Provincial broadband is not primarily won by brand, app design, or national advertising. It is won or lost on repair distance, backhaul scarcity, payment collection, and trust. A household does not buy “Internet” in the abstract; it buys a working drop line, a modem that stays provisioned, a technician who can reach the subdivision or barangay after a storm, a billing statement that will not lock the account in disputed arrears, and a provider that can route traffic from the city to a national or international network without collapsing at peak hours. In an archipelago, this operational problem is structural, not cosmetic. The Philippines’ own connectivity plan notes that fixed broadband buildout is difficult because the country is archipelagic, and the World Bank identifies low rural investment, low competition, and poor broadband infrastructure as constraining limits on national connectivity.
SkyBroadband Provincial Network is best analyzed through this lens. The central economic question is not whether it has national scale. Public evidence indicates not, at least not as a visible independent network today. The better question is how a provincial broadband identity can retain local market power without national scale. The answer is that last-mile broadband power is often neighborhood-specific. If a company controls the installed cable route, the customer account, the local repair flow, the payment relationship, or the only practical upgrade path in a building or area, it can have market power even while leasing upstream scale to someone else. Conversely, if it loses on-the-ground trust, loses port access, or cannot coordinate the migration of legacy infrastructure to fiber, that local power becomes an attrition machine.
Tangible evidence for SkyBroadband Provincial Network is limited but real. The APNIC WHOIS record lists AS45622 as “SKYBB-PILIPINOCABLE-AS-AP,” described as “SkyBroadband Provincial Network,” with country PH, imports from AS6648 and AS23944, the organization ORG-SPN2-AP, and a sponsoring organization ORG-SI1-AP. The same record shows maintenance by BayanTel/Skyinet, address history from BayanTel, IP administration by SkyCablenet, and a Globe abuse contact validated in 2026. This proves a network identity registered with the RIR and a lineage. It does not prove a currently active standalone sales company, a living provincial customer base under this exact name, or a current independent operational footprint.
The Name Is Real; the Active Network Is Not Visible
The clearest canonical identity is not a corporate website. It is AS45622. The APNIC registry gives the name, AS handle, country, routing policy relationships, organization entity, and maintenance trail. The aliases that matter commercially are “SKYBB-PILIPINOCABLE-AS-AP,” “SkyBroadband Provincial Network,” “Sky Internet,” “SKYCablenet IPadmin,” “SKYBROADBAND,” and the current customer-facing Sky Cable/SKY Fiber/SKY TruFiber ecosystem. These names are not interchangeable legal entities. They are a lineage of routing entities, operational brands, broadband products, and corporate control relationships. APNIC itself classifies the SkyBroadband Provincial Network organization as “OTHER,” tied to a BayanTel address and a skyinet.net contact, not as a consumer-facing company with a standalone evidence trail.
The routing table is more important than the name. BGP.tools reports that AS45622 is “currently not in the global routing table” and shows zero originated IPv4 prefixes and zero IPv6 prefixes, although the ASN is still “Active, Allocated under APNIC.” PeeringDB also lists SkyBroadband Provincial Network under ASN 45622, organization Sky Internet, with zero IPv4 prefixes, zero IPv6 prefixes, no public peering exchanges, and no interconnection facilities. This is the strongest signal of current status: it does not behave as a visible, active standalone network originating customer traffic onto the global internet.
There are, however, residual route and address hints. The AbuseIPDB WHOIS view for 182.18.238.75 lists the ISP as SKYBROADBAND, usage type Fixed ISP, domain mysky.com.ph, and city Davao; its raw APNIC WHOIS section shows a SKYBB-PH block and a route entity for 182.18.238.0/24 with origin AS45622 and description "Sky Cable Corporation." This counts, but it is not enough to override the live BGP evidence. A route entity can persist after operational topology changes; it can document intended or historical authorization without showing that the prefix is currently announced by the ASN. A third-party downstream list also places AS45622 under AS23944 SKYBroadband/SKYCable Corporation, alongside other Sky-related ASNs, but that is again a relationship signal rather than proof of current traffic origination.
