Summary

  • NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED (APNIC organisation object ORG-NGN2-AP, Yangon, Myanmar) concentrates administrative, technical and abuse accountability for three autonomous systems — its own AS151210 and two sponsored customers, AS152663 and AS153311 — on a single registry role object, NCLA4-AP, which lists itself as both admin-c and tech-c [1][3].
  • The holder record for sponsored AS152663 diverges across public mirrors: bgp.tools and RTSak still render it as SMART & SHINE COMPANY LIMITED (ORG-SSCL4-AP) with a registry last-modified stamp of 2024-03-27, while Robtex renders it as NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED (ORG-NGN2-AP, as-name NCL-AS-AP) with a stamp of 2026-07-02 [5][6][8].
  • The authoritative APNIC RDAP endpoint for AS152663 could not be read during this investigation, so the holder question remains unresolved at the registry of record — and no public mirror can substitute for that primary source [13].
  • A previously unreported asymmetry separates the two sponsored customers: SMART & SHINE's organisation object carries a mailbox on its own domain distinct from the sponsor's nexgenetwork.com, while SMMCL's organisation object carries a mailbox inside the sponsor's own domain [4][9].
  • The sole route object associated with AS152663 — a RADB route6 for 2401:8d20::/32 — is maintained by a Thai third party, MAINT-AS137557, rather than NEXGENET's own MAINT-NCL-MM, with rpki-ov-state reported as not_found [6].
  • AS151210 remains the only live network in the family: prefixes 103.132.102.0/24, 103.132.103.0/24 and 2001:df2:5fc0::/48, with exchange presence at BKNIX (20 Gbps), TH-IX (10 Gbps) and BGP.Exchange-Bangkok, updated during 2026 [7][10].

One Contact Object, Three Autonomous Systems, One Unanswered Question

Every organisation that holds internet number resources at APNIC is reachable through a chain of registry objects: an organisation object, role and person objects that carry administrative and technical contacts, an IRT object that carries the abuse contact, and the aut-num objects that name those contacts. The design assumes that the chain leads somewhere — that a person, or at least a monitored mailbox, answers at the end of it.

For NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED, the chain leads to itself. The role object NCLA4-AP, titled 'NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED administrator', names itself as both its own administrative contact and its own technical contact, carries the sponsor's nexgenetwork.com mailbox, is maintained by MAINT-NCL-MM, and was last modified on 3 May 2023 [1]. No individual appears anywhere in the object. The organisation object above it, ORG-NGN2-AP, gives the same Thuzitar Road address in North Okkalapa Township, Yangon, the same nexgenetwork.com mailbox, and a last-modified stamp of 5 September 2023 [3].

That circularity is the starting point for this report, not its conclusion. Three autonomous systems route their accountability through this one self-referential object:

AS151210 is NEXGENET's own network. It is registered directly to ORG-NGN2-AP with the same contact chain, last modified 3 May 2023 [7]. Unlike the other two, it demonstrably operates. Public mirror data lists its delegated prefixes as 103.132.102.0/24, 103.132.103.0/24 and the IPv6 allocation 2001:df2:5fc0::/48, all under the netname NCL-MM [7]. It holds exchange ports at BKNIX in Bangkok at 20 Gbps, TH-IX at 10 Gbps, and two BGP.Exchange-Bangkok entries, with the mirror entries updated during 2026 [7]. This is the footprint of a functioning regional transit operator, not a paper registry presence.

AS152663 is the problem child. It was registered on 27 March 2024, sponsored by NEXGENET on behalf of SMART & SHINE COMPANY LIMITED [5]. Its holder record is now written differently by different public mirrors — a divergence examined in detail below — and the ASN originates zero prefixes in either address family. It has been absent from the global routing table throughout the period covered by public trackers [5].

AS153311 is the newest sponsored number. It is registered as SMMCL-AS-MM for the organisation ORG-SA237-AP (SMMCL, org-type OTHER), with an address in Keng Tung, Eastern Shan State, sponsored by ORG-NGN2-AP, last modified 2 September 2024 [9]. Its live status in the global table is thinner in the public record than AS151210's; what the registry record establishes is the sponsorship relationship and its contact chain, which is identical to the other two.

The Two Mailboxes That Should Not Match

The newest signal in the record — and the one not documented in BTW's earlier coverage of this operator — is a contradiction in how the two sponsored customers present their own contactability.

SMART & SHINE COMPANY LIMITED is registered as ORG-SSCL4-AP, with an address at Level 2, Room 201, #838 Thuzitar Road — the same building as NEXGENET's own registered address — and its last-modified stamp is 27 March 2024, unchanged [4]. Its organisation object names NCLA4-AP as both admin-c and tech-c, which is ordinary: sponsored customers routinely borrow the sponsor's contact chain. What is less ordinary is its mailbox. The e-mail on ORG-SSCL4-AP sits on a domain that belongs to neither the sponsor nor any nexgenetwork.com property [4].

Whatever corporate relationship connects SMART & SHINE to NEXGENET, the customer's own registered contact address sits on infrastructure the sponsor does not appear to control.

SMMCL, by contrast, is registered as ORG-SA237-AP with a mailbox inside the sponsor's own domain [9]. The customer's only publicly recorded contact route runs through the sponsor's mail infrastructure.

