Summary

  • The initial application under 47 CFR § 1.70005, as excerpted, must list every proposed owner of a submarine cable — including owners who are not applicants — with their equity and/or voting interests in the system as a whole, in each U.S. cable landing station including SLTE, and by segment, plus the design capacity by segment.
  • § 1.70002(c) presumes an applicant lacks the requisite character if it did any of five enumerated things within the last 20 years, and then narrows the paperwork: the applicant need not disclose pending investigations, only violations as preliminarily or finally determined by the Commission and as adjudicated by another U.S. agency or a U.S. court.

The door is drawn on a chart

Subpart FF of 47 CFR Part 1 opens its general requirements with a sentence that spends no words on traffic, revenue or technology. It says what must be licensed, and it does so geometrically. A cable landing licence — the entry document on the eCFR page for the subpart

must be obtained prior to landing a submarine cable that connects: (1) The continental United States with any foreign country; (2) Alaska, Hawaii, or the U.S. territories or possessions with— (i) A foreign country; (ii) The continental United States; or (iii) Each other; or (3) Points within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or a territory or possession in which the cable is laid in areas beyond the U.S. territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles seaward from the coastline.

The first route is the one everybody assumes: a cable running from the United States to somewhere foreign. The second stitches the American periphery together — Alaska, Hawaii, the territories — whether each limb reaches abroad, reaches the mainland, or reaches another limb.

The third route is the one worth reading twice. It reaches a cable whose points of connection all sit inside the United States, Alaska, Hawaii or a territory, provided the cable is laid in areas beyond the territorial sea. That seaward limit is fixed in the rule itself at 12 nautical miles, which is about 22.2 kilometres in my conversion. Put plainly: a cable that never lands anywhere foreign can still need an American licence, because of where the ship went. The test is hydrographic, not commercial.

What the form actually collects

§ 1.70005 governs the initial application, and its opening is conditional in a way that matters later: the applicant must demonstrate that it meets the requirements under § 1.70002(b) and (c). The requirements of those paragraphs are not decoration appended to a filing; they are the thing the filing has to prove.

The excerpt then becomes specific.

On the applicant: "(a) The name, address, email address(es), and telephone number(s) of each applicant." On the system: "(6) The design capacity, by segment, of the submarine cable system." And then the paragraph that gives this licence its centre of gravity — "(i) A list of all of the proposed owners of the submarine cable system including those owners that are not applicants, their respective equity and/or voting interests in the submarine cable system as a whole, their respective equity and/or voting interests in each U.S. cable landing station including SLTE, and their respective equity and/or voting interests by segment of the cable."

Read it as three separate denominators rather than one list. Ownership as a share of the system as a whole. Ownership inside each U.S. landing station, including the submarine line terminating equipment. Ownership by segment of the cable. An owner at ten per cent of the whole can be dominant on one segment and absent from another; this paragraph asks for all three coordinates, because inside a cable the arithmetic of control does not run through a single number.

Then the qualifier that makes the paragraph unusual: "including those owners that are not applicants". The licence is issued to an applicant. The ownership disclosure reaches parties who never sign, and who may never appear before the Commission at all. Nothing in what I read says what procedural position such a named non-applicant occupies, and I make no claim about it.

One more feature is a matter of drafting, not drama: the capacity requirement in the excerpt is a design figure, stated by segment. It is a property of the object that will be built. Nothing in the retained text attaches a measurement, a utilisation percentage or a market commitment to it.

What the form does not ask

This is where precision pays. On the text I read — § 1.70002 in full, and § 1.70005 as an excerpt carrying ellipses between (a) and (e), between the description heading and item (6), and between item (6) and item (i) — there is no request for price, traffic, revenue, market share or a capacity commitment of any kind. The only capacity term is the design figure by segment. Requirements living in the omitted items are unread, and a reader should treat that as the limit it is rather than as a closed inventory of what the application contains.

For a cable operator or a landing-party lawyer, that is the practical shape of the American entrance: prove who is inside the cable and how much, describe what will be built, and demonstrate the matters in § 1.70002(b) and (c). Commercial terms are not the currency of this questionnaire.

The public-interest sentence recurs

§ 1.70002(b) carries a heading and one sentence: "Public interest statement. An applicant seeking a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license shall include in the application information demonstrating how the grant of the application will serve the public interest."

Note the list of filings. This is not an entrance-only duty: the same demonstration attaches to a modification, to an assignment, to a transfer of control, to a renewal or extension. Whatever an applicant assembles to show public interest the first time is not stored for the transaction that comes after it. How the Commission weighs such a statement, what evidence satisfies it, and whether any application has been turned down over it are all outside what I read, and I assert nothing about them.

A twenty-year gate with a narrowed question

§ 1.70002(c) is labelled a character presumptive disqualifying condition, and it is built as a presumption rather than a bar. The first paragraph states it plainly against a twenty-year window, and then lists five grounds. An applicant is

presumed not to possess the requisite character qualifications to become a cable landing licensee if the applicant has within the last 20 years: (i) Materially violated the Cable Landing License Act, 47 U.S.C. 34 through 39 ...; (ii) Committed national security-related violations of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq., or Commission rules as identified in Commission orders, including but not limited to violations of rules concerning the Covered List ...; (iii) Made materially false statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct concerning national security or the Cable Landing License Act; (iv) Been subject to an adjudicated finding of making false statements or engaging in fraudulent conduct concerning national security before another U.S.

