Summary

  • Chile's telecommunications regulator says 1,954 URL entries linked to unauthorized IPTV services had been blocked through October, 765 of them in October. Operators have up to five days to execute the orders in this case.
  • A LACNIC 46 presentation identifies updating lists, correcting mistakes and ending restrictions as operating duties. Chile's public tally provides the additions, but no dated removal or correction register.

The button that adds a URL to a blocklist has a deadline. The button that takes one off rarely gets a press release. Subtel's 27 October account says Chilean internet providers have blocked 1,954 URL entries associated with unauthorized IPTV services through October. October alone supplied 765. For the court order described in that release, providers have no more than five days to carry out the instruction.

The chain has several hands. Subtel says a court order followed a copyright action; an anti-piracy alliance identifies technical targets, Subtel communicates lists to providers, and providers apply the restrictions. The regulator's table counts 221 URLs in June, 180 in July, 469 in August, 319 in September and 765 in October. Those entries sum to 1,954. Its final printed line says “Total: 954 URL.” The monthly arithmetic and the release's own prose agree on 1,954; the conflicting line needs a corrected publication record. It tells readers nothing about how many entries have since been removed.

That is exactly the operational question in César Díaz and Silvana Rivero's LACNIC 46 presentation. Their 18-jurisdiction study describes a shift toward dynamic lists and more duties for ISPs: apply, update, report, review and correct. It asks who validates changes, how errors are reported and when a block ends. One address can serve several lawful sites; an imprecise IP-level order can reach beyond its intended target. A list is therefore an operating system, not a one-time announcement.

The Chilean release gives an execution deadline and describes a route from court to regulator to provider. It does not publish a per-URL expiry schedule or a dated log of corrections and removals. Those records would let a reader distinguish an expanding list from a maintained one. LACNIC's presentation gives the question a sharper edge: when an authority can add hundreds of targets in a month, who owns the switch that lets a legitimate service back through?

Sources: LACNIC 46 presentation; Subtel 27 October release.