Summary

  • GAO's October report says the FBI relies on tips from universities and industry to identify possible non-traditional intelligence collection. All four academic associations GAO interviewed said the bureau's research-security outreach could improve; two described uneven FBI-university relationships across the country.
  • The FBI ended its central Academia Program in 2023 and now leaves campus engagement to senior officials and academic coordinators in 56 field offices. GAO found no plan to strengthen those relationships. The FBI agreed to make one; the recommendation remains open.

A tip line built on relationships

The FBI needs universities to tell it when a research-security concern may warrant investigation. That call requires more than a phone number. A university must know whom to approach, what the bureau can share back, and whether contact will protect the people and research involved. GAO's full audit found the FBI depends on such tips, especially from academia and industry, while its campus relationships vary.

The old central Academia Program ended in 2023 because of policy changes. The FBI still has academic coordinators in its 56 field offices, national engagement with seven academic associations, briefings and training. Local senior executives now carry responsibility for university engagement. This is a sizeable network. It has no identified plan for repairing its weak links. At a February 2026 research-security conference, FBI officials acknowledged publicly that university relationships needed strengthening, but gave GAO no plan to do it.

The audit's evidence is specific. Representatives of all four academic associations interviewed by GAO said research-security outreach could improve. Representatives of two said the strength of FBI-university ties differed around the country. One described agents approaching individual researchers directly instead of a university's central research-security office, frustrating the institution that must manage the concern. These are selected interviews, not a census of American campuses.

They nevertheless identify a practical failure mode: headquarters can count field-office contacts while universities experience different rules at different doors.

The FBI defines a non-traditional intelligence collector by activity on behalf of a foreign entity; being a student or researcher alone supplies no such finding. Officials told GAO that some activity may be lawful until information is transferred. Academic representatives also said classified threat information can leave them without a usable, unclassified account of what to watch for. A request for tips works poorly when the receiving institution has to guess both the threshold and the contact route.

GAO recommended that the FBI develop and implement a plan to strengthen academic partnerships. The bureau concurred, and GAO still lists the recommendation as open. A dated plan is the next public receipt; another campus briefing is activity, not proof that the uneven network has been repaired.