Summary

  • RIPE records associate PKP Ferrit LLC with organisation object ORG-PFL7-RIPE and associate that object with the allocation 178.212.36.0/22.
  • A RIPE route object and a capture-time RIPEstat response point to AS41517 as the prefix origin, but neither source proves that PKP Ferrit legally controls or operationally runs that autonomous system.
  • PKP Ferrit’s website advertises Internet access delivered over Ethernet; coverage, delivered performance, resilience and SLA outcomes remain unverified.

The most useful fact about PKP Ferrit’s network footprint is not its size. It is the separation between the public records that describe it.

The RIPE organisation object records ORG-PFL7-RIPE with the name PKP Ferrit LLC, country code RU, registration number 1022701284297 and organisation type LIR. A separate RIPE inetnum record records 178.212.36.0–178.212.39.255 as ALLOCATED PA and refers to that organisation object. Those entries establish a registry association. They do not independently establish present corporate status, exclusive control of the addresses, current operational use or ownership of the physical network carrying traffic.

Routing adds a different layer. A RIPE route object, last modified in October 2023, records 178.212.36.0/22 with origin AS41517. At the evidence capture time, RIPEstat network-info also returned AS41517 for that prefix. The agreement matters: it gives an investigator a concrete origin to verify. But a route object is a registered declaration, while the RIPEstat response is a timestamped observation. Neither proves who legally controls AS41517, who configures the routers, who carries the traffic, whether the origin is continuous, or whether the arrangement supports PKP Ferrit’s retail services.

The company’s own material supplies a third layer. Its about page describes the business as a Khabarovsk provider of Internet and cable-television services and says it was founded in 1994. Its Internet service page says access is delivered over Ethernet twisted pair and advertises consumer plans of up to 100 Mbit/s. These are attributable first-party descriptions of the offer. They are not independent measurements of coverage, delivered speed, subscriber experience, capacity, support quality or availability.

The company also publishes a licence page containing images labelled for data-transmission and telematic-services licences. The page is evidence of what the company presents to customers. Without a separate regulator check, it should not be treated as confirmation that every displayed authorisation remains current, covers every advertised service or identifies the operator of AS41517.

The resulting diligence map has five separate questions. Which legal entity is the contractual counterparty? Which organisation is recorded against the number resources? Which autonomous system originates the relevant prefixes at the time of observation? Which party actually operates the network and responds to incidents? What service capability is contractually promised and independently tested? The reviewed public sources answer parts of the second and third questions and provide the company’s own account of the fifth. They do not close the first, fourth or performance portions of the fifth.

That gap is not evidence of a problem. It is evidence that identity resolution should precede a resilience judgement. A buyer seeking continuity should request a current corporate extract, the service contract and licence references, a prefix-to-origin inventory, confirmation of who operates AS41517, upstream and physical-path disclosures, capacity and failover evidence, incident-response ownership and measured SLA history. Until those records are reconciled, the defensible conclusion is limited: PKP Ferrit has a traceable public registry and service-claim footprint, while operational control and service performance remain open questions. RIPE’s membership directory separately lists PKP Ferrit LLC under RU; that listing does not resolve present operator control.