RIR Governance Document v3: who decides recognition and removal

Summary

The NRO Number Council (ASO Address Council) published its recommended draft "Governance Document for the Recognition, Operation, and Derecognition of Regional Internet Registries" as Version 3 (final draft 3.4) on 1 September 2026; it is explicitly a recommended draft pending approval, not an adopted instrument [1][2][10].
The document's preamble states that it succeeds ICP-2, adopted by ICANN on 4 June 2001 [1][15][16].
Recognition now requires ICANN to have received a Proposal supported by Recognition Assessments of at least two-thirds of the RIRs, with a possible exclusion for materially impacted RIRs (Article 3.7) [1][4].
Derecognition follows the same arithmetic but excludes the subject RIR by design: ICANN may not act without a Proposal supported by two-thirds of the other RIRs (Article 6.7(c)); initiation channels include any RIR, a quarter of the subject RIR's members (or 2,000, whichever is lesser), or ICANN itself (Article 6.3(a)) [1][2][4].
Amendment remains unanimous between ICANN and the RIRs (Article 7.1) — but Article 7.2, new in Version 3, freezes amendment during a Temporary Emergency Continuity Arrangement or while a derecognition proposal is pending [1][2][4].
The stated rationale for the two-thirds shift is on the record: "There was agreement that the process should require a two-thirds majority rather than unanimity or unanimity minus one" [3][4].

From a 2001 criteria memo to a governance constitution

The instrument now circulating as Version 3 has a single-line ancestor. On 4 June 2001 the ICANN Board adopted Internet Coordination Policy-2 (ICP-2), a short document setting criteria for the establishment of new Regional Internet Registries [15][16]. ICANN's separate 2012 "new RIRs criteria" page later consolidated the recognition pathway for any candidate registry [14]. For twenty-five years, that framework governed how the five RIRs — AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC and RIPE NCC — were recognised and, in principle, could be un-recognised.

The review that produced the successor document ran through formal channels: an ICANN public comment proceeding on the second draft of the RIR Governance Document opened 28 August 2025 and closed 7 November 2025 [17]; the ASO Address Council delivered its recommended draft to ICANN's Board and, in parallel, to the NRO Executive Council [10][11][12][13]; and a process-and-timeline page on the NRO site tracked each stage [5].

The NRO's Version 3 page, dated 1 September 2026 and marked "FINAL DRAFT", carries the full text of the recommended draft together with a redline against Version 2 and a changes-and-rationale document [1][2][3][4]. ARIN circulated the release to its community on 1 September 2026, as did AFRINIC through its announce list [20][21]. BTW's own earlier coverage tracked the release of the governance document itself [22]; this article's contribution is provision-level: what Version 3 actually says about who may decide, by what majority, and under what constraints.

One status boundary must be stated plainly. The HTML text is provided to facilitate community consultation, and the page itself states that "the PDF version is the authoritative document and should be used in the event of any discrepancies" [1]. Nothing in the record indicates that ICANN and the RIRs have yet adopted Version 3. Until they do, it is a recommendation — albeit one carrying the authority of the ASO Address Council's formal review.

Recognition: Article 3.7 and the two-thirds gate

Sections 3.1 and 3.2 set the mechanics: a Candidate RIR must meet the recognition criteria — including Regional Qualification — to the satisfaction of the existing RIRs and ICANN, and must submit a written Proposal for Recognition to both [1]. The decisive constraint is Article 3.7 (ICANN Limitations): ICANN has no power to recognise a candidate unless it has received a Proposal supported by Recognition Assessments of at least two-thirds of the RIRs, with a possible exclusion for RIRs whose Service Region or revenue would be materially impacted — an exclusion subject to notice, reasoning and a right to respond [1][2].

That arithmetic is new. Under Version 2, the corresponding provision (Article 2.3(c)(iii)) required unanimity, or unanimity minus one, of the RIRs [3][4]. The rationale document records the drafting decision directly: "There was agreement that the process should require a two-thirds majority rather than unanimity or unanimity minus one" [4]. The effect is to make recognition structurally easier against a holdout RIR, while the exclusion carve-out prevents the most directly affected RIR from being both gatekeeper and victim — but only after it has been heard.

For any future applicant — a sixth registry in an underserved region being the obvious hypothetical — the practical consequence is that two-thirds of incumbent registries, not all of them, must sign on before ICANN can act at all. ICANN's role is defined negatively: it cannot recognise on its own initiative.

Derecognition: Article 6 and the excluded subject

Version 3's derecognition machinery is the document's most consequential addition, and the rationale document lists it among the key changes: "a more detailed Derecognition process with a two-thirds RIR support threshold excluding the subject RIR" [4].

The grounds are set in Article 6.1: an RIR may be derecognised if it no longer materially meets the ongoing commitments of Section 4.1 and remains materially non-compliant after a reasonable opportunity to remedy. Article 6.2 builds in a presumption of rehabilitation — ICANN works with the RIRs on a Rehabilitation Plan before any final decision [1]. Initiation is plural-channel under Article 6.3(a): any RIR may propose; so may a group of at least 25% of the subject RIR's Members or 2,000 Members, whichever is lesser; so may ICANN itself [1][2].

