Acer eDC markets 61,500 square metres at Longtan, but discloses no powered-capacity figure

Summary

• Acer e-Enabling Data Center operates from a registered Longtan address and is wholly owned by Acer Cyber Security, whose audited 2024 accounts describe the subsidiary as an uninterrupted-operation and IT-outsourcing business.
• The company's current Chinese colocation page gives 18,000 ping of total area, 7,000 ping of raised-floor computer-room area and 2,800 ping of mechanical and electrical space. Its English colocation page separately calls 61,500 square metres the data-management centre's total floor area and describes one hosting room as occupying 23,200 square metres.
• The Longtan facility is marketed with dual supply loops from two Taipower substations, dual-loop cooling, UPS and generation, but no public source states contracted megawatts, installed critical load, generator runtime, fuel autonomy, present occupancy or immediately usable capacity.
• AS17420 is active with four IPv4 routes, one IPv6 route, two observed upstreams and valid route-origin authorisation for all five aggregate announcements. That is strong evidence of a working network edge, not proof that the two upstreams enter by independent ducts or survive the same site event.
• The defensible assessment is Medium for current company, facility and network operation, and Weak for customer-ready capacity and failover proof. A buyer should obtain dated single-line diagrams, load and occupancy schedules, carrier route evidence and witnessed recovery results before treating marketed area as resilient capacity.

Three measurements expose the central diligence problem

Acer eDC's public description of Longtan begins with an unusually large physical number and immediately creates a unit problem. The current Chinese colocation service page says the data-management centre has 18,000 ping of total area, 7,000 ping of pure computer-room raised floor and 2,800 ping of mechanical and electrical space. A ping is about 3.3058 square metres, so those rounded figures correspond to roughly 59,500, 23,100 and 9,300 square metres. The current English colocation page instead says the data-management centre has 61,500 square metres of total floor area and describes one hosting room as occupying 23,200 square metres. Those larger values align more closely with a historical company claim of 18,575 ping for the whole centre than with the Chinese page's rounded 18,000.

The English dedicated command-centre page adds a third version. It calls the whole facility 18,000 square metres and the pure computer room 7,000 square metres, even though the matching Chinese dedicated-room page labels both values in ping. That appears to be a unit translation error, not evidence that the company operates a second, smaller building with exactly the same numbers. A buyer should use 61,500 only as the operator's current total-floor-area marketing for the data-management centre and 23,200 only as its claimed area for one hosting room, not as surveyed dimensions, commissioned floor area or sellable inventory.

This distinction is more than editorial tidiness. Data-centre capacity is often discussed as if building area, raised floor, rack count and megawatts were interchangeable. They are not. Gross area includes offices, access corridors, loading and staging space, security zones, plant, storage and other support uses. Raised floor can be fitted, unfitted, occupied, reserved or unable to accept additional load because electrical or cooling headroom is exhausted. Mechanical area describes where supporting equipment can sit, not how much of that equipment is installed or available.

Acer eDC publishes all three area classes, but it does not publish a current rack inventory or any total IT-load figure.

The opening claim in this assessment is therefore deliberately narrow. Acer eDC markets 61,500 square metres of total floor area at Longtan. Public records support the existence, address and continuing operation of the site. They do not allow a reader to turn that area into megawatts, available cabinets or failure-condition capacity.

Longtan is a real operating place, not a name inferred from an ASN

The legal and physical records converge on one address. Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs company register lists Acer e-Enabling Data Center Incorporated, unified business number 51624280, at No. 69, Lane 368, Xinhe Road, Longtan District, Taoyuan City. It records the company as approved for establishment, gives paid-in capital of NT$1,144,623,500 and says the last approved change was on 12 February 2025. This is legal-location evidence. It does not prove the boundaries of the data hall or ownership of the land and building.

The network register independently points to the same place. APNIC's RDAP record for AS17420 identifies the active autonomous system as ACEREDC-TW. The corresponding public registration and current BGP.tools view describe an internet data centre at the Longtan address. PeeringDB's Acer eDC organisation record contains one facility, Acer eDC, at the same address, with a map point at approximately 24.846914, 121.186025. That coordinate is a community-maintained facility-listing pin, not a surveyed rack, power-room or fibre-entry coordinate.