Set the two side by side and the asymmetry is hard to dismiss as noise. One sponsored customer presents an independent domain; the other presents a domain owned by the entity sponsoring it. Neither pattern is prohibited, and neither proves anything about control by itself. But the pairing constrains the plausible interpretations of the relationship. If sponsorship at this LIR is a simple commercial service, one would expect either a uniform pattern (all customers on the sponsor's domain, for convenience) or full independence (all customers on their own domains).

The observed split — one independent, one absorbed — suggests two different kinds of relationship between the same sponsor and its two customers, and it gives the disputed AS152663 case a specific shape: the disputed original holder is the customer with the independent domain.

The Holder Record That Mirrors Cannot Agree On

The AS152663 divergence has been covered in BTW's briefing coverage, but this investigation places the two sides of the conflict directly against each other with current renderings.

The 'unchanged' side: bgp.tools reproduces the aut-num as as-name SMARTSHINECOMPANYLIMITED-AS-MM, descr SMART & SHINE COMPANY LIMITED, org ORG-SSCL4-AP, sponsoring-org ORG-NGN2-AP, with the registry last-modified stamp of 27 March 2024, and separately reports that the ASN is not in the global routing table with zero IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes originated [5]. RTSak independently reproduces the same SMART & SHINE object with the same 2024-03-27 stamp [8].

The 'changed' side: Robtex renders the same ASN as as-name NCL-AS-AP, descr NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED, org ORG-NGN2-AP, with a last-modified stamp of 2 July 2026 [6]. That rendering, if accurate to the registry, would mean the holder field of AS152663 was rewritten in the sponsor's favour more than two years after the original registration — precisely the kind of change that would resolve the accountability question by making the sponsor and the holder the same party.

The problem is that this cannot be verified from mirrors, and the primary source refused to cooperate. The authoritative RDAP endpoint at rdap.apnic.net/autnum/152663 could not be read during this research run [13]. APNIC itself documents RDAP as its machine-readable registry access interface — the canonical way to read an aut-num without mirror-layer interpretation [15]. Until that endpoint is readable, every rendering of AS152663's holder — including the ones in this report — is a mirror-layer artefact, and the question of who actually holds AS152663 remains formally open at the registry of record.

The Route Object Maintained by a Third Party

One further detail sharpens the picture. Robtex's rendering of AS152663 shows exactly one route object associated with the ASN: a RADB route6 for 2401:8d20::/32, origin AS152663, maintained by MAINT-AS137557, with a change record attributed to a contact at the Thai operator in April 2024, and rpki-ov-state reported as not_found [6].

Two things are notable. First, the maintainer is not NEXGENET's own MAINT-NCL-MM, even though the aut-num object's mnt-routes field — as rendered by bgp.tools — names MAINT-NCL-MM as the route maintainer [5]. A route object for the ASN maintained outside the sponsor's maintainer chain is inconsistent with the authority chain shown on the registry object itself. Second, the maintainer's change record points at intergateway.co.th, a Thai operator, and Robtex lists AS152663 in as-sets including AS-SBN-IIG, AS-INTERNATIONALGATEWAY and AS45430:AS-AWN-IIG — Thai IIG as-set namespaces [6][7].

The only routing identity ever attached to this otherwise invisible ASN was written and maintained from Thailand, not from Yangon.

This does not resolve the holder question; it relocates it. The registry record says one thing about who may announce routes for AS152663, and the operational record says a third party once prepared to do so on its behalf. Both can be true without any wrongdoing — sponsored-route maintenance by an upstream is common — but together they describe an ASN whose recorded control and its operational preparation never fully overlapped.

The Accountability Surface, Dated

The freshest dated signal in the record is the abuse mailbox validation. The IRT object IRT-NCL-MM carries an abuse mailbox inside the sponsor's domain with a validation remark dated 7 July 2026, mirrored in the auto-generated abuse role AN3144-AP, which is generated from the IRT object, names NCLA4-AP as admin-c and tech-c, and was last modified 7 July 2026 [2]. APNIC's abuse-validation tooling confirmed that the mailbox accepts mail on that date.

What the validation does not do is identify a person. The AN3144-AP object itself carries the tell-tale inconsistencies of an auto-generated placeholder: country ZZ — the registry's code for unspecified — and a placeholder phone number, alongside the real Thuzitar Road Yangon address [2]. The mailbox is real; the role that holds it is anonymous by construction; and the person who reads that mailbox is named nowhere in the public registry.

Read together with the 2023 stamps on the organisation and role objects [1][3], the record describes an accountability surface that is maintained but not attributed: someone keeps the mailbox alive, no one is accountable by name, and the last time any human-visible detail in the core contact objects changed was May and September 2023 — before either of the two sponsored customers was registered.

What the Record Establishes, and What It Does Not

The evidence assembled here supports three bounded conclusions. First, NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED is a functioning regional transit operator on its own ASN, with verifiable prefixes and current exchange presence [7]. Second, its sponsorship of two customer ASNs is real in the registry sense, and the two customer relationships are structurally different from each other, as the mailbox-domain asymmetry shows [4][9].

Third, the AS152663 holder question — the central unresolved control question in this family — is no closer to an answer than it was when BTW first documented the mirror divergence, because the registry of record remains unreadable directly [13][15].

What the record does not establish is equally important. No public evidence names the individuals behind NEXGENET COMPANY LIMITED or its role object. No public evidence documents the commercial terms of either sponsorship. And no public evidence resolves whether the 2026-07-02 holder rendering on one mirror reflects a genuine registry change or a mirror-layer reconstruction. Each of these gaps is a standing question that only a primary-source read — or a registry action visible in a dated object change — could close.

Sources consulted