Summary

  • The Dutch instrument that decides who gets scarce grid capacity ranks transport requests, not customers, and its top category — congestion relievers — is scored on location, quantity, timing, duration and a price in euros per megawatt-hour.
  • The word for a connection request does not appear in the operative articles at all, and ACM's own October 2026 decision says the framework contains no rules on connection applications; TenneT's public page nonetheless tells a first-come story ordered by the date of the original request.

The Netherlands has spent three years learning that a full grid needs an order of precedence, not just a waiting room. What it built is stranger than a queue: a scored market for the thing that relieves congestion, sitting at the front of a physical connection regime that the scoring does not touch.

TenneT's page on societal prioritisation sets out the version most readers will meet first. Where there is not enough transport capacity, it says, a waiting list forms; the first in line is the first to receive transport capacity when extra capacity appears through congestion management or through expansion investment; there are three priority categories; category 1 always precedes categories 2 and 3; and within a category the order follows the moment of the initial transport request (TenneT, Maatschappelijk prioriteren bij congestie). It reads like a queue because it is written like one.

The ranking attaches to the request, not the requester

The instrument behind that page is ACM's code decision of 2 December 2025, kenmerk ACM/UIT/652233, published as Staatscourant 2025, 42323, amending the tariff structures and conditions under Article 31 of the Elektriciteitswet 1998 and inserting Articles 7.0a to 7.0d into the Netcode elektriciteit (Staatscourant 2025, 42323). Article 7.0b(1) is the hinge, and it names its object twice in one sentence: the grid operator applies, for making an offer to perform transport under Article 24(1) of the Elektriciteitswet, either the priority order of the third lid where the transport request concerns areas designated under Article 9.9(1), or the order of receipt in other areas. Outside a designated congestion area the rule is arrival. Inside one, arrival is replaced.

Article 7.0b(3) supplies the ladder: Table 1 priority requests first, then Table 2, then Table 3, then parties without priority. Article 7.0b(4) then does something a queue never does.

The operator must first assess and rank the Table 1 requests on doelmatigheid — effectiveness — against at least five criteria printed in the article as (a) to (e): the party's location relative to the bottleneck or bottlenecks in the Article 9.9(1) area; the quantity of controllable capacity it offers; the start date on which that offered capacity is available, set against the date the operator needs or expects to need it; the period for which the capacity is made available; and the price in euros per megawatt-hour requested for the expected congestion-management services under Article 9.31(1).

Read that list as a buyer would. Four columns describe a product — where it sits, how much, from when, for how long — and the fifth is what it costs. The ranking variable is not need, not seniority, not the size of the load behind the request. It is the quality and the price of an offer to make the network work harder.

Article 7.0b(4) does not stop at criteria. It requires transparency about the assessment criteria, their weighting, their application and the outcome, with a reasoned explanation that is visible to the parties. That sentence is the one an applicant can hold an operator to, and it is the one that makes the next section worth reading.

The table has two columns, and neither is a criterion

Annex 22 Table 1 is headed "categorie 1. 'Congestieverzachters'" and prints exactly two columns, Functie and Omschrijving (Staatscourant 2025, 42323, PDF). Its single row defines the category rather than scoring it: a congestieverzachter is a party for which the operator establishes, on the most current data available, that allocating transport capacity to it increases the available transport capacity for other parties under Article 9.5(4) and does not increase congestion in another grid section of that operator or in another operator's grid. Where the rungs of the ladder are described, no weights, no scoring matrix and no minimum score appear. The five criteria live in Article 7.0b(4), in the body of the decision, and the annex carries the definition alone.

So the object being ranked is an offer to relieve congestion. Picture a data-centre campus that needs a large offtake connection and can put nothing back: it never reaches Table 1, because Table 1 is defined by what an allocation does for everyone else. It sits among the parties without priority, behind three tables of parties who bring something to the network. The legal text is not cold to it; the legal text simply ranks a different thing.