Current operational material adds stronger confirmation than an address alone. Acer's 2024 sustainability report names Acer eDC Longtan Offices in its energy measures. It reports solar generation of about 89,000 kWh, cooling-tower airflow work estimated to save about 269,000 kWh and UPS shutdown settings estimated to save about 767,000 kWh. The report presents the solar number as annual generation and the other two as estimated savings within a group sustainability table, not as facility consumption or power capacity. Still, references to chillers, cooling towers, UPS settings and energy management are evidence of an actively managed physical plant in Longtan.

Acer's 2025 CDP corporate questionnaire goes further. It says eDC's business includes colocation, managed hosting, outsourced network and system management, backup, disaster recovery and security, and that Acer calculates emissions from energy consumed by clients in the data centre for cloud business. The wording supports continuing customer load and energy measurement. It does not disclose the consumption amount, peak demand, contracted utility capacity, PUE, customer count or available headroom.

Together, these sources justify calling Longtan operational. They do not justify calling every square metre fitted, every rack powered or the site fully available under a component failure. The physical status is stronger than the initial thin-footprint hypothesis, but the capacity status remains opaque.

The operator is a current ACSI subsidiary, while the property boundary remains unclear

Acer eDC's corporate history matters because the site, company and services have moved across group boundaries. Acer's milestones page says the board approved separating the data-centre business from Acer CyberCenter Services, now Acer Cyber Security, and forming Acer e-Enabling Data Center in 2017. The current company register gives an incorporation date in January 2018. That explains why a facility operating since 2001 can sit inside a legal entity established much later.

The next boundary changed at the end of 2021. Acer Cyber Security's audited 2022 financial statements say ACSI acquired 100% of Acer eDC from parent Acer Inc. on 3 January 2022 for NT$475.748 million. Acer described the transaction as a common-control reorganisation. The current Acer eDC about page accordingly presents eDC as a subsidiary under Acer Cyber Security, stock code 6690.

The ownership is not merely a website label. ACSI's 2024 audited consolidated statements list Acer eDC in Taiwan as a 100%-owned subsidiary whose main business is uninterrupted-operation and IT-operation outsourcing services. The investee table reports 114,462 thousand shares, a carrying value of NT$1.363 billion and 2024 net income of NT$163.422 million. The Taiwan company register shows ACSI represented against all 114,462,350 issued shares. These are strong legal and financial operating signals.

They do not settle property ownership. Historical sources say Acer or its then-subsidiary built the Longtan centre. Current marketing says eDC has and operates the facility. No land-title, building-title or lease record was reviewed here, and the ACSI accounts do not split the subsidiary's carrying value into land, building, electrical plant, cloud equipment and working capital. The accurate boundary is that Acer eDC operates the Longtan offering and ACSI owns the corporate operator. It is not publicly established whether Acer eDC, another Acer group company or another party holds title to every part of the campus.

Acer's 2025 CDP questionnaire calls eDC a business unit of Acer Inc. That is understandable in a group environmental report but is less precise than the legal records. For customer contracting and incident escalation, ACSI is the immediate shareholder and Acer Inc. is the wider controlling group. Group branding should not blur which legal party promises colocation, owns customer contracts, controls AS17420 or pays for an emergency repair.

A large 2001 build still cannot answer a 2026 capacity question

Longtan was conceived at the height of the first internet data-centre expansion. An iThome launch report dated 18 October 2001 said the centre opened that day after NT$2.5 billion of investment, occupied about 19,000 ping and targeted customers needing more than 50 ping of private room space. It reported that the operator expected more than ten customers and more than 1,000 ping rented by year-end. Those contemporary figures help establish origin, scale and the initial dedicated-room commercial format.

ACSI's 2021 annual report records construction beginning in July 2000, formal external operation in October 2001, 18,000 ping of total area and 7,000 ping of computer-room area. It attributes the 99.999% figure to a January 2002 Flack & Kurtz certification concerning the reliability of the mechanical and electrical facilities, and it describes five layers of power protection. No reviewed source identifies that historical statement as an Uptime Institute Tier certification or as a current 2026 facility rating. These are historical design and certification statements preserved in a corporate chronology, not a current capacity test.

