Summary

  • SeaTelecom Nord-West is a verifiable retail communications operator with published tariffs, licence references, support duties, restoration terms and dated incident notices.
  • RIPE records link three IPv4 blocks totalling 1,280 addresses to SeaTelecom, but their route objects name AS31444, an autonomous system assigned to SeaExpress Ltd.; that proves a routing arrangement, not its corporate or physical form.
  • Continuity due diligence should record the symptom, cause, controller, restoration and remedy separately. Public route visibility and contractual targets are evidence at different layers, not a substitute for measured outcomes.

On 24 August 2026, Scrollnet subscribers received two very different explanations for what could look like the same problem. One SeaTelecom Nord-West notice said work on Rosseti electricity networks had interrupted all services in Repola, Myalki, Chulkovo and SNT Pervomayskoye, with service expected to resume automatically after the work. Another reported widespread problems in Russia with Google’s public DNS addresses and asked customers without connectivity to obtain resolver settings automatically from the provider.

The notices are valuable because they expose the diagnostic boundary. A device that cannot resolve a domain name, a powered-down access node and a withdrawn route can all be reported as “the Internet is down”. They are not the same event. They have different controllers, different remedies and different evidence. The company notices state an attribution and an estimated response; they do not independently verify the external cause, the number of affected subscribers or the actual restoration time.

The operator’s identity is not in doubt. The official site names ООО «Си Телеком Северо-Запад», INN 4703149530 and KPP 470301001, at an address in Bugry in the Leningrad region. Its 2026 data notice gives OGRN 1174704005233. RIPE’s ORG-SNL56-RIPE record names SeaTelecom Nord-West Ltd., carries the same registration number, email and telephone, and classifies the organisation as a local Internet registry. This joins the legal, customer and network-resource records without relying on a similar name.

The commercial surface is equally concrete. The current Scrollnet site markets address-dependent residential tiers from 30 to 700 Mbit/s, lists dedicated-IP availability on several plans and asks business prospects to obtain a feasibility and price quote for their location. An August 2023 public offer says the operator acts under four communications licence numbers covering channels, non-voice data transmission, telematic services and wired radio. That is evidence of what the operator represented in the offer; it is not a fresh check of each licence in the regulator’s register.

The offer also defines a customer-control surface. Service is to be continuous except while sudden failures are repaired or planned work is performed. Planned preventive or repair work is to be announced on the site at least 24 hours in advance. When service is suspended through the operator’s fault, the text sets a restoration target of no later than two working days after the subscriber contacts technical support. An operator-caused interruption longer than three hours qualifies for a written-request recalculation proportional to a daily share of the monthly fixed fee.

Those clauses matter, but they are not performance statistics. The public record does not show the share of faults restored inside two working days, the distribution of restoration times, the number of qualifying interruptions or the value of recalculations. The trigger also depends on attribution: the contract speaks of interruption through the operator’s fault, while the power notice attributes the cause to a utility and the DNS notice points to an external resolver. A customer can experience one failed service while the evidence ledger assigns control across several organisations.

The routing records add a second boundary. RIPE data assign 185.237.236.0/23 and 185.237.238.0/23 to ORG-SNL56-RIPE and sub-allocate 83.68.61.0/24 to it. Route records for all three name origin AS31444 and use the MNT-SEANET maintainer. Together, the explicitly SeaTelecom-linked blocks contain 1,280 IPv4 addresses. That count is not the number of subscribers, active addresses, premises or owned network assets.

AS31444 is not assigned to SeaTelecom in the RIPE Database. Its object names SEANET-AS and points to ORG-SL17-RIPE; that organisation object names SeaExpress Ltd. At RIPEstat’s 27 August 2026 observation, AS31444 originated ten visible IPv4 prefixes covering 9,216 addresses, was seen by all 327 IPv4 RIS peers in the returned set, had 36 observed neighbours and no visible IPv6 prefix. Only three prefixes in this evidence set are explicitly linked to SeaTelecom, so the AS-wide totals cannot be presented as SeaTelecom’s estate.

The shared maintainer and route origin demonstrate coordination at the registry and routing-policy layer. They do not disclose whether the companies share ownership, staff, routers, transit contracts, ducts or power. Nor do they identify who has final authority to change a route or lead a customer incident. The legal, commercial and operational relationship between SeaTelecom and SeaExpress remains an unknown that should be answered directly, not inferred from a database field.

Route-origin protection is another bounded fact. RIPEstat returned unknown, with no validating ROA, for each of the three SeaTelecom-linked prefixes when tested against AS31444. Unknown is not invalid and it is not evidence of a hijack. It means the captured RPKI result did not provide cryptographic origin authorisation for those exact announcements. A future valid ROA would strengthen origin assurance; it would still say nothing about batteries, field repair or resolver operation.

The honest assessment is therefore neither that the network is fragile nor that it is resilient. SeaTelecom publishes useful customer terms, live tariffs and timely-looking notices; RIPE records expose identifiable resources and a visible routing path through SeaExpress’s ASN. What is missing is a control map and an outcome ledger: which party operates each layer, how physical failure domains are separated, when incidents started and ended, how many customers were affected, and whether the promised remedy was delivered.

Selected primary evidence: SeaTelecom’s official site, 24 August power notice, 24 August DNS notice, public service offer, SeaTelecom RIPE organisation record, AS31444 RIPE record, and RIPEstat routing status. Complete source register: S01, S02, S03, S04, S05, S06, S07, S08, S09, S10, S11, S12, S13, S14, S15