The likely current status is therefore: real registry identity, probable legacy or residual network entity, commercially linked to the Sky/BayanTel/Sky Cable broadband lineage, but not a clearly active standalone ISP in the public routing table. For an infrastructure market reader, this is not a weak conclusion. It is the conclusion. The absence of visible prefixes, facilities, peering, website clarity, and direct sales documents is itself the market signal.
BayanTel and Sky Internet Explain the Fossil Registry
The SkyBroadband Provincial Network registration looks strange only if treated as a modern clean-room ISP profile. It makes more sense as an artifact of the old Sky Internet, BayanTel, Sky Cable, and Lopez group broadband stack. APNIC’s AS45622 entity imports from AS6648 and AS23944; notification and maintenance contacts include bayan.com.ph and SKYINET; the abuse registration uses Globe’s cybersecurity mailbox, while the organization address points to BayanTel’s Roosevelt Avenue building. Globe’s 2015 disclosure to the Philippine Stock Exchange says Globe agreed to purchase BayanTel shares from Bayan Telecommunications Holdings and Lopez Holdings, increasing Globe’s stake in BayanTel from 56.87% to 98.57%. This does not prove Globe owns SkyBroadband Provincial Network as a consumer-facing business, but it explains why a Sky/BayanTel-era resource may carry Globe abuse handling today.
The historical operational logic is visible in an old but useful De La Salle University management thesis on Sky Internet. It described Sky Internet as one of the leading ISPs of its time, dependent on upstream backbone providers and local loop operators, affiliated with BayanTel and Sky Cable, and weakened by billing/collection problems, a low subscriber base, and a revenue-expenditure imbalance. It also identified prepaid services, billing/collection improvement, convergence, capacity enhancement, and acquisition of smaller ISPs as strategic levers. The document dates from 2000, so it cannot establish current operations. Its value is structural: the same economic variables reappear in today’s evidence—backbone dependence, billing discipline, convergence, local access infrastructure, and subscriber base scale.
This history matters because provincial broadband assets often outlive the corporate history that created them. An ASN can stay registered; an abuse mailbox can be updated; a route entity can still exist; a customer brand can migrate from cable broadband to fiber; a billing relationship can survive even after the physical infrastructure is outsourced. The commercial entity is therefore not a neatly bounded company called SkyBroadband Provincial Network. It is a residual provincial broadband identity inside a larger Sky Cable/Sky Internet/BayanTel/SKYBROADBAND ecosystem.
Customer-Facing Activity Has Shifted to Sky Cable, Sky Fiber, and Sky TruFiber
Today’s customer-facing Sky broadband story is no longer centered on the exact name SkyBroadband Provincial Network. It is centered on Sky Cable Corporation, SKY Fiber, SKY TruFiber, SKY TV, and SKYBIZ. MySky describes SKY Cable Corporation as the pay-TV and broadband arm of ABS-CBN, offering broadband via SKY Fiber and enterprise connectivity via SKYBIZ. The same official Sky history states that Sky introduced broadband internet under the SKYbroadband brand in 2008 and later relaunched broadband as SKY Fiber in 2018. That is the consumer-facing lineage into which SkyBroadband Provincial Network most plausibly fits.
The product evidence is also narrower than the national brand might suggest. The current MySky SKY Fiber plan page shows residential plans from 100 Mbps at ₱999/month to 1 Gbps at ₱3,500/month, with the page specifying availability in select Metro Manila areas and a guaranteed speed of 30% of the subscribed rate. This page does not prove AS45622 provincial activity. It proves the current baseline retail price and service positioning of the Sky broadband brand. It also shows why a legacy provincial network would face price compression: a provider selling sub-gigabit local broadband must compete in a market where advertised speeds are cheap and the differentiator shifts from peak throughput to actual availability, installation availability, and dispute handling.