A migrated company news page dated December 2015 says the Longtan room had completed six years, or 52,560 hours, without an operating interruption. It also says the centre cost nearly NT$5 billion, had 18,575 ping in total, served more than 70 disaster-recovery customers and was 70% occupied. But the same text predicts occupancy reaching 95% in the second quarter of 2008. That chronology shows this is legacy material republished or migrated in 2015, not a 2015 occupancy survey. It is valuable history and poor current inventory evidence.

The old investment numbers differ as well: NT$2.5 billion in the 2001 launch report and nearly NT$5 billion on the later company page. They may use different scopes or accumulated investment periods, but the public material does not reconcile them. Neither amount represents today's replacement cost, present installed plant or expansion budget. Capital invested 25 years ago cannot be divided by floor area to infer current rack pricing or powered capacity.

Age also cuts in two directions. A site operating since 2001 has a long record, an established workforce and evidence of sustained customer use. It also has equipment generations, maintenance histories and renewal decisions that a launch brochure cannot capture. Switchgear, UPS modules, batteries, generators, chillers, controls, fire systems and network platforms may have been replaced, augmented or retired. The 2024 energy measures show active optimisation, but no current plant schedule shows what is original and what is new. The correct diligence question is not whether the building was impressive in 2001.

It is which components are installed, supported and tested now.

Power is described as redundant without being quantified

The strongest current power claim appears on Acer eDC's Chinese and English colocation pages. They say two different Taipower substations provide a dual-loop supply that can be expanded on demand. The product detail also says every 6U unit receives dual-loop 110V/3A power, and that the facility has dual-loop UPS and generation systems. That is more specific than a generic statement of resilience: it identifies two utility sources, two customer circuits and backup plant categories.

Yet the claim stops before the facts needed to assess a failure. The substations are not named. There is no feeder route, voltage, contracted demand, transformer schedule, main single-line diagram or statement that the two feeds avoid a common upstream transmission element. The words "two substations" establish claimed source diversity; they do not establish complete physical independence from grid to customer breaker.

The 110V/3A product allocation is a small-unit sales specification, not a site capacity figure. Multiplying voltage by current gives a nominal 330VA per circuit before power factor and product terms, but the page does not say whether both circuits may be loaded simultaneously, whether one is reserved for failover, how many 6U units exist, or what higher-density options remain available. It does not state breaker derating, phase balance, cabinet limits, cross-connect power or how a 42U or 58U rack is populated. A row of racks on a floor plan would not solve this without the electrical schedule behind it.

The UPS and generation claims are similarly unquantified. "Dual loop" does not reveal whether the architecture is 2N, 2(N+1), distributed redundant or another arrangement. No public source gives UPS module ratings, battery chemistry, battery autonomy, bypass topology, generator count, engine rating, fuel volume, full-load runtime, refuelling priority or recent load-bank results. The company offers 24-hour monitoring and lists spare-parts and staging areas, but it does not say which critical electrical spares are held on site.

This is where designed, installed, powered and usable capacity must remain separate. A design can reserve routes for two feeds. Installation means switchgear, transformers, UPS and generators are physically fitted. Powered capacity means utility and plant have been commissioned at a stated load. Operational capacity means the systems carry real production. Usable capacity subtracts sold load, maintenance reserve and the capacity that must remain free so the surviving path can carry customers after a failure. Acer eDC provides credible evidence for an operating facility and customer power product.

It does not disclose the totals needed to move from installation claims to usable megawatts.

Cooling evidence proves activity, not full-load resilience

The current colocation page says the data halls have dual-loop backup air conditioning. The dedicated-room page says eDC operates water, power, air conditioning, fire protection, CCTV, access control and a 24-hour building-management system. The 2024 sustainability report's chiller-condenser cleaning and cooling-tower airflow work corroborate the existence and active maintenance of central cooling plant at Longtan.

That combination is a useful improvement over marketing alone. It shows a company discussing the same cooling system in product, operations and environmental reporting. It still leaves the thermal envelope unknown. There is no current total refrigeration capacity, unit count, redundancy class, chilled-water storage, cooling-tower cell count, make-up water arrangement, temperature set point or high-density rack limit. The public record does not show whether each electrical zone has an independent cooling path or whether both loops share pumps, controls, headers or heat rejection.

The estimated 269,000 kWh saving from improved cooling-tower airflow should not be mistaken for cooling output. Energy saved is not thermal capacity, and an annual estimate says nothing about the site's hottest-hour margin. Similarly, the 89,000 kWh of solar generation reported for Longtan is a sustainability contribution, not backup energy. Without disclosed facility consumption, array rating, storage or an islanding arrangement, its share of load and its contribution during a grid outage cannot be calculated.

