Summary

  • Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5(1)(a), starts the four-hour initial notification from the financial entity's own classification of an incident as major, with a separate outer bound of 24 hours from awareness; Article 5(2) restarts the four hours from a later classification.
  • The two later deadlines are measured from the firm's own filings: 72 hours from submission of the initial notification, then one month from the intermediate report or from the latest updated intermediate report that the same act obliges the firm to file when its regular activities recover.

Four hours. That is the number attached to Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 in every vendor deck and every compliance summary, and it survives contact with the text only if you drop the clause in front of it. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5(1)(a), printed on the Official Journal page, runs from the classification of the incident as a major ICT-related incident: four hours from that classification, and no later than 24 hours from the moment the financial entity became aware of the incident.

An outage that begins at 02:00 starts nothing. Neither does detection, nor the moment the incident reaches an executive committee. A judgement starts the meter, and the judgement belongs to the party under the duty.

The duty itself is Article 19(1) of the Regulation: financial entities "shall report major ICT-related incidents to the relevant competent authority as referred to in Article 46 in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article" (reproduction of Article 19, cross-read against a second rendering). Article 19(4) then lists three filings — an initial notification, an intermediate report, a final report — "within the time limits to be laid down in accordance with Article 20, first paragraph, point (a), point (ii)". No hours appear in Article 19. The number arrives one instrument later, because Article 20, first paragraph, point (a), point (ii) instructs the European Supervisory Authorities to draft standards that "determine the time limits for the initial notification and for each report referred to in Article 19(4)" (reproduction of Article 20).

The regime is therefore a chain of four intervals, and the interesting question is not how long each one is. It is what each one is bolted to.

What counts as major, and who applies it

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772, Article 8(1), on its Official Journal page, defines a major incident for Article 19(1) as one that "has affected critical services as referred to in Article 6" and where either the materiality threshold in Article 9(5), point (b), is met or "two or more of the other materiality thresholds referred to in Articles 9(1) to (6)" are met.

Article 6 supplies the first gate: the incident affects ICT services supporting critical or important functions, or affects authorised or supervised financial services, or constitutes successful malicious and unauthorised access to network and information systems. Article 8(2) then folds recurrence into the same single decision — incidents that individually sit below the threshold count together where they occurred at least twice within six months, share the same apparent root cause and collectively satisfy Article 8(1). Entities assess that monthly, except microenterprises and the entities listed in Article 16(1) of the Regulation.

Article 9's thresholds, as returned by the publisher page: more than 10 per cent of clients or more than 100,000 clients; more than 30 per cent of financial counterparts; more than 10 per cent of the daily average number or value of transactions; duration over 24 hours or downtime over 2 hours for services supporting critical or important functions; impact in two or more Member States; data loss; and costs or losses exceeding or likely to exceed EUR 100,000. The returned list carried no paragraph numbering, so this article does not assert which single threshold sits in Article 9(5), point (b).

What matters for the clock is that all of this is arithmetic the firm applies to its own incident, against a rule that was published in advance. Nothing in the provisions read here gives a supervisor a pre-clearance step before the four hours begin.

The chain, link by link

Article 5(1)(b) of 2025/301 puts the intermediate report at the latest 72 hours "from the submission of the initial notification", and requires it "even where the status or the handling of the incident have not changed". The same point then obliges an updated intermediate report without undue delay, and in any case when the regular activities have been recovered. Article 5(1)(c) puts the final report no later than one month after the submission of the intermediate report or, where applicable, after the latest updated intermediate report.

Article 5(2) is the provision that changes the shape of the whole thing. Where the entity did not classify the incident as major within 24 hours of becoming aware, but classifies it later, the initial notification is due within four hours from that later classification.

Three reconstructions, mine and not quotations:

  • The two limbs of Article 5(1)(a) collide as soon as classification happens more than 20 hours after awareness. Four hours after the classification and 24 hours after awareness can both be met only while the classification lands at or before the twentieth hour; between the twentieth and twenty-fourth hours the outer bound governs. After the twenty-fourth hour, Article 5(2) moves the anchor altogether, so a firm that classifies at hour 30 files by hour 34 — four hours past the bound Article 5(1)(a) prints.
  • The 72 hours run from the submission of the initial notification, not from the incident, the classification or the awareness. A late initial notification carries the intermediate report with it, so the distance between awareness and the intermediate report is a sum of two periods the firm sets.
  • The one-month period for the final report is measured from the intermediate report or from the latest updated intermediate report — and because recovery triggers an update, the last deadline in the chain is re-anchored to an operational event the firm experiences and declares.

