram and no proof of current workload. Direct product testing was not possible from the public surface because no public testable product surface was identified.
The technical reading should therefore be about operating burden. A name like E-Base Database Warehouse points to the hard work of keeping records useful under repeated use. That work includes freshness, access control, locality, lineage, queryability, backup, restore, retention and cost discipline. The public registry record cannot establish those controls. It can only show why they matter.
That makes the due-diligence posture practical rather than speculative. A reader does not need to decide whether E-Base is secretly a modern warehouse, a retired local system or a quiet private service. The better step is to ask for artifacts that would make any of those states legible: current ownership, current service boundary, current data map, current support path, current access review, current backup evidence and current export plan. If those artifacts exist, they can turn the old registry trail into a starting point for a real assessment. If they do not exist, the risk is not the age of the ARIN row by itself.
The risk is that records may depend on memory, legacy configuration or informal operator knowledge that cannot be reliably transferred, audited or recovered.
For a reader comparing vendors, the key lesson is restraint. Do not dismiss the company record simply because the public evidence is thin; thin public evidence can coexist with private, niche or legacy operations. But do not credit the record with modern warehouse capabilities without proof. The gap between a registry row and a dependable record platform is the gap where most data risk lives.
For E-Base specifically, the most fair public verdict is this: the identity is anchored, the infrastructure clue is small and old, the current product surface is not visible, and any serious assessment must move from the name to the controls. The questions are clear even when the answers are not. Does the system keep data fresh? Does it govern who can touch records? Does it make records queryable with lineage? Can it recover cleanly? Does its hosting economics reduce total labour?
Until current evidence answers those questions, E-Base Database Warehouse remains a registry-backed company name with unresolved record-control risk rather than a proven database warehouse platform.