Summary
- A US network outage becomes reportable at 900,000 user minutes, which is a product of duration and the end users a provider judges potentially affected — not a count of subscribers, lines or customers.
- Wireline providers must notify within 120 minutes of discovering a qualifying outage; a potentially affected 911 special facility gets its own 30-minute notice; no clock in the documents read here runs to the public.
- Every filing is presumed confidential, and the aggregate that agencies may pass on must be drawn from at least four service providers.
Nine hundred thousand has the sound of a census — a city, a subscriber base, an exchange. In 47 CFR Part 4 it is none of those. The number that starts a federal clock after a network failure is a product: minutes of outage multiplied by the end users a provider believes are caught. The provider does the multiplying.
The unit is defined at § 4.7(e): user minutes are "the mathematical result of multiplying the duration of an outage, expressed in minutes, by the number of end users potentially affected by the outage, for all other forms of communications." Telephony is counted a little differently in the same section — assigned telephone number minutes, duration times assigned and administrative numbers potentially affected — but the shape is identical. Two inputs, and both arrive from the operator's own records and its own reading of how far the damage reaches.
Nothing in Part 4 requires a provider to be large. Entry runs through § 4.3(b), which defines a communications provider by what it does: an entity that provides for a fee to one or more unaffiliated entities, by radio, wire, cable, satellite and/or lightguide, two-way voice and/or data, paging, and/or SS7. No customer count, no revenue test. Size is not the gate. The product is.
For wireline providers the gate is § 4.9(f). A Notification goes to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) "within 120 minutes of discovering" an outage of at least 30 minutes duration that does one of four things: potentially affects at least 900,000 user minutes of telephony or paging; affects at least 667 OC3 minutes; potentially affects any special offices and facilities; or potentially affects a 911 or 988 special facility. Watch the verb. Three of the four limbs turn on what the outage "potentially affects" — a forward estimate made while the failure is still running, by the party that owns the equipment.
The rule never divides the product back out. That division is mine, and it is the quickest way to see what a fixed product means at different scales: 900,000 user minutes is 30,000 end users for half an hour, 7,500 for two hours, 1,500 for ten hours, 625 for a day. A slow degradation across a modest footprint can clear the same gate as a sharp one across a large footprint, because the gate is not a headcount at all.
One multiplier in that chain belongs to the Commission rather than the filer. For interconnected VoIP serving mobile users, potentially affected users are taken as the simultaneous call capacity of the affected equipment times a concentration ratio of 8. A capability of 1,000 simultaneous calls is written down as 8,000 potentially affected users; at 120 minutes that reads as 960,000 user minutes and the gate opens. The multiplication is mine. The ratio is the rule's.
Transport has a unit of the same construction. OC3 minutes are duration times previously operating OC3 circuits or equivalents affected, and 667 OC3 minutes — 23 OC3 circuits at the 30-minute floor — is an alternative trip.
The clocks do not all ring at the same door. Wireline, cable, satellite and wireless providers follow the Notification with an Initial Communications Outage Report within 72 hours and a Final report within 30 days; the Commission's own summary of the same step says three calendar days, and the rule prints hours. Interconnected VoIP providers get longer to speak and produce less paper: 240 minutes where a 911 or 988 special facility is potentially affected, 24 hours for 900,000 user minutes with complete loss of service or for special offices and facilities, and only a Final report inside 30 days.
The shortest clock reaches a call centre. A potentially affected 911 special facility must be told "as soon as possible, but no later than within 30 minutes of discovering" the outage, by telephone and in writing, with a first follow-up no later than two hours after that contact. Thirty minutes to the emergency operator and 120 minutes to the regulator are not one obligation with two deadlines.
They are two obligations with two audiences, and the 29 April 2021 order describes the regulator's notification as generally following within two hours of determining reportability — an anchor set after the provider has already decided the trigger is met, while the rule's own word is "discovering".
Who else hears? Not the customer, not the press, on the text read here. The outage itself is defined qualitatively at § 4.5(a) as "a significant degradation in the ability of an end user to establish and maintain a channel of communications", with no number in the definition. The category trigger at § 4.5(b) is Telecommunications Service Priority Levels 1 and 2 — major military installations, key government facilities, nuclear power plants, current FAA NPIAS primary airports. One of those is affected and volume stops mattering. The 911 and 988 limbs at § 4.5(e) and (f) carry their own 30-minute floor and, in three of four 911 conditions, the same 900,000 user-minute product.
Then the documentary half, which is where the instrument gets interesting. Section 4.2 opens with a presumption: "Reports filed under this part will be presumed to be confidential under § 0.457(d)(1) of this chapter." The section keeps an inspection route open under § 0.461. It also lets the Chief of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau grant state, District of Columbia, territorial, federal and Tribal agencies direct access to relevant portions of the information collections without the usual notice — and then caps what those agencies may pass on: aggregated, anonymized information aggregated from at least four service providers and not identifying any provider by name or substance.
The Commission says the same thing in its own voice. Its Network Outage Reporting System (NORS) page states: "Data submitted to NORS is presumed confidential." The 29 April 2021 Federal Register order that revised this part puts both halves in one sentence — "NORS filings are presumed confidential and thus are withheld from routine public inspection" — and records that the Commission publicly shares only limited analyses of aggregated and anonymized data, with NORS and DIRS information treated as sensitive on national-security and commercial-competitiveness grounds.
So the shape is this. A filing exists for every qualifying outage. Prior notice goes to an emergency call centre. The regulator holds the record. Selected agencies hold parts of it under a dissemination ceiling. The public output is a count whose smallest unit is four service providers. You can audit the arithmetic of the tally. You cannot test one case.
I make no claim about how any carrier computed anything, and none about the conduct of the Commission or its staff. What can be stated is where the two authored judgements sit. Whether the trigger is met is the filer's call, made under a "potentially affects" verb. How many end users are potentially affected is the filer's figure. The rule supplies one multiplier and one confidentiality presumption, and both travel in the same direction — away from the reader.
This desk had not read the rule before. I measured the gap on 19 November 2026 against our own archive with three literal queries: "outage reporting" returned no row at all; "network outage" returned one January 2026 profile of a Verizon service disruption, a story about an outage rather than the reporting rule; "FCC" returned our 26-row agency set — spectrum, EchoStar, Starlink authorisations, commissioner appointments and resignations, DEI scrutiny, robocall rules, submarine cables, Salt Typhoon. None of those reads Part 4, the user-minute gate, the notification intervals or the confidentiality of the filings.
Bound the other direction too. Across the eight documents read for this briefing on 19 November 2026 — 47 CFR 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 4.7 and 4.9, the Part 4 landing page, the Commission's NORS page and the 29 April 2021 Federal Register order — I found no provision requiring publication of an individual outage report, no per-event public identifier, and no duty to notify the public, customers or the press. I did not read § 4.11, the DIRS provisions including § 4.18, or paragraphs (b) and (d) of § 4.9; nothing here describes them.
What would change the classification is small and unglamorous: a per-event reference inside the public aggregate, or a periodic return that carries, by service class, how many filings crossed the threshold, the duration band they fell in, and the aggregate user minutes — no customer named, no circuit identified. The rule already publishes a count. It publishes it with the checking end cut off. Until that changes, the number that starts the clock is written by the party being counted, and the reader gets the total.
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