A capacity buyer needs an as-built cooling narrative tied to its room. That should identify design and current IT load, supply and return temperatures, containment, allowable rack density, normal and failure-mode unit count, maintenance isolation, water dependencies and alarm escalation. It should also state what happens after utility loss when generators are carrying load: which cooling components restart, in what sequence, and whether the battery bridge covers the entire transition. None of those answers can be inferred from dual-loop wording.

Seismic, fire and access controls are substantial claims with limited test visibility

Longtan's physical risk story is unusually detailed for a public colocation page. Acer eDC describes a six-storey precast reinforced-concrete building. It says the computer-room structure has three to five times the earthquake resistance of ordinary offices or factories and uses "level seven" seismic design. The English colocation page uses the shorthand "M7." Taiwan's Central Weather Administration defines intensity as the degree of surface vibration or damage and places Level 7 at the top of its intensity table. Acer eDC does not say whether its shorthand denotes that intensity scale, an earthquake magnitude or a design-code criterion, and it provides none of the engineering parameters needed to translate the claim into peak ground acceleration, structural code edition, equipment anchorage or current certification.

The fire-control description is also concrete. The company says every cabinet has very-early smoke detection, the rooms are air-locked and FM200 gas suppression is installed. Seven layers of access control, cards, palm recognition, man-traps, CCTV and a continuously staffed monitoring centre are listed. These controls are relevant to ignition detection, suppression and unauthorised access.

What remains unpublished is the as-built and test evidence. No current public report identifies fire compartments, suppression zones, reserve suppression medium, battery-room protection, generator and fuel separation, fire-water interfaces, detector test results or the most recent integrated exercise. There is no parcel-level flood, landslide or soil-liquefaction conclusion in the company material. Taiwan's National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction provides a public hazard-map platform, but a map viewer is not a substitute for a current site survey and must not be used to draw an exact facility conclusion without the relevant layers, elevation and equipment locations.

The absence of a public incident does not prove the absence of incidents, and a historical six-year interruption-free claim does not extend automatically to 2026. Conversely, no credible public evidence reviewed here shows that Longtan has suffered a facility fire, flood or prolonged outage. The defensible position is that meaningful prevention controls are claimed and the building has a long operating history, while current integrated-test and hazard-mitigation evidence remains private.

AS17420 is live, dual-homed and narrower than the building story

The network evidence is current and measurable. RIPEstat's AS overview identifies ACEREDC-TW and reports the autonomous system as announced. Its routing-status view shows a first observed route in February 2001 and, at the publication cut-off, four IPv4 prefixes covering 28,672 addresses plus one IPv6 /32. All reporting peers in the returned IPv4 and IPv6 samples saw the origin.

The announced-prefixes result lists 210.67.64.0/19, 210.241.128.0/19, 211.73.192.0/19, 211.79.192.0/20 and 2403:9f00::/32. Public descriptions retain several historical names: Acer Internet Services, PAGIC.net, PAGIC Information and Acer eDC. This is a reminder that routed address space can preserve corporate and service history. The aggregate count should not be interpreted as 28,672 addresses available for new eDC customers, and address quantity says nothing about servers, racks or storage.

Route-origin hygiene is a positive signal. RIPEstat returned valid RPKI status for 210.67.64.0/19, 210.241.128.0/19, 211.73.192.0/19, 211.79.192.0/20 and 2403:9f00::/32. Valid origin authorisation reduces one class of route-origin error. It does not protect the site from a fibre cut, router failure, upstream outage, route leak elsewhere or power loss.

The ASN-neighbours view sees two adjacent networks: AS4780, Digital United, and AS9924, Taiwan Fixed Network. APNIC's public AS17420 Whois entity declares export policies to both networks and default policies from both. BGP.tools and Hurricane Electric's AS17420 page independently show the same two IPv4 and IPv6 adjacencies. This is credible logical upstream diversity, not evidence of two physically independent carrier paths.

