Institution Profiling / Digital infrastructure institution

ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd.

The company operates AS210837 as a retail internet provider in the Nineveh region of Iraq, with a single announced IPv4 prefix (193.30.241.0/24) and upstream peering arranged through European exchange points. It publicly presents its service as Roaea NET and maintains a basic online presence that includes a customer website, a route server, and a looking glass.

ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd.
Caption: An imagined scene inside a ROYA Communications network facility in Mosul, illustrating the fragile connectivity that defines the ISP's operating environment. · Source context: Generated image based on supplied editorial brief. · Relevance reason: The image captures the operational reality of a small ISP in a post-conflict region, emphasizing the technical and infrastructural fragility that underpins the intelligence profile. · Image provenance: Generated image based on supplied editorial brief.

Sources

Public references used for this article.

  • Registry RDAP / WHOIS recordpublic-source identity and registry context for ROYA-Communications-and-Internet-Services-Company-Ltd. (source risk: low)
  • Registry RDAP / WHOIS recordRIPE-derived WHOIS text shows AS210837, the ROYA-Communications-and-Internet-Services-Company-Ltd as-name, ORG-RI63-RIPE, RIPE source, creation and modification dates, and organisation details in Iraq. (source risk: low)
  • PeeringDB network profilePeeringDB lists ROYA Communications as ASN 210837, organisation ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd., AKA Roya ISP, AS-ROYA-ISP, Cable/DSL/ISP, Middle East scope, route server and looking glass URLs, and interconnection facilities. (source risk: low)
  • bgp.he.netHurricane Electric's BGP view lists AS210837 as ROYA COMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNET SERVICES COMPANY LTD and shows announced prefixes and upstream visibility. (source risk: low)
  • bigdatacloud.comBigDataCloud lists AS210837 with registry Ripe, registered country Iraq, registered date 2021-08-26, last change 2023-03-20, and active IPv4 prefix 193.30.241.0/24. (source risk: low)
  • asrank.caida.orgCAIDA AS Rank identifies AS210837 as ROYA-Communications-and-Internet-Services-Company-Ltd, organisation ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd., country Iraq, with dataset-specific topology metrics. (source risk: low)
  • radar.cloudflare.comCloudflare Radar's routing page labels AS210837 as ROYA-Communications-and-Internet-Services-Company-Ltd, AKA Roya ISP, country Iraq, and website http://www.roya-isp.com, with sections for prefixes, connectivity, BGP announcements and IRR AS-SETs. (source risk: low)
  • Operator websiteThe associated operator website presents Roaea NET as an Internet Service Provider in Nineveh, Iraq, founded in 2017 and offering internet access and local services. (source risk: low)
CategoryInstitution

The company operates AS210837 as a retail internet provider in the Nineveh region of Iraq, with a single announced IPv4 prefix (193.30.241.0/24) and upstream peering arranged through European exchange points. It publicly presents its service as Roaea NET and maintains a basic online presence that includes a customer website, a route server, and a looking glass.

RegionIraq

Shifts in AS210837's registry records, RPKI state, prefix announcements, upstream relationships, or website availability serve as concrete indicators of operational continuity or market stress in northern Iraq's fragile internet infrastructure. Because of its thin public documentation, even small changes can alter dependency maps and signal broader connectivity developments.

Signal FocusDigital infrastructure institution

Shifts in AS210837's registry records, RPKI state, prefix announcements, upstream relationships, or website availability serve as concrete indicators of operational continuity or market stress in northern Iraq's fragile internet infrastructure. Because of its thin public documentation, even small changes can alter dependency maps and signal broader connectivity developments.

Content TypeProfile

The company operates AS210837 as a retail internet provider in the Nineveh region of Iraq, with a single announced IPv4 prefix (193.30.241.0/24) and upstream peering arranged through European exchange points. It publicly presents its service as Roaea NET and maintains a basic online presence that includes a customer website, a route server, and a looking glass.

