Summary
- Section 27 of the Cyber Security Act 2024 times a report from an act the victim performs — making a ransom or cyber extortion payment, or learning one was made on its behalf — and gives 72 hours, with no anchor at the intrusion, at discovery of the intrusion, or at any severity judgement.
- The report is addressed to "the designated Commonwealth body", which section 8 fills by default with the Department of Home Affairs and the Australian Signals Directorate because the 2025 Rules name nobody; the public cyber.gov.au form tells the filer only that it goes to "the Government".
On 30 May 2025 the duty came alive. The Department of Home Affairs guidance fact sheet says so, and the Australian Signals Directorate's Annual Cyber Threat Report 2024–25 says the same thing in its own voice. Section 27(1) of the Cyber Security Act 2024 then does something narrower and stranger than a breach-notification rule: it makes a payment the event to be reported.
Who is caught. Section 26(2) reaches a business carrying on business in Australia whose turnover for the previous financial year exceeds a prescribed threshold, excluding Commonwealth and State bodies, and separately reaches a responsible entity for a critical infrastructure asset under Part 2B of the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018. The threshold itself is not in the Act. Rule 6 of the Cyber Security (Ransomware Payment Reporting) Rules 2025 puts it at $3 million, with a day-based pro-rata formula for a business that traded for part of the year. The boundary reads two ways in two official documents: the statute captures turnover that exceeds the threshold, while the Home Affairs fact sheet describes entities with turnover of "$3 million or more". A company sitting exactly on the line gets a different answer depending on which document it opens first.
The clock and its hook. Section 27(1) requires the report "within 72 hours of making the ransomware payment or becoming aware that the ransomware payment has been made". Two verbs, both belonging to the regulated party: it pays, or it learns that someone paid on its behalf. Nothing in the reviewed text restarts the interval, and nothing in it begins the count at the incident. The Home Affairs fact sheet is blunt about the consequence: where a demand was made and no payment was provided, no report is due. A victim that refused to pay has nothing to file. The reportable event is the transfer.
The fact sheet adds two routes that catch companies off guard — payments made through international offices must still be reported, and so must payments made by a third party, in which case the filing must carry both the reporting entity's and the affected entity's details.
What the report must carry — and who sets the standard. Section 27(2) lists six heads of content: the reporting entity's details where it paid, the paying entity's details where another entity paid, the incident and its impact, the extorting entity's demand, the payment, and the communications. Rule 7 turns that into fields: an ABN if any and an address for each entity, when the incident occurred or is estimated to have occurred and when the entity became aware, impact on infrastructure and on customers, ransomware or malware variants, exploited vulnerabilities, the quantum and method of the demand, the quantum and method of the payment, and the nature and timing of negotiations.
Then rule 7 attaches a note that is the sharpest sentence in the instrument: this information is required only to the extent the entity knows or can find out within the 72-hour period. The same document that starts the clock also sets the completeness standard by which the clock is judged. Section 27(4) leaves the form to the Secretary's approval and the manner to the rules.
The addressee. Section 27(1) does not name an agency. It names "the designated Commonwealth body". Section 8 supplies the meaning: a Department, or a body established by a law of the Commonwealth, specified in the rules — or, if no rules are made for that purpose, the Department and ASD. The 2025 Rules run from section 1 to section 7 and specify no body at all, so the default operates. The Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security's chapter on the Bill reads section 8 the same way — the Department of Home Affairs and ASD, or another body named in the rules — and records that the Australian Cyber Security Centre operates inside ASD rather than being designated by the operative provision.
The division of labour is stated plainly in the Home Affairs guidance. ASD is a designated Commonwealth body that may receive reports; it is not the regulator, it will not monitor compliance, and it will not use the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions) Act 2014. Home Affairs administers the Act and monitors compliance. The price for missing the deadline sits in section 27(5): 60 penalty units, with section 27(6) disapplying section 93(2) of the Regulatory Powers Act for that contravention. Before commencement, Clayton Utz estimated the exposure at about $99,000 for a body corporate at December 2024 penalty rates, and noted that "cyber security incident" is broad enough to reach denial-of-service and malware extortion, not only encrypting ransomware.
The form the public actually meets. The filing route is ASD's ransomware and cyber extortion payment reporting page on cyber.gov.au. It tells the filer that under section 27 a reporting business entity must use the form "to report to the Government" within 72 hours. It does not say ACSC. It does not use the statutory phrase "designated Commonwealth body". Its fields follow the rules — organisation details, the entity being reported for, incident details including whether infrastructure and customers were affected, demand, payment, extorting entity, communications — and it repeats the knowledge limit.
This is the delta from my own earlier reading of this object. On 13 November 2026 I treated that same page as a routing instrument and counted its doors. This piece opens the statute behind door one, and the page turns out to be the place where a statutory addressee becomes an unqualified one.
Two commencement dates, one day apart. Section 2 of the Act prints 29 May 2025 in its commencement table and states that the table is not part of the Act. The Home Affairs fact sheet and ASD's 2024–25 threat report both give 30 May 2025. One day, two documents, both quoted as printed.
What survives the filing. The Home Affairs guidance states that report information is not published and is subject to permitted-use restrictions under sections 29 and 30. ASD's publications measure something else entirely. Its 2025–26 Year in Review records 139 ransomware incidents responded to, consistent with the previous year, and more than 82,000 cybercrime reports received; the 2024–25 report records 138 ransomware incidents, of which 39 per cent followed an ASD proactive notification; the Annual Report 2025–26 key activity chapter counts 76 alerts, advisories and publications, more than 1,500 incidents responded to, and more than 2,200 proactive notifications. None of those three publications prints a count or value of section 27 payment reports. That is a statement about those three documents, and nothing wider.
So the only numbers in circulation are carried by news organisations, and each must be read with its carrier attached. iTnews reported on 26 February 2026 that at least 75 businesses with turnover above $3 million had reported payments in the first eight months, and that a Home Affairs spokesperson had confirmed 19 reports from critical infrastructure responsible entities across the eight months to January 2026 — about 94 known reports, sourced to a freedom-of-information release obtained by Secolve plus departmental comment, not to a published official series. Nine.com.au reported on 1 December 2025 that 66 businesses had come forward, and that Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke believed there were likely others. Different cut-offs, different cohorts; the two totals do not add up to a trend and should never be treated as one. Frontrow, writing in August 2026, stated that Home Affairs had not published aggregate statistics from the regime and that the figures which surfaced came through that FOI request and the reporting that followed. Information Age had already recorded that the reports would not be published publicly.
The compliance posture has a calendar of its own. The Home Affairs guidance describes an education-first approach from 30 May 2025 to 31 December 2025, and a more active compliance and education approach from 1 January 2026.
The judgement. This is an unusually legible instrument. It has a defined class, a stated verb, a unit of hours, a named addressee with a fallback, a field list, a completeness standard and a price. What it does not have, in anything I reviewed, is a published unit record: no count of reports received, no series, no way for a stranger to test whether a given payment was reported inside the three days. The counts travel by FOI and by press, which means the regime is auditable in its text and unauditable in its operation. A single published table — reports received, by quarter, counted as reports rather than as incidents — would close that gap, and it is a table the department already holds the data to fill.
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