The word that is not in the article

Articles 7.0a and 7.0b speak of transportverzoek and transportcapaciteit. The Dutch word for a connection request, aansluitverzoek, does not appear in either article. That absence is not an accident of the paragraphs I happened to read, because two other documents say the same thing from opposite directions.

The 2024 predecessor decision of 12 April 2024, ACM/UIT/605893, Staatscourant 2024, 12928, stated in terms that it does not determine how grid operators must handle connection requests; that connection requests must be treated non-discriminatorily and realised within the statutory maximum periods; and that first-come-first-served is not legally prescribed for them (Staatscourant 2024, 12928). That decision was annulled by the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven, and ACM's own page records that the court gave it until 1 January 2026 to revise the framework, with the then-current framework continuing to apply in the meantime (ACM, reactie op de uitspraak van het CBb).

Then, on 20 October 2026, in a dispute between Tethys and TenneT, ACM restated the boundary in one paragraph: "Het prioriteringskader ziet uitsluitend op de verdeling van schaarse transportcapaciteit. Het bevat geen regels over de geldigheid van een aanvraag om een aansluiting, de volgorde waarin aanvragen voor aansluitingen worden gerealiseerd of de toewijzing van aansluitvelden" — the framework covers only the distribution of scarce transport capacity and contains no rules on the validity of a connection application, the order in which connection applications are realised, or the allocation of connection fields (ACM, besluit Tethys–TenneT). That is later interpretation beside the operative text, not the text itself, and it is the clearest statement anyone has published of what the framework does not decide.

Two objects, then, with two regimes. The connection has its own obligations — non-discrimination, statutory maximum periods — and they survive untouched. The transport capacity behind the connection is what gets scored. A developer who treats a queue position as a property right in the connection is arguing about the wrong instrument.

Twenty days for safety, a reasonable period for flexibility

Article 7.0a(6) reads, in the original: "De netbeheerder toetst binnen twintig werkdagen na ontvangst van het verzoek, als bedoeld in het eerste lid, onderdeel a, of de verzoekende partij voldoet aan de vereisten uit het tweede lid, onderdeel b." Twenty working days to test whether the requesting party meets the requirements of the second lid, onderdeel b.

That clock is narrower than it looks. The requirements in onderdeel b are the safety and basic-needs route, and Article 7.0a(2)(b)(3) restricts capacity granted that way to electricity consumption for safety and basic-needs categories. The congestion-reliever route sits in onderdeel a, and Article 7.0a(5) places it on "binnen een redelijke termijn" — within a reasonable period. A party bringing flexibility gets the reasonableness standard. A hospital or a water board gets the twenty days.

Article 7.0b(6) adds the sequencing rule that matters most for anyone counting on a date: before making an offer under the third, fourth and fifth lids, the operator must first test, in line with Article 7.0a(6), all Article 7.0a(2)(b) requests received up to the day before transport capacity becomes available. When capacity appears, the safety and basic-needs requests go through the qualifying test first.

Three printings of one date

The decision's own commencement is printed three ways, and I adopt none of them. The original Staatscourant text printed entry into force on 1 January 2026. A rectification published as Staatscourant 2025, 42323 n1 calls that erroneous and prints Article II as "Dit besluit treedt in werking op 31 december 2025" (rectificatie, Staatscourant 2025, 42323 n1). ACM's own publication page for the decision still describes the framework as mandatory in congestion areas from 1 January 2026 (ACM, codebesluit prioriteringsruimte transportverzoeken 2025).

No document I read says which date now governs. The difference is one day and it is not decorative: it is the day the legal position of every party in a congestion area changed. A second, separate transition sits alongside it — TenneT's own news item says the framework changed on 1 January and that from 1 July 2026 small consumers requesting a new or heavier connection also join a waiting list (TenneT, nieuwe verdeling schaarste). Framework commencement and the small-consumer extension are two moments, not one, and neither resolves the discrepancy above.