Primary DomainInfrastructure

The ISP's significance lies in its position as a single-ASN, single-prefix access provider in a post-conflict region. Any observable infrastructure change—such as a withdrawn prefix, a new upstream AS, or a dormant registry object—provides a concrete watchpoint for analysts tracking the resilience and evolution of internet connectivity in Mosul and the surrounding area.

TopicDigital infrastructure institution

ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd. trades as Roaea NET, providing internet access in Mosul, Iraq, through AS210837 and a single /24 IPv4 prefix. The operator interconnects at European facilities in Frankfurt, Istanbul, and Sofia. Public evidence is limited to RIPE NCC registries, PeeringDB, BGP monitoring platforms, and a basic website; no beneficial ownership, management, or financial data is publicly available. The profile is a registry-based watchpoint: changes to prefix announcements, upstream peerings, registry records, or the website would signal operational shifts in an under-documented market. Key uncertainties include the relationship between the registered name and the trading brand, the completeness of upstream relationships, and the absence of historical routing data.

ImpactMedium

The ISP's significance lies in its position as a single-ASN, single-prefix access provider in a post-conflict region. Any observable infrastructure change—such as a withdrawn prefix, a new upstream AS, or a dormant registry object—provides a concrete watchpoint for analysts tracking the resilience and evolution of internet connectivity in Mosul and the surrounding area.

Confidence?Confidence Grade
0.90–1.00AHigh — direct sources
0.75–0.89A/BStrong
0.55–0.74B/CMedium
0.35–0.54C/DWeak–medium
0.10–0.34DWeak signal
0.00–0.09DInternal monitoring
High confidence (95%)

Several public sources

ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd. trades as Roaea NET, providing internet access in Mosul, Iraq, through AS210837 and a single /24 IPv4 prefix. The operator interconnects at European facilities in Frankfurt, Istanbul, and Sofia. Public evidence is limited to RIPE NCC registries, PeeringDB, BGP monitoring platforms, and a basic website; no beneficial ownership, management, or financial data is publicly available. The profile is a registry-based watchpoint: changes to prefix announcements, upstream peerings, registry records, or the website would signal operational shifts in an under-documented market. Key uncertainties include the relationship between the registered name and the trading brand, the completeness of upstream relationships, and the absence of historical routing data.

ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd.

ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd. is an Iraqi ISP in Mosul trading as Roaea NET, with a single autonomous system (AS210837) and a single IPv4 prefix interconnected at European facilities, serving Nineveh province since 2017. Public evidence is drawn exclusively from RIPE and PeeringDB registries, BGP monitoring tools, and the operator's website; no financial or ownership records are available.

Why It Matters

The ISP's significance lies in its position as a single-ASN, single-prefix access provider in a post-conflict region. Any observable infrastructure change—such as a withdrawn prefix, a new upstream AS, or a dormant registry object—provides a concrete watchpoint for analysts tracking the resilience and evolution of internet connectivity in Mosul and the surrounding area.

What Public Sources Show

ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd. is a small internet service provider in Mosul, Iraq, trading as Roaea NET. Its network, autonomous system AS210837, holds a single IPv4 prefix and connects to European exchanges. Because northern Iraq's internet infrastructure remains fragile and poorly documented, even minor technical changes at this operator can signal broader operational shifts or stress in the region's connectivity.

Public records from RIPE NCC, PeeringDB, and BGP monitoring platforms confirm the company's registration details. AS210837 was created in August 2021 and modified in March 2023. It announces the prefix 193.30.241.0/24 and lists upstream providers including AS200697, AS212890, and others. Platforms such as Hurricane Electric, BigDataCloud, CAIDA, and Cloudflare Radar corroborate this footprint. The company's website describes Roaea NET as a provider founded in 2017 serving Nineveh.

No financial or ownership information is publicly available.

The operator's public control surface rests on its RIPE aut-num and organisation objects (ORG-RI63-RIPE), the route-set AS-ROYA-ISP, and its PeeringDB profile. It maintains route server r.roya-isp.com and looking glass lg.roya-isp.com.