Sky’s official upgrade page is more commercially revealing than the plan page. It states that, following the Converge deal, SKY is on a pure fiber network; traditional SKY cable service and plans will no longer be offered in the covered transition; free upgrade is available for active Metro Manila subscribers with no outstanding balance; authorized representatives will conduct home visits; and customers who do not upgrade will see their service end when the legacy network in their area is decommissioned. It also says that SKY TV requires a SKY TruFiber connection and will not work with other ISPs, while Sky remains the service provider and biller after the upgrade. These details are unit economics, not marketing. They define who controls the account, who controls the customer migration journey, and where switching costs lie.
Converge Provides the New Scale; Sky Retains the Customer Relationship
The current central transaction is Sky’s commercial agreement with Converge ICT. Sky says it will use Converge’s pure fiber network to upgrade services for new SKY Fiber subscribers and existing subscribers. The official page states that the agreement allows Sky to use Converge’s FTTH network; Converge, for its part, says the deal increases port utilization and provides a revenue boost. ABS-CBN’s corporate release adds scale: Converge had over eight million FTTH ports, a fiber footprint of over 700,000 kilometers, coverage of 16 million Philippine homes, and 2.3 million residential broadband subscribers as of end-March 2024.
This shifts Sky’s economics from “own and operate the access network” to “monetize the customer base while using another operator’s fiber infrastructure.” That is not automatically bad. A struggling or sub-scale broadband operator can improve service quality by migrating customers to a more robust FTTH network, while the network owner monetizes excess ports. But it also creates supplier concentration. If Converge ports are unavailable, local cabinets missing, migration records incomplete, or truck-roll responsibility unclear, the customer sees a single service failure even if the fault is shared across two companies.
The deal also appears strategically important enough to trigger market rumors and an official denial. Converge and Sky issued a joint statement on June 26, 2026, saying the commercial agreement remains “fully in effect,” contrary to a news article that had declared it terminated. The economic reading is straightforward: the continuity of the Converge deal is now a primary variable of Sky’s broadband value. Sky’s own legacy network decommissioning language makes this unavoidable. If the replacement FTTH path is stable, Sky can convert aging infrastructure into a customer-service and billing business riding on Converge’s infrastructure. If it is unstable, the migration period destroys trust faster than it saves capex.
The Paradox: Declining Broadband Can Still Have Local Power
A network can lose subscribers and retain market power in places where households are locked into its physical path or account structure. ABS-CBN’s 2024 quarterly report shows Cable TV and broadband revenue of ₱4.122 billion for the first nine months of 2024, down 24% from ₱5.456 billion in the comparable 2023 period, primarily due to subscriber decline; the Cable TV and broadband segment still generated ₱1.120 billion in EBITDA but posted a net loss of ₱418 million for the period. In 2025, ABS-CBN reported that Cable TV and broadband revenue dropped a further 39% to ₱3.27 billion, while the segment’s recurring net loss narrowed to ₱1.34 billion and the reported net loss fell to ₱776 million thanks to cost reductions. Philstar, citing the financial report, added that Sky Cable’s debt fell by 26% to ₱3.3 billion after a refinancing with lenders that extended payment terms to 2032.
These numbers describe distress, not dominance. But local power in broadband is not the same thing as consolidated financial health. A provider can have weak corporate finances and yet still have high local switching frictions. The customer may need an available port at a competing provider; a condo or subdivision may have limited internal wiring; a household may need to clear an outstanding balance before termination or upgrade; an IPTV bundle may require the same fiber service; a technician may only be scheduled through a specific subcontracting chain. Sky’s upgrade page makes the payment and account filtering explicit: only active subscribers with no outstanding balance are eligible for the free upgrade, customers are asked to keep their accounts in good credit standing, and Sky remains the biller after the upgrade.
