Summary

  • NovaCloud-Hosting (Tech Tide Portugal Unipessoal LDA, AS209874) declared its FFM2 datacenter outage — a Major outage running 20 July to 8 August 2026 — resolved on 8 August 2026; six weeks later, the operator's public routing and registry record shows no measurable correction of the contradictions documented in prior coverage.
  • Four mutually incompatible upstream lists still coexist: the operator's ASN microsite names PletX (AS62403), Tube-Hosting (AS49581) and IP-Projects (AS48314); bgp.tools shows SMARTNET (AS203446), Tube-Hosting (AS49581) and TELE90 (AS215787); ipregistry repeats the operator's trio; and the operator's own incident narrative names AS203446, AS215787 and PletX.
  • The /24 prefix 5.83.150.0/24, registered to the operator on 3 February 2026 under ORG-TTPU1-RIPE with a geofeed and a route object, remains not visible in the global routing table according to bgp.tools.
  • Registry mirrors disagree on the route object's own creation date — 28 April 2025 on bgp.tools versus 11 September 2026 on ipregistry — a contradiction that makes any dated chronology of the operator's network build-out unreliable from public sources alone.

When NovaCloud-Hosting declared the FFM2 incident resolved on 8 August 2026, the natural question was whether the weeks that followed would bring the operator's public record into line with itself. The answer, from a fresh read of the routing and registry sources on 1 October 2026, is that they have not. The gaps documented in BTW's 29–30 September coverage — between what the operator announces and what third parties can observe — remain in place, in some respects sharpened.

Start with the upstream lists. On its own ASN microsite, the operator still names three active upstreams: AS62403 PletX GmbH, AS49581 Ferdinand Zink (trading as Tube-Hosting) and AS48314 IP-Projects GmbH & Co. KG, all marked Active https://as209874.net/. The registry-observed picture is different. bgp.tools shows the current upstream set for AS209874 as AS203446 SMARTNET LIMITED, AS49581 Tube-Hosting and AS215787 TELE90 Telecom GmbH https://bgp.tools/as/209874 — a set that excludes PletX and IP-Projects entirely. ipregistry, a registry-derived mirror, repeats the operator's trio (AS48314, AS49581, AS62403) in data dated 26 February 2026 https://ipregistry.co/AS209874. And the operator's own incident narrative for the July outage named AS203446, AS215787 and PletX as the operative transit paths https://novacloud-hosting.instatus.com/cmrsxwgnz06wh1ao0b04o4obb. That is four combinations across three source classes, none identical, and the comparison with the 30 September baseline shows no drift toward convergence.

The incident itself remains the anchor for any time comparison. The operator's status record dates the FFM2 Major outage from 20 July 2026 to 8 August 2026 — 19 days — and attributes tunnel and TCP connection failures to "false filtering" by PletX dropping GRE/TCP traffic https://novacloud-hosting.instatus.com/cmrsxwgnz06wh1ao0b04o4obb. Notably, the same incident record is duplicated on a second instatus subdomain with identical dates https://novacloud.instatus.com/cmrsxwgnz06wh1ao0b04o4obb, fragmenting the operator's own status history. And as of 1 October 2026, the main status page still displays a "Potential Disruption Affecting FFM2" banner while the July incident is marked Resolved — two incident states coexisting on the operator's own surfaces https://novacloud-hosting.instatus.com/.

The clearest single gap is a prefix that exists in the registry but not in the routing table. bgp.tools marks 5.83.150.0/24 as not visible in the DFZ, even though the prefix carries a RIPE inetnum (netname NovaCloudHosting, org ORG-TTPU1-RIPE, created 3 February 2026) and a route object with origin AS209874 https://bgp.tools/prefix/5.83.150.0/24. The organisation object behind it is well-formed: ORG-TTPU1-RIPE is Tech Tide Portugal Unipessoal LDA, registered in Quarteira, Portugal on 8 November 2024, and the inetnum carries country DE, maintainer GHOSTNET-MNT, a note that IP data is managed by noez.de, and a geofeed at cdn.web.novacloud-hosting.com https://ipregistry.co/AS209874/5.83.150.0/24. In other words, every piece of paperwork that should precede routability is present — and the route is still not announced. That is the announced-versus-operable gap in its purest form, and six weeks after the outage it is unchanged.

Even the dating of the paperwork is contested. bgp.tools renders the route object for 5.83.150.0/24 as created 28 April 2025; ipregistry's reproduction of the same object shows a creation date of 11 September 2026 https://bgp.tools/prefix/5.83.150.0/24. For a network whose marketing claims rest on build-out speed, a public record that cannot agree on when its own route object came into existence is more than a footnote: it means no independent chronology of this operator's network can be assembled from public mirrors without stating which mirror one trusts and why.

Layer in the aut-num object itself. The RIPE registration for AS209874 carries as-name TECHTIDE, org ORG-MWUL2-RIPE, sponsoring-org ORG-SL1164-RIPE, maintainers RIPE-NCC-END-MNT, SBL-MNT and novacloud-mnt, created 24 April 2025 and last modified 26 February 2026 https://apps.db.ripe.net/db-web-ui/query?searchtext=AS209874&types=aut-num. The organisation named there (ORG-MWUL2-RIPE) differs from the organisation on the prefix (ORG-TTPU1-RIPE), while the legal entity named on the operator's own homepage — Tech Tide Portugal Unipessoal LDA, VAT PT517354420, founded 2023, with infrastructure claimed in Frankfurt, Nuremberg and Eygelshoven https://novacloud-hosting.com/ — matches the prefix-side organisation. The homepage also asserts an owned ASN with dual-stack IP transit across Europe https://as209874.net/, which is exactly the announcement that the third-party record tests.

Where does the peering story stand? bgp.tools lists 9 peers and 6 downstreams for AS209874 https://bgp.tools/as/209874, while ipregistry states flatly that the ASN has no direct peering agreements and reaches the internet only through transit providers https://ipregistry.co/AS209874. The two sources disagree on a basic, binary question: does this network peer or not. Supplementary mirrors add texture without resolution. Hurricane Electric's copy of the routing data and ipinfo's ASN page both carry figures that diverge from bgp.tools on prefix counts — Hurricane Electric shows 34 prefixes (17 IPv4, 17 IPv6) in the prior BTW baseline, bgp.tools shows 22 IPv4 and 16 IPv6 https://ipinfo.io/AS209874. A third-party whois mirror records 5.231.96.0/24 as part of the operator's holdings https://whois.ipip.net/AS209874/5.231.96.0/24. BTW's own prior reporting documented the same pattern of mirror divergence on 29 September https://btw.media/en/novacloud-as209874-routing-mirrors and the announced-service gap in the original first-hand re-check on 29 September https://btw.media/en/novacloud-hosting-announced-versus-routed.

One further operator surface adds instability rather than clarity: a second instatus status page, novacloud.instatus.com, duplicates the incident record and carries its own prefix and upstream figures https://novacloud-hosting.instatus.com/cmrodnyxv06gz0kmrkcnlpw2v. A single scrape of the operator's status infrastructure therefore misses part of the record — a methodological trap for anyone tracking this target.

The conclusion is a negative one, and it is precisely stated: compared against the 30 September 2026 baseline, the bgp.tools upstream and origination picture is essentially unchanged, 5.83.150.0/24 remains registry-only, the upstream lists still do not agree with each other or with the registry as-set, and no public source has corrected any of the contradictions documented in prior coverage https://btw.media/en/novacloud-as209874-routing-mirrors. Six weeks after a 19-day outage, this operator's public network record is not converging on truth — it is standing still.