Physical carrier diversity remains unresolved. The dedicated-room page says all domestic fixed-network providers have circuits connecting to eDC rooms. That may include private customer circuits, managed lines and carriers that do not provide public transit to AS17420. It does not conflict with two visible BGP upstreams. Neither statement identifies building entrances, meet-me rooms, duct paths, poles, splice points or common crossings. Two carrier contracts can still share a campus entrance, metro duct or upstream facility.

PeeringDB illustrates the disclosure gap. The public AS17420 network record is regional, enterprise-classified and last updated in 2022. It reports a 100-1000 Mbps traffic band, but no public exchange or facility attachment. The separate Acer eDC facility record, updated in September 2025, lists the Longtan address but zero networks, exchanges and carriers. This does not mean the active ASN is absent from the site; the shared address and company material make that unlikely. It means PeeringDB does not publicly bind the network to the facility or enumerate its carriers, so it cannot be used as physical route proof.

Designed, installed, lit, sold and usable capacity remain different measurements

The area and network facts allow several positive statements. A large dedicated-room building exists. Colocation units, full racks and private rooms are marketed. Customer circuits, internet access, cloud compute, storage, security and operational support are offered. An active autonomous system originates substantial address space through two visible upstreams. Current energy reporting and certifications indicate continuing management.

They do not allow a current capacity total. The public product gives 42U and 58U rack formats, 6U increments, dual 110V/3A circuits, one 100 Mbps Ethernet port per 6U unit and adjustable bandwidth. It never states how many racks are fitted. There is no count of private rooms, occupied rooms, reserved expansion, powered shells or cabinets ready for delivery. The 70% historical occupancy and 95% forecast belong to legacy text looking toward 2008 and cannot be carried forward.

Design capacity is the intended end state. Installed capacity is physically fitted plant and racks. Lit network capacity is commissioned interfaces and circuits. Powered capacity is the IT load the electrical and cooling systems can support now. Sold or reserved capacity has already been promised. Operational capacity carries customer load. Available capacity is what can be delivered within a stated lead time. Failure-condition usable capacity is what remains after a feed, UPS path, cooling loop, router, upstream or room is removed.

Acer eDC publishes pieces of design and product specification but no complete bridge across those states. The 61,500-square-metre claim is gross physical scale. The 23,200-square-metre figure is a hosting-room area claim. The rack dimensions are product design. The 100 Mbps port is a baseline offer. The two observed upstreams are lit logical relationships. None states current inventory or surviving capacity.

The financial figures should remain separate too. Paid-in capital, investment carrying value and net income prove a substantial operating company. They do not identify capital committed to Longtan or the amount required to refresh its plant. Likewise, ISO certification shows management systems within a defined scope. Acer eDC's current certificate page lists ISO 50001 energy management, ISO 14001 environmental management, ISO 27001 information security, ISO 27017 and 27018 cloud controls, ISO 20000 service management and CSA STAR dates extending into 2026, 2027 or 2028. Certification is valuable assurance; it is not a rack-availability schedule or a substitute for an electrical load test.

Disaster recovery is a service discipline, not proof of a second live site

Acer eDC has a long disaster-recovery history. Its current DR service page traces a SunGard collaboration to 2002 and describes business impact analysis, RTO, RPO, cold, warm and hot sites, synchronous and asynchronous replication, network and DNS switching, failover, failback and drills. This is a credible service methodology. The company's information-security policy also says important information must be backed up and maps certification scope to shared emergency backup-centre service, hosting, bandwidth and facility service.

What the page does not do is identify the current backup location for any eDC product or customer. The old interruption-free article said a satellite room in Neihu could back up Longtan. The present PeeringDB organisation lists only Longtan. The current DR page names no second facility. Taiwan's government cloud-procurement listing for eDC Cloud explicitly tells buyers to confirm the location of an off-site backup room before purchase. That caution fits the evidence: backup location and service tier are contract-specific, not implied by the Longtan campus.

The company's hybrid-cloud page offers Azure as a DR site and distinguishes backup, pilot light, warm standby and multi-site patterns. It correctly shows different speed and cost. But an architecture menu is not a statement that every eDC workload has a warm Azure copy, that customers have funded the required licences and replication, or that DNS and identity will switch successfully.

For a customer, the proof must be workload-specific. Which data is replicated? How far away is the destination? Does it avoid Longtan power, cooling, carrier, staff and control-plane dependencies? Is the copy immutable? Who declares a disaster? Which DNS, firewall, identity and certificate changes are required? What RPO and RTO are contracted? What was restored in the last drill, and at what measured rate? Can the recovery environment carry full demand or only a priority subset? Public material describes how eDC can answer these questions as a service provider, but it does not answer them for a generic colocation or eDC Cloud purchase.

