Summary

  • NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED (APNIC organisation object ORG-NGN2-AP, org-type LIR, Yangon) is the registered holder of AS151210 and the sponsoring organisation for two other Myanmar ASNs, AS152663 and AS153311 (https://wq.apnic.net/apnic-bin/whois.pl?form_type=advanced&searchtext=ORG-NGN2-AP).
  • All three autonomous systems route their administrative, technical and abuse contact through the same generic role object, named "NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED administrator", which lists itself as both its own admin-c and tech-c — no named individual appears anywhere in the accountability chain (https://wq.apnic.net/apnic-bin/whois.pl?form_type=advanced&searchtext=NCLA4-AP).
  • AS151210 is the only live network of the three: it originates three prefixes and peers at three Bangkok exchange points (https://bgp.he.net/AS151210); AS152663 has not been visible in the global routing table since 11 September 2024, and its public records diverge between a "SMART & SHINE COMPANY LIMITED" holder rendering and a NEXGENET rendering modified as recently as 2 July 2026 (https://bgp.he.net/AS152663).
  • The only documented route object for AS152663, 2401:8d20::/32, is maintained not by NEXGENET's own maintainer but by a Thai third party, and carries an RPKI origin-validation state of "not_found" — meaning who controls announced reachability of the dark ASN is answered outside the sponsor's registry objects (http://iad.robtex.com/as/AS152663.html).
  • The company's corporate identity claims — founded 2015, part of Crystal Shine Group, an international gateway licensee of Myanmar's Posts and Telecommunications Department — predate its registry footprint by eight years, but no filings, transaction records or regulator decisions were obtainable for this report, so the corporate substance behind the registry surface remains unverified.

A registry identity, and everything behind it

Start with what the authoritative registry actually says. The APNIC organisation object ORG-NGN2-AP names NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED, an org-type LIR — a local internet registry, the class of membership that can receive and allocate number resources — registered in Myanmar at No. 838-839, Thuzitar Road, corner of Thuzitar 8 Street, North Okkalapa Township, Yangon, last modified 5 September 2023 (https://wq.apnic.net/apnic-bin/whois.pl?form_type=advanced&searchtext=ORG-NGN2-AP). That single address recurs across every object in this cluster: the organisation, the role account, the ASNs and the separately named customer organisations all point to the same building on Thuzitar Road.

Around that organisation sit three autonomous systems. AS151210 is the direct holding: its aut-num object names NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED, org ORG-NGN2-AP, with the role handle NCLA4-AP as both administrative and technical contact, abuse handle AN3144-AP, maintainer chain MAINT-NCL-MM and IRT-NCL-MM, last modified 3 May 2023 (https://bgp.he.net/AS151210). AS152663 and AS153311 belong to different organisations — the first recorded under ORG-SSCL4-AP for SMART & SHINE COMPANY LIMITED, the second under ORG-SA237-AP for SMMCL in Keng Tung, Eastern Shan State — yet both carry the same sponsoring-org field pointing back at ORG-NGN2-AP, and the same role, maintainer and abuse handles as NEXGENET's own objects (https://bgp.tools/as/152663, https://bgp.he.net/AS153311).

What a generic role object concentrates

The hinge of this story is a registry artefact most readers skip past. APNIC's whois returns a role object named "NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED administrator", handle NCLA4-AP (https://wq.apnic.net/apnic-bin/whois.pl?form_type=advanced&searchtext=NCLA4-AP). Three properties matter. First, it is generic: it names a company and a function, not a person. Second, it is self-referential — the role is listed as its own admin-c and tech-c, so no other named contact exists upstream of it in that object. Third, its reach is broad: it serves as admin-c and tech-c on AS151210, AS152663 and AS153311 simultaneously, and the incident-response object IRT-NCL-MM lists the same generic company-domain mailbox as its abuse contact, with validation remarks dated 24 June 2025, 30 December 2025 and 7 July 2026 — an actively maintained, but entirely non-personalised, contact surface (https://whois.ipip.net/AS151210).

