Summary

  • APNIC prop-168-v003 would allow eligible account holders with less than an aggregated /22 to request more IPv4 space up to a combined /22, while excluding accounts that transferred IPv4 resources out.
  • APNIC's Secretariat reported 11,729 available /24 equivalents on 13 August 2026 and said reserving the proposed /12 transition pool would leave 7,633; that remainder would not cover every eligible APNIC and NIR member seeking more space.
  • BTW analysis: the missing control is therefore not another eligibility test but a transparent ordering rule for demand that can exceed supply.

In BTW's analysis, a ceiling answers the wrong question once the queue is longer than the pool. It says how large one approved holding may become, but not whether the first complete application, the smallest request, a new entrant or an operator with demonstrated transition need should receive scarce space first. When each answer produces different winners, sequence is policy rather than administration.

Prop-168-v003 returned to the APNIC policy cycle after an earlier version failed to reach consensus at APNIC 61. Version 3 was posted on 31 July 2026 and, at this article's 4 September reporting freeze, remained scheduled for discussion at the APNIC 62 Open Policy Meeting on 10 September. It was not adopted or implemented policy.

The proposal would permit an account holder with less than an aggregated /22 to seek an additional delegation up to that combined maximum. An account that transferred any IPv4 space out would be ineligible. A new delegation would start a proposed five-year transfer restriction from the date of the most recent delegation. Normal needs assessment would still apply.

It would also reserve a /12 for IPv4-to-IPv6 transition after the general available pool is exhausted. APNIC's impact assessment says the reserve would need to be set aside immediately if the proposal reaches consensus, because waiting until exhaustion would leave nothing to reserve. New account holders could receive up to a /24 from that transition pool under the proposal's conditions.

The proposal's arithmetic changes the governance question

APNIC reported that it held 11,729 /24 equivalents on 13 August. Removing a /12-equivalent reserve would leave 7,633 /24 equivalents for ordinary availability. The Secretariat said that remainder would be insufficient if all eligible APNIC and National Internet Registry members requested additional space.

That statement is not a demand forecast. The number of eligible organizations that would apply, the sizes they would justify and the pace of applications remain unknown. It is nevertheless a capacity warning from the registry responsible for implementation: the rule could admit more qualified demand than the ordinary pool can satisfy.

The proposal currently supplies several anti-gaming controls. The aggregate /22 cap limits accumulation through this route. The outbound-transfer exclusion targets organizations that have already sold or moved space away. The five-year lock is intended to reduce rapid conversion of a new delegation into transferable inventory. Needs assessment preserves a use-based threshold.

Those controls govern admission and later conduct. They do not resolve simultaneous scarcity. A first-come queue rewards application readiness and information access. Pro rata distribution stretches the pool but changes useful block sizes. Priority for smaller holders favors one fairness theory; priority for transition use risks importing the separate /12's purpose into the ordinary pool. Random selection is neutral only in a narrow procedural sense. The choice cannot be left implicit if it materially changes access.

APNIC's assessment also identifies unresolved scope. It asks whether the /22 maximum applies to new members after implementation, flags ambiguity over whether the five-year restriction covers both market and merger-and-acquisition transfers, and notes possible interaction with IXP, temporary and experimental assignments. It also raises the timing relationship between the proposed /12 and an existing /16 reservation trigger.

These are not drafting decorations. They determine the denominator of eligible demand, the assets constrained by the transfer lock and the moment at which one pool stops serving ordinary applications while another remains protected.

What remains unknown

Whether prop-168-v003 will reach consensus at APNIC 62 is unknown. So are the number and distribution of eligible applicants, the ordering mechanism for excess demand, the final scope of the transfer restriction and the interaction among reserved pools. The proposal's implementation text may change through the bottom-up policy process.

Sources