The decision rule sits in Article 6.7(c), verbatim in the authoritative PDF: "ICANN shall have no power to Derecognize an RIR unless it has first received a Proposal to do so that is supported by the Derecognition Assessments of at least 2/3s of the RIRs, excluding the subject RIR" [2]. With five RIRs, that means four, minus the subject, of the remaining four — in practice, all of the others must support the proposal, since a two-thirds threshold of four peers requires roughly three of them and the arithmetic is deliberately tight.

What derecognition actually does is spelled out in Article 6.8: the derecognised RIR must transfer RIR services and operations under a Transition Plan to a successor or interim entity, such as a Temporary Emergency Operator; it "shall no longer be a member of the NRO, and … shall have no decision-making authority under this Document" (Article 6.8(c)) [2]. Article 6.9 obliges the RIRs and ICANN collectively to be able and ready to facilitate that transfer [1]. The reader should note the sequencing: the section 4 audit cycle (no less than once every five years) supplies the compliance evidence on which any proposal would rest [1].

The structural read is this: derecognition is now a peer-voting process with ICANN as executor, not initiator-by-default. A subject RIR cannot block its own removal, but its peers must each go on record — and a Rehabilitation Plan stands between non-compliance and the vote.

Amendment: unanimity, then a freeze

Article 7.1 is unchanged in its arithmetic: "This Document may be amended by the unanimous agreement of ICANN and the RIRs, after consulting their respective communities" [2]. But Version 3 adds Article 7.2 (Conditions), which the rationale document marks as new: the document "may not be amended during a period in which" a Temporary Emergency Continuity Arrangement is in force or a Proposal for Derecognition is pending. The stated rationale is to "prevent hasty changes or watering down requirements at difficult moments" [3][4].

The combination is a deliberate asymmetry. Routine amendment stays unanimous — the hardest possible threshold, preserving each RIR's veto over the constitution that governs it. But during exactly the periods in which that veto would be most valuable to a struggling RIR — an emergency continuity arrangement, or a live attempt to remove it — the veto is suspended. The document's drafters have, in effect, ring-fenced the removal procedure from the constitutional-amendment procedure.

Two neighbouring provisions complete the picture. Article 7.3 (Rectification) gives the document precedence over conflicting RIR practices, with a three-year grace period for new obligations not already contained or implicit in ICP-2 [1]. Article 7.4 requires the NRO and ICANN to assess at least every five years whether the document needs review [1].

Emergency continuity and the audit clock

Two other Version 3 changes bear on the removal pathway. The threshold to initiate a Temporary Emergency Continuity Arrangement (Section 5.1(b)) was lowered from unanimity to ICANN plus two-thirds of the RIRs, while Section 5.1(c) retains the 90-day time limit [3][4]. And the audit framework now runs on a fixed clock: each RIR must undergo an audit of its Section 4.1 compliance no less frequently than once every five years [1]. Those audits are, in practice, the evidentiary pipeline from which any future derecognition proposal would draw its case.

The timeline itself is documented stage by stage: public comment from 28 August to 7 November 2025 [17]; drafting workshops in Montevideo, at ICANN 85 in Mumbai in March 2026, and finally in Seville at ICANN 86 in June 2026 [4]; handover of the third draft to the NRO Executive Council in July 2026 [4]; publication of the recommended Version 3 on 1 September 2026 [1]. The ASO AC's June 2025 advice to the ICANN Board, submitted at ICANN 83, is also on the public record [18].

What to watch

The document is a draft with an unusual degree of finished detail. Its next factual checkpoints are institutional, not textual: adoption by the NRO EC and ICANN in their respective procedures [5][19], the beginning of the five-year audit cycle, and — the true test of the new arithmetic — whether any Rehabilitation Plan or derecognition proposal is ever initiated. BTW's earlier briefing on the document's release [22] covered the timeline; the thresholds analysed here are the mechanism that will decide whether any of those checkpoints ever matter.

A final evidentiary caution: article numbering quoted here is drawn from the 1 September 2026 HTML text and the fragments the authoritative PDF made available; the PDF itself is stated to govern in case of discrepancies [1]. Until adoption, every threshold described above is proposed law, not governing law.

Sources

Two-Thirds, Not Unanimity: How the RIR Governance Document's Version 3 Rewrites Who Decides

Why it matters

Summary

From a 2001 criteria memo to a governance constitution

Recognition: Article 3.7 and the two-thirds gate

Derecognition: Article 6 and the excluded subject

Amendment: unanimity, then a freeze

Emergency continuity and the audit clock

What to watch

Sources

Deeper Profile Context

Strategic Circle

Leadership Alliance

Strategic Circle Briefing

Leadership Alliance Briefing