The economic reading is straightforward. Accountability in the routing system is supposed to terminate in a reachable, responsible party. Here it terminates in a shared function mailbox operated by the sponsoring company, and the same mailbox serves the sponsor, both sponsored customers, and the abuse-response path for all of them. If something goes wrong on any of the three networks — a hijacked prefix, a spam wave, a government takedown request — the first and only institutional stop is the same company.

That is not a violation of registry rules; role objects exist precisely so that responsibility does not depend on one employee's inbox. But it does mean the observable accountability surface for three ASNs and two distinct legal entities collapses into one company-controlled channel, and nothing in the public record identifies who inside that company operates it.

A small detail sharpens the point: the role object's phone number differs from the organisation object's phone number, while both resolve to the same generic company-domain mailbox (https://wq.apnic.net/apnic-bin/whois.pl?form_type=advanced&searchtext=ORG-NGN2-AP). Two contact numbers, one mailbox, one company. Even the contact surface's internal consistency depends entirely on whoever answers that mailbox.

The live network, and what it reveals

AS151210 is the only network of the three that is actually doing anything observable. Its objects record three originated prefixes — 103.132.102.0/24, 103.132.103.0/24 and 2001:df2:5fc0::/48, each labelled NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED — with RPKI-valid origins and 21 observed BGP peers (https://bgp.he.net/AS151210). Its IPv4-visible footprint is confined to those two /24s (https://ipv4.bgp.he.net/AS151210). It is present at three Bangkok exchange points — BKNIX, TH-IX and BGP.Exchange-Bangkok — which is geographically telling: a Yangon-registered operator reaches the open interconnection market not in Myanmar but across the border in Thailand (https://bgp.he.net/AS151210). PeeringDB and third-party routing monitors corroborate the live routing picture (https://www.peeringdb.com/asn/151210, https://www.cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-report?as=AS151210&v=4&view=2.0, https://radar.qrator.net/as/151210).

This is the reference point for everything else: a functioning operator with a real exchange presence, whose registry objects nonetheless terminate in the same generic mailbox as its two dormant sponsored networks. Myanmar's ASN landscape is thin enough that one such family is a non-trivial share of the national allocation picture — country-level ASN listings under Myanmar's country code place this family among the limited set of MM-registered networks (https://ipgeolocation.io/browse/asn/countries/MM).

The dark ASN and the holder question

AS152663 is where the record gets genuinely unresolved. Two states of its public record exist, and they disagree about who holds it.

The pre-change state, still rendered by several mirrors, reads holder SMART & SHINE COMPANY LIMITED, as-name SMARTSHINECOMPANYLIMITED-AS-MM, org ORG-SSCL4-AP, registered 27 March 2024, with sponsoring-org ORG-NGN2-AP and NEXGENET's role and maintainer handles; its registered address, "#838, Thuzitar Rd, N Okkalapa Tsp", is the same building as NEXGENET's (https://bgp.tools/as/152663, https://rtsak.com/en/as-numbers/AS152663). A commercial geolocation database likewise titles the ASN under SMART & SHINE (https://db-ip.com/as152663-smart--shine-company-limited).

The post-change state appears on Hurricane Electric's page and Robtex, which render the same ASN with as-name NCL-AS-AP, description NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED, org ORG-NGN2-AP, and an aut-num last-modified stamp of 2 July 2026 (https://bgp.he.net/AS152663, http://iad.robtex.com/as/AS152663.html). An unattributed third-party tracker summarises the situation in one line — registered holder SMART & SHINE, org NEXGENET — and confirms the family grouping AS151210/AS152663/AS153311 that other observers have also adopted (https://rg443hh.x10.mx/hh/152663).

The most likely reconciliation is procedural rather than adversarial: sponsoring-org is a registry relationship in which the sponsor (NEXGENET, the LIR) holds and manages resources on behalf of a non-member organisation, so mirrors can legitimately display either the sponsored holder's name or the sponsoring LIR's objects. But that interpretation is itself inference; the public record as captured does not settle it, and this report does not declare a holder. What is settled is the routing fact: bgp.he.net states AS152663 has not been visible in the global routing table since 11 September 2024, bgp.tools confirms it is not currently in the global routing table, and the tracker records a last-seen date of 10 September 2024 — three independent snapshots agreeing that the network went dark in September 2024 (https://bgp.he.net/AS152663, https://bgp.tools/as/152663, https://rg443hh.x10.mx/hh/152663).