Interconnection facilities are at Equinix FR5 Frankfurt, MedNautilus Istanbul, and TELEPOINT Sofia Centre. PeeringDB estimates traffic at 5–10 Gbps, balanced. The website roya-isp.com serves as the customer-facing portal and public identity.

Several watchpoints emerge from the thin evidence base. The RIPE ASN object was last modified in 2023, and the organisation object in 2026, which may indicate low administrative activity or pending updates. Any change to the announced prefix 193.30.241.0/24—expansion, withdrawal, or reallocation—would directly alter the network’s footprint and capacity. Shifts in upstream AS relationships could re-route Iraqi traffic and affect dependency analysis.

The company’s legal name in RIPE records differs from its trading name Roaea NET, a mismatch that may reflect an informal or layered corporate structure. Additionally, no public records identify beneficial owners, directors, or operational staff. This leadership and contact gap hampers assessments of accountability, stability, and decision-making. PeeringDB contact information is partially hidden, further limiting visibility.

Key uncertainties include the actual subscriber base, revenue, and the completeness of peer relationships beyond those declared in RPSL. The available BGP snapshots may not reflect sustained operations. Historical routing data is absent, so the profile is a current-registry watchpoint rather than a longitudinal assessment. The relationship between the Roaea NET brand and the registered entity remains unconfirmed.

Operating Surface

The company operates AS210837 as a retail internet provider in the Nineveh region of Iraq, with a single announced IPv4 prefix (193.30.241.0/24) and upstream peering arranged through European exchange points. It publicly presents its service as Roaea NET and maintains a basic online presence that includes a customer website, a route server, and a looking glass.

Shifts in AS210837's registry records, RPKI state, prefix announcements, upstream relationships, or website availability serve as concrete indicators of operational continuity or market stress in northern Iraq's fragile internet infrastructure. Because of its thin public documentation, even small changes can alter dependency maps and signal broader connectivity developments.

Watchpoints

The company’s thin public profile suggests it is a small, possibly family-run or local venture operating in a post-conflict market where formal corporate documentation is scarce. Its dependence on European interconnection points makes it vulnerable to international transit policy changes and local infrastructure damage. Any observable registry or routing change can be used as a proxy for operational health in the Mosul area.

Observable events that would change the assessment: a new prefix announcement, withdrawal of 193.30.241.0/24, addition or removal of upstream ASes, RPKI invalidity, changes to the RIPE organisation handle, or the unavailability of the route server/looking glass. An update to the last-modified date in RIPE objects without a corresponding routing change would also be significant.

The absence of historical BGP data, subscriber counts, financial records, and corporate structure details limits the profile to a current-state watchpoint. To strengthen the assessment, longitudinal routing data, an official company registration extract from Iraqi authorities, and any public statement by the operator about its capacity or plans would be needed.

Sources

  • Registry RDAP / WHOIS record - public-source identity and registry context for ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd.
  • Registry RDAP / WHOIS record - RIPE-derived WHOIS text shows AS210837, the ROYA-Communications-and-Internet-Services-Company-Ltd as-name, ORG-RI63-RIPE, RIPE source, creation and modification dates, and organisation details in Iraq.
  • PeeringDB network profile - PeeringDB lists ROYA Communications as ASN 210837, organisation ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd., AKA Roya ISP, AS-ROYA-ISP, Cable/DSL/ISP, Middle East scope, route server and looking glass URLs, and interconnection facilities.
  • bgp.he.net - Hurricane Electric's BGP Toolkit identifies AS210837 as ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd., shows Iraq as country of origin, links the roya-isp.com website, and reports observed prefix, RPKI and peer counts.
  • bigdatacloud.com - BigDataCloud lists AS210837 with registry Ripe, registered country Iraq, registered date 2021-08-26, last change 2023-03-20, and active IPv4 prefix 193.30.241.0/24.
  • asrank.caida.org - CAIDA AS Rank identifies AS210837 as ROYA-Communications-and-Internet-Services-Company-Ltd, organisation ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd., country Iraq, with dataset-specific topology metrics.
  • radar.cloudflare.com - Cloudflare Radar's routing page labels AS210837 as ROYA-Communications-and-Internet-Services-Company-Ltd, AKA Roya ISP, country Iraq, and website http://www.roya-isp.com, with sections for prefixes, connectivity, BGP announcements and IRR AS-SETs.
  • Operator website - The associated operator website presents Roaea NET as an Internet Service Provider in Nineveh, Iraq, founded in 2017 and offering internet access and local services.

