Summary

  • The RIR Governance Document turns ICP-2, ICANN’s 2001 checklist for recognising new regional internet registries, into a rulebook over existing ones: audits, a temporary operator for renewable 90-day periods, and derecognition decided finally by ICANN.
  • Between drafts, the thresholds fell from unanimity to ICANN plus two-thirds of the other registries.
  • The registries’ members got a questionnaire and consultations that AFRINIC’s own page called “non-binding”, but no vote.

What is the RIR Governance Document?

It is the rewrite of ICP-2, which the ICANN Board accepted on 4 June 2001 “as a statement of essential requirements for the recognition of new Regional Internet Registries (RIRs)”. ICP-2’s criteria apply to “an organisation which is proposing to establish a new RIR”. It says nothing about derecognition, emergency operators or audits of existing registries. What it did demand was support from below: consensus that “a very substantial majority of the ISPs in the region are prepared to support the new RIR.”

The NRO’s FAQ, last modified on 1 September 2026, now claims the criteria were “implicitly considered to be the standard that all RIRs must adhere to”. The 2001 text speaks of new registries only.

On 25 October 2023, according to ICANN, the NRO Executive Council, the heads of the five registries, “asked the ASO AC to establish and manage a process to propose updates” to ICP-2. Version 3 was published on 1 September 2026. Lu Heng, the internet entrepreneur behind Cloud Innovation, still calls it the ICP-2 revision.

What powers does the latest draft give, and to whom?

Version 3 lets ICANN and the other registries audit a registry, put a temporary operator into it, strip its recognition and hand its services to a successor.

  • §5.1: “a Temporary Emergency Operator may be authorized to temporarily provide all or part of the affected RIR Services”.
  • §5.1(b): it “may also be initiated or renewed with the agreement of ICANN and 2/3 of the other RIRs, following discussion with the affected RIR and its community (where reasonably possible under the circumstances)”. Discussion, not consent.
  • §5.1(c): it “may not exceed 90 days, unless renewed”. Section 5.1 sets no limit on the number of renewals.
  • §4.1(m): every RIR must regularly share its “records, data, Regional Policy implementation procedures, and systems with a Temporary Emergency Operator”.
  • §4.2: an Audit at least once every five years, and, with no request from anyone, “ICANN may, upon notice to all RIRs, initiate a Compliance Review over an RIR”.
  • §6.7: “ICANN shall consider and make the final decision” on derecognition. Under §6.7(c) it needs “at least 2/3s of the RIRs, excluding the subject RIR.”
  • §6.8(b): the successor, ICANN and the other RIRs may do whatever is “reasonably necessary to transition the Derecognized RIR’s RIR Services”.
  • §7.3: where the document conflicts with an RIR’s practices, “this Document shall take precedence”. Under §7.1, amending it takes “the unanimous agreement of ICANN and the RIRs, after consulting their respective communities.” Unanimity for the institutions; consultation for the members.

What changed between the drafts?

The thresholds went down. Version 1, of 14 April 2025, rejected derecognition unless the other RIRs “unanimously recommend Derecognizing the RIR”. Version 2, of 28 August 2025, said in §5.1(a) that an emergency arrangement “may only be initiated with the unanimous agreement of all the other RIRs and ICANN”.

Version 3 drops both. The NRO NC’s rationale says the threshold for an emergency arrangement “has been lowered from unanimity to ICANN and two-thirds of the RIRs”. Derecognition now needs two-thirds of the registries, excluding the one concerned, and ICANN’s final decision. Under unanimity, a single registry could say no. Under two-thirds, one dissenting registry stops nothing.

The NRO NC’s notice of 1 September 2026 says the process “emphasizes rehabilitation as the preferred path”. That is its description. The thresholds are the text.

Who wrote it?

The ASO Address Council, which also serves as the NRO Number Council, drafted it. ICANN describes it as “an elected body of up to 15 members, comprising three representatives from each of the five RIR communities.” At ICANN 86, on 11 June 2026, one of its members said: “currently, we are 13 people because, in the case of AFRINIC, we have only one representative.” The region whose crisis, as Lu Heng has written, revived ICP-2 had one of its three seats filled while the rules for failing registries were drafted.