The most credible failure paths are ordinary and coupled

Power is the first path because all other systems depend on it. The company says the site receives two Taipower loops and has UPS and generation. A prolonged utility event tests whether the loops are truly independent, batteries bridge generator start, engines accept load, cooling restarts, fuel is available and operators can maintain the sequence. A maintenance error in a common bypass or control system can defeat redundant hardware. Uptime Intelligence's 2026 outage analysis says power remains the leading cause of impactful outages and highlights UPS, transfer-switch and generator failures. That industry evidence explains what to test; it does not establish any Acer eDC failure.

Cooling is the second path. A chiller, pump, tower, control valve or common header can reduce room capacity before servers lose electrical power. Dual loops help only if the surviving loop has enough heat-rejection capacity and can be isolated during repair. High humidity, water treatment and prolonged hot-weather operation add constraints. Acer's documented cooling work is positive, but the available margin is unknown.

Carrier access is the third path. AS17420 has two visible upstreams, while company material says all domestic fixed-line providers connect. A router fault, cross-connect problem, common duct cut or shared upstream facility can still affect both logical paths. Customer private circuits may fail independently of internet transit. A customer should inspect route drawings and conduct controlled withdrawal tests rather than count logos or BGP neighbours.

Fire is the fourth path. VESDA and FM200 can detect and suppress an incipient equipment-room event, but batteries, switchgear, generators, fuel, cables and shared plant create different zones. Suppression can preserve equipment while access restrictions delay repair. A fire alarm, even without fire damage, can trigger shutdown or block staff. The relevant proof is current compartmentation and integrated testing, not a photograph of detectors.

Seismic and weather events are the fifth path. The robust structural claim and long history matter in Taiwan, but building survival is only one layer. Racks, overhead services, batteries, pipes, tanks, generators, ducts and access roads must remain usable. A typhoon can combine grid faults, transport disruption and fuel-delivery delay without directly damaging the building. Parcel-level hazard and equipment anchorage evidence would settle more than the broad "level seven" statement.

Operational change is the sixth path. ACSI owns eDC and sells security services alongside facility, cloud and network operations. Shared monitoring can improve response, but coupled credentials, software, support staff or change windows can also carry an error across services. Acer eDC's information-security and privacy policy addresses capacity, change management, network segregation, backups, logs and supplier assessment. Buyers still need incident records and service-specific escalation to know how those controls perform.

Who is affected when Longtan or AS17420 fails

The company's current about page identifies multinational companies, financial groups, government agencies, manufacturers and ecommerce businesses as customer classes. The dedicated-room page emphasises customers requiring physical separation and independent access control, especially finance. These users do not all experience failure in the same way.

A colocation tenant may retain ownership of servers but depend on eDC for building access, power, cooling, fire protection and remote hands. If a utility or cooling event develops, the tenant cannot solve it by moving a virtual machine unless it already has capacity elsewhere. A private-room customer may have extra physical separation yet share the same upstream plant. A customer using internet bandwidth may stay powered but become unreachable through a route or fibre failure.

An eDC Cloud customer depends on a deeper stack: compute hosts, shared storage, virtual networking, the Cloud Smart Portal, identity, monitoring and support. The public-cloud page promises self-service compute, storage, network and security with a 24-hour service centre. It does not publish region count, availability zones, host headroom, storage-failure domains or restore performance. A portal can continue responding while a workload is impaired, or fail while underlying virtual machines continue running; customers need independent monitoring.

A disaster-recovery customer may be affected before a declared disaster. Replication congestion, expired credentials, incomplete application consistency or an untested DNS change can make a nominal copy unusable. If Longtan is itself the recovery site for a customer's primary environment, the customer's risk depends on the independence of its primary facility from Longtan. If Azure is the recovery site, the dependencies shift toward cloud identity, network egress, licences and the customer's ability to operate in that environment.

AS17420's route space also contains legacy service names. A network event could affect users and hosted services that do not recognise the Acer eDC brand. Conversely, not every eDC customer necessarily uses AS17420; a dedicated room can use a customer's own carrier and addresses. The blast radius cannot be calculated from 28,672 originated IPv4 addresses or marketing customer classes. It requires a service map that joins contract, room, power path, carrier, address, DNS, backup and support owner.