Government agency; or (v) Materially failed to comply with the terms of a cable landing license, including but not limited to a condition requiring compliance with a mitigation agreement with the Executive Branch agencies, including the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (Committee) ...

Five grounds, one of which is worth dwelling on: failure to comply with a licence condition, expressly including a mitigation agreement with Executive Branch agencies including that Committee. The written condition and the electronic-coverage condition arrive through the same doorway here, and the gate is retrospective for both. Three of the grounds carry their own sub-conditions — whether the violation was remediated through an adjudicated consent decree or compliance plan, whether it cost the party a Commission licence or authorisation, and whether the Commission found it intentional.

Then comes the sentence that turns a sweeping screen into a narrower documentary duty:

An applicant subject to paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of this section can overcome the adverse presumption only by establishing that the applicant has the requisite character, despite its past conduct. An applicant need not disclose pending investigations, but rather must only disclose violations as preliminarily or finally determined by the Commission, and as adjudicated by another U.S. Government agency or a court in the United States.

Hold the two halves together, because either one alone misleads. The screening scope is twenty years of conduct, including conduct that never became a Commission matter. The disclosure duty is not the same scope: only violations preliminarily or finally determined by the Commission, and only those adjudicated by another U.S. agency or a U.S. court. An open investigation — the thing that would be most useful to a reader of an application — is not something this rule asks the applicant to volunteer. The burden of overcoming the presumption still sits with the applicant; the obligation to say sits somewhere narrower than the obligation to have been.

That difference between what is screened and what is written down is the most interesting design decision in the subpart. It is also the sort of thing a reader of a filing cannot recover by reading the filing.

The starting line is a date

§ 1.70002(c)(2) makes the presumption turn on filing dates rather than on the grant in hand. It applies to an initial application filed after 26 November 2025; to a filing for modification, assignment, transfer of control, renewal or extension made after that date by a licensee whose initial licence was granted after it; and to the same filings by a licensee whose licence was granted before it, where that licensee did not exhibit any of the five § 1.70002(c)(1) criteria before that date.

That third limb is a carve-out from the past, written as a date test. A licensee granted years ago, whose record showed none of the five grounds, does not walk in already presumed against for the transaction it files after 26 November 2025. My arithmetic on the two dates in the text and today's reading date: 356 days have passed since that line, and it is a filing date, not a deadline.

The text also makes clear what this is not. It is a presumption with a stated way out — establishing requisite character despite past conduct — not a disqualification, not a revocation and not a finding against anyone. I read no record of any applicant, licensee or named owner being screened under it, invoked against it, or required to rebut anything.

What the list shows, and what a heading is not

The same page returns the subpart's own section list, and it is worth counting carefully because the count is easy to inflate. The returned list has 30 rows: 23 carry a title, one is marked [Reserved], and six came back with no title at all. That is a count of the list I was given, not a count of what the subpart contains.

The titles are the story of how this instrument grew: Routine conditions; Substantial assignment or transfer of control applications; Pro forma assignment and transfer of control notifications; Quarterly reports; Foreign adversary annual report for licensees; Action on applications, revocation, and termination; Covered list certification for cable landing licensees; One-time cybersecurity and physical security certification.

A heading proves that a section exists and what it is called. It does not establish one word of its operative content. So: what continuing conditions a licence carries, what counts as a substantial assignment, what a pro forma notification requires, what a quarterly report must contain, and on what ground a licence can be revoked are all questions I cannot answer from what I opened, and I do not answer them.

What is left open, on the record

Everything below is a limit of this reading, dated 17 November 2026. The text of § 1.70007 (Routine conditions) was not obtained, so no statement here describes the conditions a granted licence carries. § 1.70012 and § 1.70013 were not obtained, so no threshold, filing requirement or approval test for an assignment, transfer of control or pro forma notification is stated. The Cable Landing License Act, 47 U.S.C. 34 through 39, is named inside quoted rule text only; I did not read the Act, and I attach no date of enactment and no granting authority to it.

No public record of licence grants was read, so there is no grant count, no licensee name, no processing time and no grant rate in this article. The retained § 1.70005 text is an excerpt with ellipses, and the retained text of § 1.70002 skips from (a) to (b). No capacity, traffic, revenue or price figure appears anywhere in what I read, and none is asserted.

On the address itself, one correction worth printing rather than burying: on the Cornell Law School page for 47 CFR Part 1 read the same day, the cable landing rules sit in Subpart FF, §§ 1.70000 to 1.70029, while Subpart X of the same part is Spectrum Leasing, §§ 1.9001 to 1.9080. Subpart FF is the surface this article works.

What the instrument is, then

Put the two halves together and the American landing licence looks less like a commercial permission and more like a persistent register of who is behind a cable, refreshed at the moment anyone new takes a share of it. The questions it asks are about identity, share and design. The questions it declines to ask — or declines to make an applicant answer in writing — are about what is still being investigated.

That is a coherent instrument, and it has a consequence for anyone who thinks of landing rights as an asset to be bought. Before buying into a cable that touches the United States, the file that matters is not a price list. It is the ownership map at three denominators, and the twenty-year record of everyone named on it — the part the form will not summarise back to you. The FCC directory entry collects the rest of our coverage of the Commission; this piece is about one subpart of one part of its rulebook, read on one day.