Level one conditions, level two requires

Article 19(4)(b) of the Regulation frames the intermediate report around change: it is owed as soon as the status of the original incident has changed significantly or its handling has changed on new information, with updates as appropriate and upon request of the competent authority. Article 5(1)(b) requires that same report at 72 hours even where neither status nor handling has changed. The delegated act makes unconditional what the Regulation made conditional, and both texts stay on the page.

Three smaller seams are worth keeping visible rather than tidying away. Article 5(1)(a) says "initial report" while the introductory sentence of Article 5(1) and Article 19(4)(a) say "initial notification". Article 5(2) contains the typographical error "ITC-related" where ICT-related is meant; it is reported as found and not repaired inside quotation. And Article 19(4)(c) anchors the final report's content to the completion of root-cause analysis and the availability of actual impact figures, while Article 5(1)(c) fixes its outer date one month after the intermediate report.

Content anchored to completion, deadline anchored to a date: the two can diverge, and the text read here does not say which prevails.

Where the filing goes

Article 19(1) is narrower than the duty it creates. Where a financial entity is supervised by more than one national competent authority referred to in Article 46, Member States designate a single competent authority as the relevant one for the Article. Credit institutions classified as significant under Article 6(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 report to the national competent authority designated under Article 4 of Directive 2013/36/EU, which immediately transmits the report to the European Central Bank.

Article 46 does not create an authority. Its chapeau, agreeing across two reproductions, says compliance "shall be ensured by the following competent authorities in accordance with the powers granted by the respective legal acts", without prejudice to the oversight framework for critical ICT third-party service providers in Chapter V, Section II. The sectoral list points credit institutions to Directive 2013/36/EU and gives the ECB line for significant ones.

What the regime does not do

Article 19 contains no obligation on the financial entity to publish the incident. Paragraph 3 is a client duty, not a public one: where a major ICT-related incident has an impact on the financial interests of clients, the entity informs those clients without undue delay as soon as it becomes aware, about the incident and the mitigation measures taken. Paragraph 2 keeps a voluntary channel open for significant cyber threats.

Paragraphs 6 to 8 govern onward dissemination by the recipient to the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, the ECB, CSIRTs, resolution authorities and other public authorities, plus cross-border assessment by the supervisory authorities and the ECB.

One sentence in Article 19(5) deserves board attention for a different reason: the reporting task may be outsourced to a third-party service provider, and the financial entity remains fully responsible for fulfilling the reporting requirements. The provider can hold the pen; it cannot hold the duty.

How I know, and what I could not check

On 18 November 2026 the EUR-Lex ELI page for Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 and its CELEX rendering returned no readable article text, and the official PDF returned the title block and recitals only; the official page identifies the act, and the article text above is cited to the labelled independent reproductions named beside each passage, which agree on every overlapping sentence read. Both delegated regulations are quoted from their Official Journal pages. No supervisory decision, individual incident report, published register of notifications or enforcement record was read, and nothing here asserts that any of them is absent. Article 30 was not read, so no claim is made about the contractual reporting or assistance duties of an ICT third-party provider; the third-party finding rests only on Article 19(5).

One design question stays open rather than answered: whether an entity that never classifies an incident as major owes the four-hour notification at all. The four-hour limb has no trigger without a classification, which leaves the 24-hour limb as the only operative bound in that case. That is a question about how the instrument is built, not a finding about any firm.

This archive searched for DORA on 18 November 2026 and returned 25 rows, exactly one of which touched the regime: an Arabic-language item from 24 January 2025 relaying a vendor's call for long-term cyber resilience. None of the returned titles or excerpts read the classification criteria, the reporting stages or the time limits. The European Commission, whose delegated regulations carry the criteria and the clocks, has a directory entry; the provision-level chain is the addition this briefing claims.

So read the headline number twice. The regime does not give Europe a four-hour reporting duty measured from a failure; it gives each financial entity a decision to make, and then measures its compliance from the moment it made it. If a supervisor ever wants to know whether four hours meant anything in a particular case, the artefact that answers the question is not the outage log. It is the firm's own classification record, timestamped, on the day the judgement was made.