Summary

  • APNIC planned a three-hour Brisbane security-maintenance window for 15 October and warned that listed services could face interruptions of up to five minutes.
  • Its current status history records 2h56 of DASH maintenance and 1m02 for the RPKI Repository, but neither entry measures how long either service was inaccessible.

The public record now says more about the work window than a green uptime figure alone, but less than an impact report. APNIC scheduled network-device security updates at its Brisbane data-centre locations from 06:00 to 09:00 UTC+10 on 15 October. That is 20:00 to 23:00 UTC on 14 October. The announcement said listed services might be interrupted for up to five minutes.

APNIC’s status history now marks two related maintenance entries complete. The DASH record runs from 20:03:29 to 23:00:00 UTC and displays a duration of 2 hours 56 minutes. A separate entry for RPKI Repository runs from 21:51:30 to 21:52:32, or 1 minute 2 seconds. Both in-progress updates point to the 15 October announcement.

Those figures describe records labelled “Network maintenance.” They are not measurements of how long DASH or the repository was unreachable. The notice’s five-minute warning describes a possible interruption, not an observed service-loss duration. The status history gives no failed-probe times, affected user actions, transaction results or component-specific recovery test alongside the two entries.

The timing also matters. An earlier check at 09:16 UTC+10 still showed the event as upcoming, with 100% uptime values; the current history now includes completed component records. The newer entries add a timeline for the maintenance state, not a retrospective availability calculation. The public record does not explain why the DASH maintenance entry spans nearly the full announced window or whether users saw an interruption during it.

APNIC listed member, API, web, RPKI and other services in the announcement. Operators therefore need to distinguish when maintenance was recorded from when a service failed or recovered. Nothing in these entries establishes an RPKI publication gap, a routing effect, member harm or an outage of either named component.

Sources: APNIC’s 15 October service announcement, APNIC Services Status, and Theo March’s earlier report on APNIC’s public uptime calculation.