Summary

  • AFRINIC's second consultation on a proposed amended Constitution opened on 4 August and closes on 21 August 2026 at 23:59 UTC; the draft is not operative.
  • Draft Article 13.5 would rank the eight candidates elected in 2028 by their valid-vote totals: the top three would receive three-year terms, the next three two-year terms and the final two one-year terms.
  • The eight directorships are not one undifferentiated contest. Six represent separate sub-regions and two are competency seats without a regional mandate.
  • Vote-based allocation can be an improvement over allowing a newly seated Board to distribute its own terms. AFRINIC used highest-vote staggering within same-role elections in 2026.
  • The draft provides a guidelines-based tie breaker, but does not itself define a common denominator, treatment of abstentions or an uncontested winner, certification, recount, challenge or correction of a term ranking.

A second result would be calculated after eight winners emerge

In AFRINIC's proposed 2028 Board election, winning a seat would not settle how long the winner serves. A second calculation would begin.

Article 13.5 of the draft published on 4 August says the three elected candidates with the highest numbers of valid votes would receive three-year terms. The next three would receive two years. The following two would receive one year. After those transitional terms, ordinary three-year terms would return, with elections staggered so that roughly one third of the elected Board retires each year.

The purpose is understandable. If all eight terms end together, the same cliff returns three years later. Staggering distributes renewal and reduces the risk of a whole-Board turnover.

The mechanism also limits insider discretion. AFRINIC's August 2025 call said the newly seated Board would agree within a month on an initial distribution of term lengths. A public vote formula is easier to audit than eight directors deciding who receives the shorter mandate.

That is the strongest case for the proposal. It does not answer the next question: what exactly is being ranked?

Eight seats do not automatically create one comparable race

Draft Article 13.3 preserves six seats linked to Northern, Western, Indian Ocean, Central, Southern and Eastern Africa. Seats seven and eight are elected for competencies rather than regional representation. The nomination pools and the public meaning of each contest are therefore different even if the same eligible members can receive ballots for every open seat.

Raw candidate totals can still express something real. A winner who attracts votes across a broad electorate may have stronger demonstrated support than another winner. AFRINIC's 2026 election guidelines used highest-vote rankings to stagger terms for Governance Committee and NRO NC/ASO AC candidates. Within one role and one contest, that approach is intelligible.

Article 13.5 goes further. It appears to place winners from eight seat-specific races on a single ladder. The public text does not say whether every voter must cast a choice in every race, whether an abstention counts in the denominator, whether each race shares the same number of valid ballots, or whether totals should be normalised before comparison.

Those details can change the ranking without changing anyone's preference. One race may draw more selections than another; a voter may vote in six races and abstain in two. A winner's total then measures both support and that ballot's architecture.

AFRINIC does not need to abandon vote-based staggering. It needs to prove that the unit of comparison is the same.

The uncontested-seat problem is not hypothetical history

On 10 September 2025, AFRINIC announced that there would be no election for the Northern Africa seat because the Nomination Committee had retained only one suitable candidate. The candidate would be declared elected. Two days later, AFRINIC's results announcement named all eight winners but supplied no vote totals in that notice.

That history does not predict an uncontested seat in 2028. It does show why a constitutional formula must say what happens if one appears. Does an elected but unopposed candidate receive zero valid votes, one formal vote, the total number of eligible electors, or a separate placement outside the ranking? Each answer can determine whether the candidate serves one, two or three years.

The draft resolves a narrower edge case. If equal valid-vote totals affect term allocation, the Election Guidelines must provide a fair, transparent and objective tie breaker, and no term may be allocated until the tie is resolved. That is a useful safeguard. It acknowledges that the secondary ranking requires rules beyond the Constitution's headline formula.

The same discipline should cover non-comparable denominators, abstentions, invalid ballots, uncontested seats and a candidate withdrawal or successful challenge after the initial declaration.

Sources

Further reading