Summary

  • BEREC Chair Marko Mismas argued on 14 October that competition should remain a stand-alone objective in the EU's proposed Digital Networks Act.
  • The Commission's draft already names effective competition separately from connectivity-sector competitiveness and says its general objectives are not ranked; the legislative process is still open.

The argument is about what telecom rules should optimize, not whether competition appears in the proposal. At a WIK conference in Germany on 14 October, BEREC Chair Marko Mismas welcomed the proposed Digital Networks Act's emphasis on Europe's competitiveness, then warned that competition should remain an objective in its own right. BEREC's account of the event says he linked competition with lower prices, better service, innovation and investment, and urged that investment be judged by the connectivity and service benefits it delivers to citizens and businesses. BEREC's conference account records his intervention; it is not itself a legislative amendment.

The distinction matters because “competitiveness” and “competition” describe different policy tests. The former can concern the capacity of Europe's digital industries and infrastructure to compete globally. The latter asks whether providers face effective rivalry and whether users benefit from choice, price, quality and innovation. They can reinforce each other, but one is not a substitute for the other. Investment can expand capacity while market structure changes in ways that reduce competitive pressure; the proposal's separate objectives leave regulators and lawmakers with the task of handling that tension.

The European Commission's 21 January proposal already includes both. Article 3(1)(a) calls for strengthening the competitiveness of the connectivity sector and industry through investment and advanced infrastructure. Another objective refers to effective competition in the provision of services to end users. The same paragraph tells Member States, national regulators and EU bodies to pursue the listed objectives “not listed in order of priority.” That wording does not make competition the overriding goal, but it also does not place it below competitiveness in an explicit legal hierarchy. The proposal text is therefore the baseline for judging changes, not an example of competition being omitted.

The measure remains a proposal. EUR-Lex lists it as an ongoing ordinary legislative procedure, 2026/0013/COD, addressed to the European Parliament and Council. The eventual text may change as co-legislators negotiate. Mismas's remarks are a policy signal during that process, not a decision by either legislature and not, on the available record, a separately adopted BEREC Board position. The procedure page records its status.

There is market evidence in the background, but it does not settle the normative question. BEREC's 1 October “Europe’s Telecom Reality Check” compares the EU-27 with seven other economies across connectivity, quality, pricing, operator financial performance and regulation, drawing mainly on trends from 2019 to 2024. It provides a basis for testing claims about Europe's telecom performance; it cannot by itself decide which objective should govern a particular regulatory choice or prove that one rule caused a particular outcome. BEREC's report page describes the scope and limits of that comparison.

The institutional design is part of the same question. In a formal June position on DNA governance, BEREC raised concerns about national regulator independence and resources, the proposed role of the Office for Digital Networks, and changes to BEREC's voting and working arrangements. That paper does not establish the source of the chair's October remarks. It does show why a policy objective depends on who has the authority and capacity to apply it. A competition objective on paper has limited effect if the bodies expected to act cannot exercise their functions independently. BEREC's governance position sets out those concerns.

The next test is not whether lawmakers choose “investment” or “competition” as a slogan. It is whether the final framework preserves both as usable objectives, clarifies how authorities weigh them within their legal powers, and ties investment claims to end-user outcomes. The proposal currently contains both objectives without ranking them. The negotiation and implementation record will show whether that balance survives.

Sources