Summary

  • The Government Accountability Office's report GAO-26-107729 found that HHS and USDA sold 1,316 surplus laboratory items in fiscal 2022–2025. Nine were on the Commerce Control List, but neither agency reported that status to GSA as federal rules required.
  • In a separate test, GAO used fictitious identities to buy four items that selected experts judged to pose a biosecurity risk. Its four recommendations, including a standard way to flag controlled items in GSA's system, remain open on the official product page.

An auction with a blank classification box

The sales machinery worked. HHS and USDA moved unwanted laboratory equipment through the federal disposal process, and buyers in the United States and Canada took possession. Some buyers appeared to be resellers. The GAO's full report counts 1,316 pieces over four fiscal years. Nine were on the Commerce Control List. The two agencies did not pass that classification to the General Services Administration, which runs the disposal channel. The rule requiring the handoff existed; the handoff did not.

GAO identifies two pieces of the administrative failure. HHS policy did not tell staff to identify those controlled items for disposal. GSA's property system had no standard method or dedicated field for agencies to report the classification. A warning that cannot be entered in the ordinary form is easy to leave behind. Once the item appears as another surplus asset, the next actor inherits a thinner account of what is being sold.

The sales record does not establish that anyone exported an item unlawfully or put it to harmful use. It establishes the narrower and more useful fact: the government did not carry a required control attribute through its own transaction. The nine sales went to recipients in the United States and Canada. A subsequent transfer would require its own evidence, which this report does not supply.

GAO also tested the buyer side. Using fictitious identities, including a nonprofit identity, it acquired four pieces of equipment that selected experts considered a biosecurity risk. That test is separate from the nine Commerce Control List sales; the report does not make the four a subset of the nine. HHS and USDA had concentrated on concerns such as decontamination without assessing disposal biosecurity risk. Clean equipment and a safe transfer are different decisions.

GAO issued four recommendations. GSA should give agencies a standard way to flag Commerce Control List items in the disposal system. HHS should require staff to identify them. HHS and USDA should regularly assess biosecurity risks and work with GSA on suitable mitigations. The agencies generally agreed and planned action. As of the official product page consulted for this article, all four recommendations were open. The report is dated September 1, 2026 and was publicly released on October 1.

Sources