The NRO Executive Council has held it since 28 July 2026 and, by ARIN’s slides of 22 October 2026, “has provided the document to ICANN for consideration”.

What the audits would cost has not been formally discussed with the members. At ICANN 85, on 10 March 2026, an ASO speaker told the joint session with the ICANN Board that audits “are all extra costs”. Asked whether the membership communities had discussed that, the answer was: “There hasn’t been a formal discussion about this.”

Were the registries’ members asked, and do they get a vote?

They were asked for comments, not for a decision: no published document gives any registry’s members a vote. The NRO’s process page: “The NRO EC and ICANN will determine the procedures for approval and adoption”. ARIN’s slides list “Adoption of the document by RIR and ICANN Boards”. AFRINIC called its consultation “non-binding”.

The questionnaire on the principles, from 8 October to 6 December 2024, received “298 individual submissions”; by the NRO NC’s own report, “approximately half of these were found to be duplicate comments”. ICANN’s three Public Comment rounds drew 14, 17 and 17. Under §2.7, nothing in the draft “either prevents or obliges” the RIRs or ICANN to consult their communities on a derecognition.

Members can only knock on the door. A compliance review needs “at least 15% of the RIR’s total Members or 1,000 Members, whichever is lesser”; a derecognition proposal, 25% or 2,000. Members have no vote on an emergency operator, on derecognition or on amendments, and §6.8 deals with a derecognised registry’s “RIR Services and operations”, not with its members. BTW Media asks the same question of what AFRINIC’s Cape Town meeting decided, and who decided it.

What does Lu Heng say about it?

Lu Heng says power over a registry belongs to its members. He accepts a failure standard: in Note 17, of 17 September 2025, he wrote, “Establishing a failure standard is necessary.” Then he drew the line: “What is not acceptable is using that process to further centralize power. Any mechanism to de-accredit or re-accredit an RIR must be driven exclusively by its members, not by the NRO or ICANN.”

In Note 25, of 29 December 2025, he named what the draft does: “It converts coordination into permission. And permission into power.” And why that cannot hold: “Consent is the system.”

In Note 62, of 2 April 2026: “The current draft RIR Governance Document sets out rules for recognition, operation, audit, handoff, and derecognition of Regional Internet Registries.” And: “That is not the language of a clerical address book.”

What happens next, and what should members ask?

No date is public. The NRO Executive Council’s promise of 28 July 2026, “An updated timeline will be published soon”, was still unmet on 19 November 2026. At ICANN 86 an ASO speaker said the NRO and ICANN would “begin their approval and adoption process, including a final call for comments.”

If adoption runs through the registries’ boards, as ARIN’s slides say, AFRINIC’s would come from a Board whose own appointment is still before the Supreme Court of Mauritius (SC/COM/MOT/000757/2025), in a registry still in receivership: see what the Court asked of AFRINIC’s Receiver and what he did. Cloud Innovation’s position, on its page on AFRINIC governance, is that AFRINIC belongs to its members.

Members should ask:

  • Who chose the people who would decide that a registry has failed?
  • Why did the thresholds go down while members still have no vote?
  • What happens to a registry’s members when its services are handed to someone else?
  • Why is a document that would bind every registry’s members left to the NRO, ICANN and boards to adopt, and not to those members?

The registries exist because their members recognise them, and power over a registry belongs to its members. Lu Heng’s full case is in Note 25, on the ICP-2 revision draft and its structural risk.

Sources

Also cited: ICP-2 and ICANN Board resolution 01.67 (4 June 2001); the NRO’s ICP-2 pages, process page and FAQ; the RIR Governance Document, versions 1, 2 and 3 (Version 3.4), and the NRO NC’s rationale; the NRO EC’s notice of 28 July 2026 and the NRO NC’s of 1 September 2026; ICANN’s Public Comment pages; the NRO NC’s questionnaire report; the ICANN 85 and ICANN 86 transcripts; ARIN’s slides for ARIN 58; AFRINIC’s consultation page.