Summary

  • AFRINIC's second consultation on the draft amended Constitution closes on 21 August 2026 at 23:59 UTC; the proposal is not yet operative.
  • Current Article 16 creates a Council of Elders of no more than six former AFRINIC chairpersons; the draft would replace it with standing and ad hoc committees controlled by the Board.
  • Draft Articles 16.2–16.6 contain meaningful safeguards: reserved powers, published mandates and appointment rules, conflict considerations, Board accountability and reporting.
  • Article 16.7 separately permits nonbinding input from governments, regulators, intergovernmental organisations, industry, technical experts, civil society, the private sector or any other relevant person or body.
  • Unlike Article 16.3's committee rules, Article 16.7 does not expressly require a public record of each adviser's identity, principal, funding, conflicts, submissions, meetings or the Board's response.

One article, two disclosure standards

AFRINIC opened the second constitutional consultation on 4 August. Comments close at 23:59 UTC on 21 August. The headline change in Article 16 is easy to describe: a fixed Council of Elders would give way to committees that the Board can create, reshape and dissolve.

The current Constitution defines the Council narrowly. It may contain at most six former AFRINIC chairpersons, each of whom must have completed a full term. A first-in-first-out rule limits its size, members retire without reappointment, and its advisory terms are mutually agreed with the Board.

The draft offers flexibility in exchange for a fuller committee rulebook. Article 16.2 says committees cannot exercise powers reserved by law or the Constitution to members, the Board or another constitutional body. Before creating one, Article 16.3 requires publication of its purpose, functions, appointment criteria, qualifications, term, terms of reference and governance arrangements. Article 16.4 calls for a fair, transparent and objective appointment process, considering independence and conflicts where appropriate. Committees report to the Board, which remains able to change or dissolve them.

Those are substantive safeguards. The accountability gap appears in the next paragraph. Article 16.7 lets the Board establish, recognise or engage advisory groups, or seek information and nonbinding advice from an exceptionally wide field. Governments, regulators, intergovernmental organisations, industry bodies, the technical community, experts, civil society, companies and “any other person or body” with relevant expertise or interest all fit within it.

The clause says the advice cannot bind AFRINIC. It does not expressly say that every use of this channel must disclose who spoke, whom they represented, who funded the work, what instructions or conflicts existed, what was submitted, when meetings occurred or how the Board answered. Article 16.3's publication list is written for a committee established under the article; it is not expressly repeated for every engagement under Article 16.7.

Nonbinding influence still needs provenance

“Nonbinding” answers one question: an adviser cannot formally decide for the Board. It does not answer whether advice shaped an agenda, narrowed the options or supplied the factual premise for a decision. A meeting can influence a decision without receiving a vote.

Mauritius company law keeps that distinction important. Section 131 of the Companies Act permits delegation, within stated limits, but generally leaves the Board responsible as if it exercised the power itself unless the statutory conditions on reasonable belief and monitoring are met. Section 143 requires directors to act within the Act and Constitution, honestly, in good faith and for the purposes for which their powers exist. Section 145 permits reliance on specified advisers and experts only with good faith, proper inquiry when circumstances call for it and no knowledge that reliance is unwarranted.

Those provisions do not make Article 16 unlawful, and this report alleges no breach. They show why an advice register would be practical evidence rather than decorative transparency. Members could see the input on which directors relied, test conflicts and distinguish technical evidence from institutional lobbying. Publication would not itself prove legal compliance; silence makes scrutiny harder.

The draft's rationale deserves credit too. It says AFRINIC needs legal, financial, technical, strategic and operational expertise that a single former-chair body may not supply. It also says wider consultation preserves Board independence and responsibility. Flexible expertise is a defensible objective. The question is why the draft publishes a committee's mandate before formation but does not expressly publish the provenance of advice that may arrive outside a committee.

A recent influence dispute shows the missing fields

The Smart Africa–ICANN record is relevant as a design test, not as evidence about Article 16's authorship.

Smart Africa said in June 2025 that consultations led it to endorse eight AFRINIC Board candidates. After the September vote it said seven of eight coalition-backed candidates had won, invoked a mandate from its Heads of State and Governments, promised collaboration with the newly elected Board and connected that work to CAIGA. Those are Smart Africa's claims. A governmental-coalition mandate is not the same thing as authorization from AFRINIC members, network operators or every person in a service region.

ICANN, for its part, says it contributed US$40,000 to a broader Internet Governance Blueprint and provided administrative support for Smart Africa dialogues at ICANN meetings. It denied directing a change to AFRINIC, substantively designing or endorsing CAIGA, endorsing candidates, coordinating the election process or funding election and candidate work.

The record proves neither that ICANN nor Smart Africa wrote Article 16, sought it, will be consulted under it or is its intended beneficiary. It demonstrates the categories an Article 16.7 register should capture: speaker, principal, funding, mandate claimed, meeting, document supplied and institutional response. A reader should not have to reconstruct those fields months later from scattered letters and statements.

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Further reading