That is how local market power survives without national scale. It is not a monopoly in the classic national-market sense. It is a series of micro-monopolies around drop connections, ports, account status, local repair knowledge, subcontractor access, and decommissioning schedules. A customer can dislike the provider and yet be unable to switch quickly if the alternative lacks a nearby network access point. In provincial broadband, the customer’s outside option is not “PLDT or Globe or Converge exists nationally.” The outside option is “a working port and a technician are available at this address this week.”
The Balance Sheet Rests on Field Strength
The costliest moments in an access network are not always bandwidth purchases. They are truck rolls, failed installations, repeat visits, and unpaid accounts. A technician sent to a remote barangay who finds there is no available fiber port has generated a cost without revenue. A household that is billed while service is unstable becomes a collection risk and a complaint risk. A customer who refuses to pay an arrear because the service was down can block termination, migration, or equipment recovery. These are not edge cases; they are the core economics of broadband.
ABS-CBN’s 2024 report gives a useful accounting view of this. Sky Cable pays sales commissions to agents for subscription contracts, capitalizes those costs as incremental costs of obtaining contracts, and amortizes them over the service period. The same report describes contract liabilities including subscription fees billed and collected in advance, non-refundable installation fees collected in advance, and security deposits, with ₱2.841 billion in contract liabilities as of September 30, 2024. This means the business is not just about selling bandwidth. It manages a ledger of accounts with deposits, prepaid items, installation economics, agent commissions, and service performance obligations.
Payment collection is also visible in the broader market. A 2021 CIMB/GCredit merchant list groups Sky Broadband, SkyCable, Skydirect Postpaid, Converge ICT, Bayantel, PLDT, Globe At Home, and numerous local cable/internet operators into biller categories. The document is old and does not prove current acceptance, but it demonstrates how cable/internet service in the Philippines has long been embedded in third-party payment loops. Economically, this matters because collection channels are part of the moat. A local ISP with easy payment options, accurate posting, and fast reconnection can outperform a technically stronger network with poor billing reconciliation.
The abuse‑handling trail is another operational clue. APNIC’s AS45622 registration directs abuse to a Globe cybersecurity mailbox; older SkyCablenet role data directs abuse incidents to skyinet.net; the SKYBB‑PH IP block shown in AbuseIPDB has a separate Sky abuse mailbox validated in 2026. This split is not necessarily a problem, but it shows legacy complexity. Abuse desks are economically important because consumer ISPs generate spam, malware, botnet, and copyright complaints. Poor abuse responsiveness can increase upstream risk, create blocklists, and damage interconnection relationships. For a currently dormant ASN, the abuse path is less about live AS45622 traffic than about whether legacy Sky/BayanTel/Sky Cable resources are kept administratively clean.
Backhaul and Ports Are the Real Upstream Dependency
The public routing evidence says AS45622 has no live global visibility; the commercial evidence says Sky’s current broadband upgrade path rests on Converge FTTH. Those two facts point to the same business model: the scarce asset is no longer AS45622’s independent transit posture. It is access to a working physical last mile and the ability to ride on someone else’s network at scale. Converge wants port utilization; Sky wants service continuity and a capex‑light upgrade path.
This shifts the risk from transit pricing to operational coordination. If Converge’s nationwide network has available ports and local cabinets, Sky can preserve subscribers without rebuilding infrastructure. If not, the customer is stuck between a legacy network being decommissioned and a new fiber network not yet ready. Sky’s official upgrade text already creates this tension: the upgrade schedule is area‑dependent, authorized representatives will contact customers, the legacy network will eventually be decommissioned, and the free upgrade is conditional on account standing.
In provincial terms, backhaul remains decisive. A local provider may own the drop to the home but depend on a larger operator for transport to Manila, a regional hub, or an international gateway. The 2000 thesis on Sky Internet observed the same upstream dependence in an earlier form: ISPs needed upstream internet providers and depended on backbone providers and local loop operators. The technology changed—from dial‑up/cable/IPLC to FTTH and wholesale fiber—but the bargaining problem endures. The company closest to the home may not own the route that determines congestion, latency, and recovery after major cuts.