ACSI and the wider Acer group may also be affected through intercompany services and reputation. Audited accounts show material intercompany transactions, but they do not identify which workloads use Longtan. It would be wrong to declare every ACSI or Acer service dependent on this one site. The narrower conclusion is that eDC is an important operating subsidiary and shared group service relationships make boundary documentation necessary.

What evidence would convert area into buyable resilience

The first requirement is a dated capacity schedule. It should state total commissioned critical IT load, installed and reserved load, current customer load, maintenance reserve and available capacity by room. Rack inventory should be split into installed, occupied, reserved, powered and immediately deliverable units. High-density limits and delivery lead times should be explicit. A square-metre figure without these states is a property description.

The second requirement is an electrical evidence pack. A customer does not need sensitive public diagrams, but it should receive a controlled single-line view showing the two utility feeds, substations, feeder paths, transformers, switchgear, UPS, bypass, generators and customer A/B distribution. It should include current protection studies, battery tests, generator load tests, full-load runtime assumptions, fuel contracts, refuelling procedure and maintenance-isolation results. The key test is whether the surviving path can carry contracted critical load during the loss and maintenance of the other.

The third is a cooling evidence pack tied to electrical load. It should show normal and failure-mode capacity, common components, restart sequence, water dependency, temperature and humidity limits, rack-density rules and the latest integrated systems test. Energy-efficiency projects should be accompanied by measured baselines rather than used as proxies for resilience.

The fourth is carrier evidence. Name the production upstreams and private-circuit carriers, then show building entrances, meet-me rooms, campus paths and metro routes at an appropriate confidentiality level. Confirm which circuits share ducts or upstream facilities. Demonstrate AS17420 failover by withdrawing each transit in a controlled window, and show customer monitoring from outside both providers. Keep RPKI and route records current for every production prefix.

The fifth is workload recovery evidence. For colocation, show remote-hands escalation, spare parts, access during an emergency and equipment-removal rights. For eDC Cloud, show host evacuation, storage recovery, control-plane dependency and restore tests. For managed DR, show the last failover and failback report, achieved RPO and RTO, recovered workload scope, destination capacity and unresolved findings. A generic daily-drill statement should become a dated customer result.

The sixth is contractual clarity. Identify Acer eDC as operator and contracting party, ACSI's role, any Acer group property owner, carriers, cloud partners and key maintenance suppliers. State service measurement points, maintenance exclusions, credits, termination assistance, data export, equipment access and emergency authority. Certifications can support this pack, but they do not replace it.

The evidence grade is Medium for operation and Weak for usable capacity

Acer eDC is not merely a company name attached to an internet number. It is an approved Taiwan company, a wholly owned and profitable ACSI subsidiary, a current colocation and cloud seller, the operator associated with a large Longtan facility, an energy-reporting site and the holder of an active routed network. Its address is consistent across legal, facility and internet-number records. Current certification dates, energy measures and route observations support continued operations.

The facility evidence is stronger than its capacity evidence. Current company pages describe a large six-storey site, dual Taipower loops, dual-loop cooling, UPS, generation, fire controls, private rooms, colocation units and 24-hour operations. Historical reports establish a 2001 opening and substantial investment. The current network has two observed upstreams and valid origin authorisation. These are meaningful signals.

But no reviewed public source states a current MW figure, installed rack count, occupied load, sellable inventory, generator endurance, battery autonomy, measured PUE, full-load cooling result or customer failover outcome. The site-area translations conflict. The last public occupancy percentage belongs to legacy text about 2008. An old Neihu backup-room reference is not current multi-site proof. Logical upstream diversity is not a map of physically independent fibre.

The final network evidence grade is therefore Medium: AS17420 is active, visible through two upstreams and RPKI-valid, but physical carrier paths are not disclosed. The customer-ready capacity grade is Weak: Longtan is plainly real and operating, yet design, installation, powered load, sold load, available load and failure-condition usability cannot be quantified. Acer eDC's most important next disclosure would not be another claim about gross floor area. It would be a dated statement of commissioned critical load, remaining headroom and the capacity that survives the loss of one power, cooling and carrier path.