Summary

  • RIPE NCC lists intermittent database and reverse-delegation failures through 19:40 UTC on 28 October.
  • The incident page says “resolved” at 20:32 CET (19:32 UTC); a 30 October review says none of the failed requests would have changed a delegation.

The status page’s first update described a live service problem: some RIPE Database updates were not being processed, and domain objects were affected in a way that touched the Reverse DNS service. The incident ran from 11:42 to 19:40 UTC on 28 October. RIPE NCC implemented a fix, monitored it and marked the incident resolved at 20:32 Central European Time.

The two clocks are one hour apart on 28 October. The European Commission’s 2026 summer-time schedule ended on 25 October, so the incident page’s 20:32 CET stamp converts to 19:32 UTC. RIPE’s status history puts the end of the affected window at 19:40 UTC. The resolution stamp therefore falls eight minutes before the listed end.

The public summary changed two days later. A more detailed review of the failed requests found that none would have resulted in a reverse-delegation change. Some contained no change to make; the rest failed Zonemaster pre-delegation checks. The update path was failing, but the attempted requests had not passed the checks required to alter the delegation record.

That distinction is the story. A failure can interrupt an operation without changing the state that operation is meant to control. Here, RIPE NCC says reverse-delegation creation, updates and deletions failed intermittently, while its later request review says the failed submissions would not have changed those delegations anyway. The status history gives readers both facts, but not the number of requests in either group.

RIPE has not stated whether database updates resumed at 19:32 or 19:40 UTC; a corrected, timezone-normalized recovery time would settle whether this is a display gap or an incident closed before the affected window ended.

The sequence is unusually useful as a piece of incident reporting. At 20:04 CET, RIPE NCC said updates were not being processed and that some domain objects affected Reverse DNS. At 20:23 it said a fix was in place and monitoring had begun. At 20:32 it marked the incident resolved. On 30 October, it added the request-level explanation. The first three entries describe service recovery; the later one refines the effect on registry state.

The chronology moves from failed updates to repair and monitoring, then to a request-level account of registry state. Publishing retry and replay outcomes beside the fix would show whether valid work remained after service recovery.

Records: RIPE NCC incident timeline; RIPE NCC status history and 30 October update; European Commission 2026 summer-time schedule.