Price Pressure Is National; Trust Is Local
Sky’s published residential plan page shows how intense advertised‑price pressure has become: 300 Mbps at ₱1,500, 500 Mbps at ₱2,000, 700 Mbps at ₱2,500, and 1 Gbps at ₱3,500 in select Metro Manila areas, with 30% guaranteed throughput. Even if these are not an AS45622 provincial product sheet, they anchor consumer expectations. A provincial ISP selling 50–100 Mbps at similar prices must win on availability, fast repairs, payment convenience, or absence of alternatives. If it cannot, its only remaining moat is customer inertia.
The competitive set is not just PLDT, Globe, Converge, and DITO. It includes local cable operators, small WISPs, building‑specific providers, resellers, and municipal broadband enterprises. The DICT connectivity plan stakeholder list includes regional private operators such as DCTV Cable Network Broadband Services, Leyte Cable Network, Mindanao Cable Television, and other local communications and cable entities. The GCredit biller list also shows a fragmented cable/internet payment ecosystem, with names such as Angeles Cable, BICORE, Cavite Cable, Central Luzon Cable, PARASAT, Royal Cable, Shama Broadband & CATV, and Sky Broadband appearing alongside national brands. That fragmentation is the relevant competitive environment for a provincial broadband network.
Small local ISPs can be inferior in scale and superior in responsiveness. A Reddit user in an InternetPH thread claimed that a small local provider fixed outages on the same day while Sky’s restoration timelines were repeatedly pushed back; that is anecdotal, but it captures a real economic counterfactual. A local operator with worse upstream pricing can beat a national brand in a neighborhood if it has a closer technician, fewer call‑center layers, and direct control over the drop. Local service quality is often a labor‑coordination problem before it is a bandwidth problem.
Hyperscalers are not direct competitors to SkyBroadband Provincial Network. AWS, Google, Microsoft, Netflix, and content delivery networks affect traffic volumes, cache placement, and customer expectations around video quality, but they do not install the home drop. Exchanges and data centers are also not the right category for AS45622 today. PeeringDB shows no public peering exchanges and no interconnection facilities for AS45622. The category is access ISP or legacy regional broadband network, not cloud, hosting, exchange, or national telecom.
Control Has Been Strategically Unstable
Sky’s broadband business has been through a visible cycle of control and strategy. In January 2024, GMA reported that Sky Cable would cease cable broadcast as part of preparations for the PLDT‑Sky acquisition, while Sky Fiber services would continue. The same report said the Philippine Competition Commission had approved the sale, and that PLDT had agreed to acquire 100% of the outstanding capital stock of Sky Cable for ₱6.75 billion. Then in February 2024, GMA reported that the sale was canceled after ABS‑CBN and PLDT jointly decided not to proceed, with Sky stating cable TV would continue and SKYFiber was unaffected.
That failed transaction matters because it shows the asset was strategically valuable but hard to absorb. The buyer logic was clear: broadband coverage, especially in remote areas, could improve under a larger telecom group. The seller logic was also clear: Sky’s broadband asset had customer relationships but needed capital and operational renewal. The cancellation left Sky needing another path, and the Converge deal became that path.
By 2026, the main control risk was no longer PLDT acquisition; it was continuity of the Converge partnership and lender accommodation. The Converge joint statement says the Sky deal remains in effect despite a termination report. The 2026 Philstar report says Sky Cable reduced debt to ₱3.3 billion after a refinancing deal extending payment terms to 2032. The implicit constraint is balance‑sheet time. Sky needs enough runway to finish migration and preserve accounts; Converge needs enough confidence that wholesale economics and customer conversion will pay; lenders need evidence that the segment can stop contracting faster than costs can be taken out.
