Summary

  • Arab States contribution 91 addendum 35 proposes an ITU study of minimum data, detection performance, geolocation error bounds and confidence levels for satellite-navigation interference cases.
  • The proposal also seeks a stronger incident repository and reasoned, accessible Radio Regulations Board decisions; PP-26 has not adopted it.

A map pin is persuasive. It is also a poor substitute for an error bar. When a satellite-navigation receiver is jammed or spoofed, the crucial question is not merely whether the signal went wrong. It is how investigators detected it, how they placed its source, and how much doubt travels with that location. The Arab States’ new draft resolution, filed under ITU contribution 91, wants those questions built into the international case file.

The proposal asks ITU-R to study the minimum technical parameters and data sets needed to assess RNSS interference reliably. More strikingly, it asks for recommended performance metrics, error bounds and confidence levels for detection and geolocation methods. Those words matter. A point on a map can look final even when several methods or measurements could move it. A stated uncertainty makes the claim easier to test, answer and correct.

The 2023 World Radiocommunication Conference already adopted Resolution 676, urging administrations to protect RNSS in two specified bands and report interference cases under the Radio Regulations. The Radio Regulations Board’s public RNSS page already records cases and decisions. The new draft would put more structure behind that record. It directs the Radiocommunication Bureau to maintain an online repository of administrations’ reports and regularly summarize case numbers, characteristics, status and outcomes. Safety-related reports would receive appropriate priority under existing procedures. The Board would publish clear, reasoned views and decisions in an accessible form, while respecting confidentiality.

There is a second piece of infrastructure hiding behind the navigation story: time. The draft asks ITU’s standardization and development sectors to work on resilient positioning, navigation and timing for telecom networks and to help countries assess dependencies. A spoofed clock can be as operationally awkward as a false location. PP-26 will decide whether to take up this proposed machinery. If it does, the test will be the shape of the next case record: measurements, method, uncertainty, response and a decision a reader can actually follow.

Official sources