Core Entity Brief
| Entity | Kenneth B. Mc Cleaft |
|---|---|
| Public role | Kenneth B. Mc Cleaft is tracked because his registry-granted authority over AS212010 could directly affect IP prefix routing and RPKI validation if the ASN becomes active. Currently, the ASN is inactive and his profile is limited to a lone RDAP record, but any activation or record change would make this subject materially relevant to routing security. |
| Region | Global |
| Category | Individual registry-holder label |
| Primary domain | Infrastructure |
| Signal focus | Institution Type |
| Time horizon | QUARTER_30_120D |
| Impact | Medium |
| Confidence | 0.95 |
| Evidence coverage | 1 public source reference |
| Related coverage | Profile anchor article |
| Website | Public evidence pending |
| Last update | Jun 03, 2026 |
The entity associated with Kenneth B. Mc Cleaft in public registry records is an individual contact point for AS212010, not a commercial company; its operating role is limited to registry administration of the autonomous system.
What It Does
- Registry stewardship: The ‘business model’ is non-commercial: the entity exists as a designated maintainer of the AS212010 registry object. It does not sell services, earn revenue, or support customers. The value it provides is purely administrative, ensuring the ASN record remains accurate and compliant with RIPE NCC policy.
- No commercial operation: No supplied evidence indicates any commercial transactions, service offerings, or customer relationships. The entity is not registered as a company, has no known website or product portfolio, and does not appear in any marketplace.
Operating Snapshot
- Registry footprint: The only verifiable operating footprint is the RDAP entry for AS212010, which lists Mr. Mc Cleaft as admin and tech contact with handle KBMC1-RIPE. The ASN is allocated but has no observed BGP announcements, PeeringDB presence, or internet service infrastructure.
- Contact capability: In principle, the entity acts as the communication endpoint for registry-related queries about AS212010. However, there is no public evidence of any such interactions occurring, nor of the entity proactively managing network operations.
Control Surface
- Registry object management: The entity controls the RIPE database aut-num object for AS212010 and any linked maintainer, allowing it to update contact details, change authorization credentials, and create or modify route objects. This control is analogous to ownership of the ASN’s public registration identity.
- Indirect routing influence: By creating or withdrawing route objects, the entity can influence how BGP speakers treat prefixes originated by AS212010 (e.g., for RPKI validation). Since no active routing is observed, this influence is currently theoretical.
Watchpoints
- Registry mutability: Because the entity’s entire operating surface is the registry record, any alteration—especially to contact or maintainer fields—is a significant event that could indicate a change in control, ownership, or operational intent.
- ASN activation: If AS212010 begins announcing prefixes, the entity’s control surface becomes operationally critical, and its timely management of RPKI ROAs and route objects will directly affect routing security. This warrants technical monitoring.
- Organizational affiliation: Discovery of a parent organization or employer would shift the entity’s profile from a standalone registry contact to a representative of a larger entity, introducing commercial and jurisdictional dimensions.