Summary

  • AS210837 remains administratively ASSIGNED to ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd (organisation ORG-RI63-RIPE, Mosul, Iraq), while Hurricane Electric reports no visibility in the global routing table since 11 February 2026 and zero announced prefixes.
  • The authoritative RIPE record could not be read first-hand in the study window: the database web interface and the RIPEstat view for the ASN returned only application shells, so every registry figure rests on third-party mirrors.
  • The mirrors disagree on the aut-num's last-modified date (2023-03-20 in several copies against 2026-09-24 in others), on the administrative contact (OA2932-RIPE against a DUMY-RIPE copy) and on the ownership of the single /24 tied to the origin (Pitline Ltd, TECHNOX-INTERNET-TEKNOLOJILERI or OMEGATECH-AS).
  • Mirror divergence is itself the accountability finding: with no first-party payload obtainable, no public observer can currently state what this registration's present state is, only what various copies of it claimed at various times.

An assigned record, read through copies

On the registry side of the ledger, mirrored copies of the RIPE aut-num for AS210837 describe an as-name of ROYA-Communications-and-Internet-Services-Company-Ltd, an organisation of ORG-RI63-RIPE, administrative and technical contact OA2932-RIPE, status ASSIGNED, creation at 11:45:54 UTC on 26 August 2021 and a last modification of 23:40:37 UTC on 24 September 2026; the mirrored organisation behind the number reads ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd., country IQ, organisation type OTHER, registered in Mosul, Nineveh, Iraq, with commercial registration number M.SH. A.-02-0000029678, declared upstream import and export pairs involving AS200697, AS212890, AS202354, AS50597, AS59458 and AS203735, and route counters reading zero in both address families — a figure the mirror presents without saying whether it counts registry route objects or live announcements (https://ipgeolocation.io/browse/asn/AS210837). BTW's directory entry for the company (https://btw.media/en/directory/roya-communications-and-internet-services-company-ltd-profile-2) records the same identity; what the directory cannot supply, and what this briefing adds, is an account of how unstable the public evidence about that identity currently is.

The routing table since 11 February

The other side of the ledger is emptier. Hurricane Electric's ASN profile reports that AS210837 has not been visible in the global routing table since 11 February 2026, with zero announced prefixes in IPv4 and IPv6, one historically originated prefix — 193.30.241.0/24, which the page attributes to Pitline Ltd — and zero prefixes carrying RPKI-origin-valid status (https://bgp.he.net/AS210837). Hurricane Electric's IPv4 view supplies the network's only observed peer, AS212330, registered to Civilisation Information Technology, communication and internet services Co., LTD, in Iraq, and places its own copy of the aut-num's last modification at 2023-03-20T15:53:34Z; both facts belong to a wider divergence record that extends even to the administrative contact, where at least one mirrored copy in the set swaps OA2932-RIPE for the dummy-styled DUMY-RIPE (https://ipv4.bgp.he.net/AS210837). CIDR Report reads the same table from its own collectors and states that the ASN is not currently used to announce prefixes nor as a visible transit AS, yet records one more-specific advertisement, 45.151.234.0/24 carved from 45.151.232.0/22, within the seven days preceding its snapshot — a window whose anchor date the entry does not disclose (https://www.cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-report?as=AS210837&view=6447).

Definitions discipline the comparison. RIPEstat's documentation defines the announced flag as true only where originating prefixes are visible to at least ten RIPE RIS full-feed peers, and notes that a transit-only ASN would be reported as announced false — so a false value cannot, by itself, prove inactivity (https://stat.ripe.net/docs/data-api/api-endpoints/as-overview). The zero-announcement picture therefore rests on converging independent observations, not on a certified absence from any single authoritative system.