Domain of operation

ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd. is an Iraqi ISP in Mosul trading as Roaea NET, with a single autonomous system (AS210837) and a single IPv4 prefix interconnected at European facilities, serving Nineveh province since 2017. Public evidence is drawn exclusively from RIPE and PeeringDB registries, BGP monitoring tools, and the operator's website; no financial or ownership records are available.

  • Registry RDAP / WHOIS record: public-source identity and registry context for ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd. Evidence basis: source-34459ed25829

Timeline

  1. ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd. public evidence observed

    Shifts in AS210837's registry records, RPKI state, prefix announcements, upstream relationships, or website availability serve as concrete indicators of operational continuity or market stress in northern Iraq's fragile internet infrastructure. Because of its thin public documentation, even small changes can alter dependency maps and signal broader connectivity developments.

At A Glance

  • Name: ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd.
  • Type: Digital infrastructure institution
  • Base: Iraq
  • Profile focus: Institution

What It Does

  • public operating records
  • official service pages
  • source-backed relationship updates

Why It Matters

  • The ISP's significance lies in its position as a single-ASN, single-prefix access provider in a post-conflict region. Any observable infrastructure change—such as a withdrawn prefix, a new upstream AS, or a dormant registry object—provides a concrete watchpoint for analysts tracking the resilience and evolution of internet connectivity in Mosul and the surrounding area.
  • Operational criticality: Medium
  • Time horizon: Next quarter

What To Watch

  • official company sources
  • public registries
  • operator-published records
NowMedium priority

Track verified source updates, role changes, and current public evidence.

QuarterMedium policy sensitivity

The ISP's significance lies in its position as a single-ASN, single-prefix access provider in a post-conflict region. Any observable infrastructure change—such as a withdrawn prefix, a new upstream AS, or a dormant registry object—provides a concrete watchpoint for analysts tracking the resilience and evolution of internet connectivity in Mosul and the surrounding area.

YearNext quarter outlook

Longer-term relevance depends on verified operating, policy, and relationship changes.

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Public View

The ISP's significance lies in its position as a single-ASN, single-prefix access provider in a post-conflict region. Any observable infrastructure change—such as a withdrawn prefix, a new upstream AS, or a dormant registry object—provides a concrete watchpoint for analysts tracking the resilience and evolution of internet connectivity in Mosul and the surrounding area.

Watchpoints

  • The company’s thin public profile suggests it is a small, possibly family-run or local venture operating in a post-conflict market where formal corporate documentation is scarce.
  • Its dependence on European interconnection points makes it vulnerable to international transit policy changes and local infrastructure damage.
  • Any observable registry or routing change can be used as a proxy for operational health in the Mosul area.

Caveats

  • Public evidence is used only for source-backed claims.
  • Private control or contract claims require separate public support.

FAQ

Why does BTW track ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd.?

Shifts in AS210837's registry records, RPKI state, prefix announcements, upstream relationships, or website availability serve as concrete indicators of operational continuity or market stress in northern Iraq's fragile internet infrastructure. Because of its thin public documentation, even small changes can alter dependency maps and signal broader connectivity developments.

What evidence supports the profile?

public-source identity and registry context for ROYA Communications and Internet Services Company Ltd.

What should readers watch next?

The company’s thin public profile suggests it is a small, possibly family-run or local venture operating in a post-conflict market where formal corporate documentation is scarce.

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