Who controls a dark ASN's reachability?

Here is the mechanism that matters for accountability, and it runs outside NEXGENET's own objects. The only documented route object for AS152663 is route6 2401:8d20::/32, sourced from RADB, with maintainer MAINT-AS137557 and a change record attributed to a Thai interconnection operator in April 2024 — not NEXGENET's MAINT-NCL-MM — and an RPKI origin-validation state of "not_found" (http://iad.robtex.com/as/AS152663.html). On Hurricane Electric's page, the sole observed IPv6 peer of AS152663 is AS151210 itself, and the prefix is labelled NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED (https://bgp.he.net/AS152663).

Read as an operating mechanism: a sponsored, routing-dark ASN whose only route object is maintained by a third party in Thailand, whose RPKI validation state is absent, and whose only observed adjacency is to its own sponsor. In other words, the registry paperwork says SMART & SHINE or NEXGENET depending on which mirror you read; the routing paperwork says the reachability of 2401:8d20::/32 was last controlled from Bangkok, by an organisation with no maintainer relationship to the Yangon sponsor, without origin validation.

If a question ever arose about who was responsible for that prefix, the answer would run through at least three jurisdictions of paperwork — Myanmar's company registry (which was not obtainable for this report), APNIC's sponsor objects, and a Thai route-object maintainer — before reaching any single accountable party.

The second sponsored network

AS153311 completes the pattern. Its aut-num names SMMCL (as-name SMMCL-AS-MM), org ORG-SA237-AP, with an address in Keng Tung, Eastern Shan State, last modified 2 September 2024 — and the same sponsoring-org ORG-NGN2-AP, role NCLA4-AP, abuse handle AN3144-AP and IRT-NCL-MM as everything else in this cluster (https://bgp.he.net/AS153311). Its organisation record on a third-party mirror carries a nexgenetwork.com e-mail address as SMMCL's own contact (https://whois.ipip.net/AS153311). A company nominally registered 700-plus kilometres from Yangon, in a different name, uses the sponsor's own domain as its operational contact — the sponsor's control surface extends past the registry relationship into the customer's own identity layer.

One of NEXGENET's own maintainer objects appears in a Thai IIG's AS-set, indicating that the live network's reach is at least partly composed through that foreign wholesale relationship (https://bgp.tools/as-set/AS-SBN-IIG).

Corporate claims versus registry timeline

The company's own website describes NexGeNet Company Limited as an international gateway provider founded in 2015, a Network Facilities Service (individual) and international gateway licensee of the Posts and Telecommunications Department of Myanmar's Ministry of Transport, and part of Crystal Shine Group (https://www.nexgenetwork.com/). The registry tells a different-timed story: the APNIC organisation object and the ASN objects in this family first appear from May 2023 onward (https://wq.apnic.net/apnic-bin/whois.pl?form_type=advanced&searchtext=ORG-NGN2-AP, https://bgp.he.net/AS151210). Corporate existence predating the registry footprint by eight years is not a contradiction — but it does mean the entire verifiable public footprint of this gateway licensee is barely three years old, and the claimed licensee status and group affiliation could not be corroborated against any filing or regulator decision obtainable for this report.

What would resolve it

The holder divergence is observable, in principle, from the outside. An APNIC-side change to the AS152663 aut-num or a re-render of the authoritative object that consistently shows either ORG-SSCL4-AP or ORG-NGN2-AP would collapse the mirror disagreement into a dated registry event. A route object for AS152663 maintained by MAINT-NCL-MM instead of MAINT-AS137557, or an RPKI origin signed by NEXGENET's resources, would move reachability control back inside the sponsor's surface. Any of these is a checkable condition with a timestamp — which is exactly what separates the resolvable from the merely argued in this record.

Until one occurs, the honest description is: one live network operated through a generic role account, one dark network with divergent holder records and third-party route maintenance, one sponsored Shan State network using the sponsor's domain, and no named individual anywhere in the chain.