Where the copies cannot agree

The registry picture is reconstructed, not retrieved, and the reconstruction is internally inconsistent. IPIP's mirrored copy carries the 2023-03-20T15:53:34Z aut-num date, and in the same output places the containing as-block — AS208189 to AS214345, described as a RIPE NCC ASN block maintained by RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT — at a creation timestamp of 12 February 2026, one day after the recorded visibility loss, a coincidence reported here without interpretation, since object metadata can be redated for reasons no outside observer can see; the same copy shows the mirrored organisation's last modification at 05:06:32 UTC on 13 May 2026, includes the sponsoring organisation ORG-DTUL2-RIPE and lists no route or route6 objects at all (https://whois.ipip.net/AS210837). The ip.cc mirror's copy agrees on the 2023-03-20 aut-num date and lists exactly one IPv4 prefix for the origin, 193.30.241.0/24, under country Turkey with the description TECHNOX-INTERNET-TEKNOLOJILERI; its whois copy shows status ASSIGNED, organisation ORG-RI63-RIPE and sponsoring organisation ORG-DTUL2-RIPE, names a role object OA2932-RIPE carrying the name Huthaifa Alaani, and dates the organisation's last modification to 27 June 2024 (https://ip.cc/topic/asn/AS210837/). IPTrace's copy sits with the 2023-03-20 family (https://iptrace.net/en/as/210837). Robtex's copy does the same while attributing 193.30.241.0/24 to OMEGATECH-AS SC (https://robtex.com/en/as-numbers/AS210837). Against them, the ipgeolocation copy cited above — and, on its own page, Hurricane Electric's main ASN profile, also cited above — place the last modification at 24 September 2026.

Three values therefore circulate for the same object's revision date — 2023-03-20, 2026-09-24 and, for the organisation record, both 2026-05-13 and 2024-06-27 — and two values circulate for the administrative contact, while the single /24 carries four attributions across the copy set: Pitline Ltd, TECHNOX-INTERNET-TEKNOLOJILERI, OMEGATECH-AS SC and CIDR Report's separate 45.151.234.0/24 entry. None of the mirrors marks its copy as stale or authoritative; each presents itself as the record.

The operator's own account, frozen in 2022

PeeringDB's entry for network 30448, corresponding to ASN 210837, still describes an operating ISP: Cable/DSL/ISP type, 22 IPv4 and 29 IPv6 prefixes, traffic between 5 and 10 Gbps, Middle East scope, an IRR as-set of AS-ROYA-ISP, and route server and looking-glass services under the operator's own domain. The entry's RIR status reads ok, updated 26 June 2024; the network record itself was last updated on 27 July 2022 (https://www.peeringdb.com/net/30448). These are self-reported figures, four years old at the routing cut-off, and cannot be reconciled with collector zeros without assumptions the evidence does not license. What they establish is that an operator self-described as live, peered and announcing dozens of prefixes once maintained this record — and that nothing in the public chain shows what became of it.

Why no first-party view exists in this study

The reason the picture rests on mirrors is mechanical. The RIPE Database's web query interface for AS210837 returned only a JavaScript application shell; no RPSL object content was retrieved, so the current authoritative revision of the aut-num could not be confirmed first-hand (https://apps.db.ripe.net/db-web-ui/query?searchtext=AS210837). The RIPEstat view for the ASN behaved the same way, returning an application shell rather than data (https://stat.ripe.net/AS210837). A first-party read would normally be assembled through the registry's documented navigation, including the inverse-query mechanism RIPE documents for enumerating the objects bound to an organisation (https://docs.db.ripe.net/Types-of-Queries/Inverse-Queries) — but no such payload was obtainable within the window. The consequence is structural: the registration is real, the mirrors are real, and the gap between them contains no inspectable first-party evidence at all.

Two further ASN profile mirrors, IPinfo (https://ipinfo.io/AS210837) and TheIpAPI (https://theipapi.com/asn/210837), were consulted as part of the same survey and are listed here for provenance; this briefing carries no unique claim from either.

What earlier BTW reporting established

Prior BTW coverage fixed the dated visibility loss and the collectors' contradiction on what the network announces (https://btw.media/en/as210837-roya-routing-continuity-gap), and mapped the evidence chain from registration to operational continuity, finding no live registry or observation-system response obtainable to assert present prefixes, paths, RPKI states or continuity events (https://btw.media/en/roya-as210837-what-routing-evidence-can-and-cannot-prove). This briefing adds the step those pieces could not take: the mirrors themselves now disagree — on revision dates, contact handles and prefix ownership — so the accountability question has moved from what the network does to what the record says, and the second question is the one public evidence currently fails.

What would change the picture

Three observable conditions would move this dossier. A first-party read, through the registry's web interface, a whois service or the RIPEstat API, would fix the revision date and settle both the OA2932-RIPE and DUMY-RIPE question and whether the registration still stands as mirrored. Any announcement from AS210837 reaching any collector would falsify the dormant reading and reopen continuity against the 2022 self-report. A change in the sponsoring organisation away from ORG-DTUL2-RIPE, or deletion of the object, would signal administrative movement no mirror capture can reverse.

Until one of those occurs, the honest position is the one the evidence forces: an assigned number, an empty routing table, and a set of mirrors that cannot agree on what the assignment says.