What the operator publishes, area by area

The capacity picture is published, but not in a form that permits arithmetic across regions. TenneT's Netcapaciteitskaart is an indication of available space on the high-voltage grid for injection and for offtake, and it states that no rights can be derived from it (TenneT, Netcapaciteitskaart). Read that caveat before reading any of the numbers below.

Groningen, in a project update dated 17 April 2025: congestion declared at the end of 2023 on the 110 kV grid for offtake; expansions entering service from 2032 through 2034; a new partial grid expected at the end of 2034, after which the remaining waitlisted customers can be served; the Eemshaven waiting list served once the new Oostpolder high-voltage station is ready in 2033. For 2025 the page prints 97 MW released in Groningen-West against about 781 MW needed to serve all waitlisted customers there, and 56 MW released in the Eemshaven 110 kV network against about 371 MW (TenneT, druk op stroomnet Groningen).

Rotterdam port, in an update dated 31 March 2026: a transport-capacity deficit of 9 MW from 2027, rising to 64 MW in 2030, against a 244 MW deficit projected in October 2025 for 2030; part of the current waiting list probably served after the Simonshaven subgrid from 2031, and the full current waiting list after the Europoort 380 kV station is taken into use in 2032 (TenneT, netcongestie havenregio Rotterdam).

Overijssel, in an update dated 17 April 2025 and last updated 19 May 2025: limited space found in part of the province; no space found at that time west of Zwolle or east of Hengelo; no MW figure for the waiting list and no MW figure for released capacity. The only number on the page is that the flexibility obligation concerns large consumers with a connection larger than 1 megawatt (TenneT, druk op Overijsselse stroomnet).

Those three pages measure three different things in three different years: released capacity against stated need in Groningen, projected deficits and service expectations in Rotterdam, and a qualitative finding with a threshold in Overijssel. There is no like-for-like cross-area queue to compare, and I am not going to manufacture one. The honest reading is narrower and more useful: the operator publishes dates for when capacity returns, and it publishes almost nothing about who is ahead of whom inside the wait.

Where the checkable artefact should be

Article 7.0b(4) requires the operator to be transparent about the criteria, the weighting, the application and the outcome, with reasoned explanations visible to the parties. That is the document a large load should ask to see, because it is the only artefact that would show the ranking working. I did not obtain one: no ranking decision, reasoned explanation or transparency publication by TenneT under Article 7.0b(4) was located in what I read, and I make no claim about how any request was scored. A missing document is a statement about my access on 18 November 2026, not a finding about the operator's practice.

What can be said is structural. A regime that ranks offers rather than applicants puts the leverage where the network constraint is: the party that can shift load, curtail, or deliver controllable capacity at the bottleneck holds the strong position, and it holds it in euros per megawatt-hour. A party that can only consume holds whatever the connection regime gives it, which is non-discrimination and a statutory maximum period, and no rank at all.

What I read, and what I did not

This is a reading of documents obtained on 18 November 2026, and the boundaries travel with it. No ranking decision, reasoned explanation or transparency publication under Article 7.0b(4) was obtained, so nothing here says how any request was scored or that any applicant was misranked, favoured, understated or misreported. The CBb judgment itself was not read; the annulment and the 1 January 2026 revision deadline rest on ACM's reaction page. Annex 22 Table 1 came to me as a provider extraction of the PDF rather than as typeset pages, so merged cells and footnotes were not verified.

TenneT's societal-prioritisation page returned HTTP 403 on a re-attempt and its description rests on a single extraction I could not re-open. The Overijssel and Rotterdam pages were read as search-result extraction after direct fetches returned HTTP 403, and any chart or infographic on them was not captured. The interactive capacity map was not queried area by area. No public roster of individual priority decisions, queue positions or waiting times was located, and a sentence on a page is not a queue position. Nothing I read explains why TenneT's page and Article 7.0b(4) diverge, so I assign no cause and call neither an error.

The 1 MW figure is Overijssel's printed threshold for a flexibility obligation on large consumers, not a national definition. Where a document was not obtained, that is a statement about access, not about the existence of any duty, criterion or queue.