Summary

  • The ACSK-RIPE role object — "ACS SK", attached to ACS spol. s r. o. in Bratislava, Slovakia — was created on 18 February 2002 and has not been modified since 4 September 2018, yet it still appears in the admin-c and tech-c fields of the AS210263 registration (IPIP.NET whois mirror).
  • The organisation object behind AS210263, ORG-SA4223-RIPE (SEAL IT Services, s.r.o., Slovakia, registration number 35 880 872), carries a last-modified timestamp of 13 May 2026 — the only layer that has visibly moved in the past year (IPGeolocation.io).
  • RIPEstat reports that AS210263 does not originate prefixes visible in RIS and is not seen transiting, with its data panels cached as of 1 September 2026 (RIPEstat); Hurricane Electric's observer states the network has not been visible in the global routing table since 1 June 2022 (bgp.he.net).
  • Third-party mirrors disagree on which network owns the 185.250.244.x space: Hurricane Electric once attributed 185.250.244.0/24 to AS210263, while current observers attribute the covering /22 to AS12905 (ACS spol. s r. o.) with a valid ROA (ping.pe, IPinfo); an older mirror still carries the /24 under the stale attribution (https://console.rpki-client.org/rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFAULT/44/8b1bc2-5926-4ace-b16f-197fe8365643/1/owXJBHpnE_pu52wzEvYbFXAGAAM.roa.html), and a third-party mirror of the /24 preserves the same stale attribution (whoismind).
  • The defensible conclusion is unchanged in substance but sharper in form: contactability is proven, operation is not, and the only recent state change sits in an organisation object whose holder relationship to the silent autonomous system remains unattributed.

Directory record for the subject: BTW, ACSK-RIPE.

A contact handle is a routing table for mail, not for rights. The AS210263 aut-num object — as-name SEALIT, status ASSIGNED, jointly maintained by RIPE-NCC-END-MNT and ACS-SK-MNT, created on 6 September 2018 and last modified on 16 November 2020, with sponsoring-org ORG-AL12-RIPE — names ACSK-RIPE and the person handle LJ2720-RIPE in its admin-c and tech-c fields (IPIP.NET whois mirror, RADb). That is the entirety of what the association proves. RIPE's own documentation separates route origin validation from the registry record: a ROA authorises an origin AS to announce a prefix, independently of who holds the resource (RIPE NCC, RIPE NCC).

The divergence between mirrors is itself evidence. RADb serves a personal-data-stripped variant of the same aut-num in which both contact fields read DUMY-RIPE; IPIP.NET and IPGeolocation.io serve variants showing ACSK-RIPE and LJ2720-RIPE (RADb, IPIP.NET whois mirror, IPGeolocation.io). A third-party reader sees a different attribution surface depending on which database it queries — and none of the variants answers who operates the network.

The routing layer answers the operational question with silence. Since mid-2022, AS210263 has not been observed announcing prefixes, and RIPEstat's aggregation view confirms no RIS-visible origination as of its September 2026 snapshots (bgp.he.net, RIPEstat). The 185.250.244.x space that stale pages still associate with AS210263 is, in the current observed record, covered by a valid ROA for AS12905 (ping.pe, IPinfo, https://btw.media/pt-br/governance/rir-watchdog/ripe-ncc/story/acsk-ripe-as210263-contato-nao-prova-controle). Whether AS210263's registration remains a dormant reserve, a discontinued service, or an administratively intact but operationally absent network cannot be settled from public data.

What has changed since BTW's August 2026 coverage is narrow and worth stating precisely: the organisation object ORG-SA4223-RIPE was last modified on 13 May 2026, which shows the maintenance relationship behind the holder entity is still being exercised, even as the contact and routing layers stand still (IPGeolocation.io). That single timestamp is the strongest available signal that someone with authenticated update rights remains active — but an update to an organisation object is not evidence of operating control over a silent autonomous system.