Chatter Is Not Evidence, but It Is a Leading Indicator
Unofficial evidence is commercially important precisely because official evidence is thin. Internet service‑quality failures appear first as call‑center scripts, local Facebook posts, Reddit threads, technician chatter, and complaint screenshots long before they become formal disclosures. These signals are not representative samples. They are biased toward angry customers. But in broadband, angry customers are the right early‑warning set because service failures are local, clustered, and time‑sensitive.
A Reddit thread from a long‑time Sky Fiber customer describes repeated outages after switching to Converge lines, a failed migration because there was allegedly no nearby Converge cabinet, months of intermittent service, ongoing billing, and no technician resolution. The same thread includes comments claiming zero‑balance requirements for termination or upgrade, limited Sky TruFiber availability, and long waits tied to Converge availability. Another Reddit thread describes over a month without SKY internet, delayed migration to Converge, difficulty getting clear answers, Sky email attempts that bounced or went unanswered, and intent to report to NTC and DTI. A third thread focuses on pushed‑back restoration estimates, unclear outage causes, cable‑theft explanations, and the perception that old Sky infrastructure was being replaced by Converge‑fed fiber.
These threads do not prove systemic failure. They prove that some customers experience the migration as a three‑way coordination failure: the Sky account, the Converge infrastructure, and local technician availability. The commercial significance is broader than the anecdotes. If customers believe they are billed during unusable service, trust falls. If termination requires a zero balance while the balance itself is disputed, attrition turns conflictual. If there is no local port or cabinet, the “free upgrade” is a promise without capacity. If restoration dates are repeatedly pushed back, the provider loses the only asset that matters in a local outage: credibility.
A low‑reliability tech blog amplified these claims, alleging widespread Sky Fiber outages in November 2025, Converge transition failures, unavailable fiber ports, missing distribution cabinets, incomplete barangay rollouts, support template replies, and exposure to regulatory rebates. That source should not be treated as verified fact; it uses broad claims that would need stronger corroboration. But it is useful market chatter because it names the exact operational bottlenecks an analyst would expect in a forced HFC‑to‑FTTH migration: port exhaustion, incomplete local fiber rollouts, reduced maintenance on legacy infrastructure, and unresolved complaint channels.
If the rumor pattern is materially true, the value transfer is severe. Converge only gains wholesale utilization where ports are ready; Sky retains billing exposure but loses customer goodwill; local competitors acquire disgruntled subscribers; regulators receive a complaint volume; lenders see slower retention. If the rumor pattern is largely false or isolated, then the economics are more benign: a messy but finite migration period creates noise, while the new FTTH service improves retention after conversion. The monitoring point is not whether customers complain; every ISP has complaints. The monitoring point is whether complaints cluster around the same scarce assets: no port, no cabinet, no technician, no bill adjustment, no clean termination.
What the Registry Silence Means Economically
There is no strong public evidence that SkyBroadband Provincial Network, under that exact name, is currently selling services, operating a customer website, hiring field staff, winning procurement contracts, or interconnecting as an independent network. That absence should not be filled with speculation. It must be interpreted.
The first interpretation is dormancy: AS45622 could be an allocated but non‑announcing network entity, kept for administrative continuity or possible future use. BGP.tools and PeeringDB confirm that. The second is absorption: the traffic and customers once linked to Sky’s provincial broadband could now sit under other Sky/SkyCable ASNs, Converge infrastructure, or larger upstream arrangements. APNIC’s links to AS23944, Sky Internet, BayanTel, and Globe abuse handling support a legacy‑resource view. The third is local invisibility: some access networks may serve customers without their own ASN appearing as the retail brand, especially when traffic is NAT’ed, tunneled, sold in bulk, or routed under a parent network. That is possible, but the public evidence does not show it specifically for AS45622 today.
This distinction matters for valuation and risk. A live independent ASN with growing prefixes, IX presence, and clean peering would have optionality as a network asset. A dormant ASN embedded in a struggling broadband migration has a different value: customer lists, billing relationships, local infrastructure knowledge, brand recognition, and possibly residual numbering resources. The first is an internet infrastructure asset; the second is an access‑market / customer‑migration asset.
Category Recommendation
SkyBroadband Provincial Network should be categorized as a regional ISP or legacy provincial broadband access network identity in the Asia‑Pacific access infrastructure market. It should not be categorized as cloud/hosting, national telecom, exchange/interconnection platform, or data center operator. The routing registration is too thin for interconnection; the customer‑side evidence is tied to residential and business broadband; the corporate trail points to Sky Cable/Sky Internet/BayanTel; and the current operational economics are dominated by FTTH migration, local service continuity, billing, and supplier dependence.
The more precise label is: “Legacy regional ISP / cable broadband access network entity within the Sky Cable–Sky Internet broadband lineage, now commercially affected by Sky’s Converge FTTH migration.” This category preserves the evidence boundary. It acknowledges the solid registration facts without claiming AS45622 is a visible live network. It also keeps the economics focused on the true asset: local access power without national routing scale.
The investment‑quality conclusion is not that SkyBroadband Provincial Network is a hidden national broadband player. It is that provincial broadband market power can survive as a local control point even after national‑scale economics have moved elsewhere. Sky’s power, where it exists, comes from customer accounts, legacy access, migration filtering, billing continuity, and repair coordination. Its weakness comes from the same places: disputed balances, delayed technicians, decommissioned infrastructure, no available fiber ports, and dependence on Converge for the new physical network. A small provincial ISP with direct field control can beat it locally; a national provider with ready ports can absorb its attrition; Sky can only preserve value where it converts customers faster than trust erodes.
Evidence Register
Source name: APNIC WHOIS for AS45622. URL:https://wq.apnic.net/apnic-bin/whois.pl?object_type=aut-num&searchtext=AS45622. Source type: RIR/WHOIS registry. Evidence provided: AS45622 identity, “SKYBB-PILIPINOCABLE-AS-AP,” “SkyBroadband Provincial Network,” country PH, imports from AS6648 and AS23944, ORG-SPN2-AP, BayanTel/Skyinet maintenance trail, Globe abuse contact. Does not prove: active service, current subscribers, legal incorporation, or live global routing. Economic importance: establishes authoritative network identity and the legacy control/abuse chain.
Source name: BGP.tools AS45622. URL:https://bgp.tools/as/45622. Source type: BGP/routing intelligence. Evidence provided: AS45622 is allocated and active in APNIC but not currently in the global routing table, with zero originated IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes. Does not prove: absence of private routing, resale, internal use, or historical service. Economic importance: indicates a dormant or residual public‑network status rather than a visible active independent ISP.
Source name: PeeringDB AS45622. URL:https://www.peeringdb.com/asn/45622. Source type: interconnection registry. Evidence provided: organization listed as Sky Internet, ASN 45622, zero IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes, no public peering exchanges, no interconnection facilities. Does not prove: any private interconnections or wholesale traffic paths. Economic importance: rules out classification as an exchange, hosting, or peering‑centered network.
Source name: AbuseIPDB WHOIS for 182.18.238.75. URL:https://www.abuseipdb.com/whois/182.18.238.75. Source type: WHOIS cache / abuse intelligence platform. Evidence provided: SKYBROADBAND fixed ISP label, mysky.com.ph domain hint, Davao location signal, SKYBB‑PH IP block, and a route entity for 182.18.238.0/24 with origin AS45622 and description Sky Cable Corporation. Does not prove: current BGP announcement by AS45622 or a live Davao customer footprint today. Economic importance: shows the provincial and Sky Cable connection in numbering records, while reinforcing the need to separate route entities from live routing.
Source name: Ditatompel AS23944 downstream list. URL:https://www.ditatompel.com/asn/23944/downstreams. Source type: third‑party BGP aggregation. Evidence provided: AS45622 appears as a downstream/linked ASN under AS23944 SKYBroadband/SKYCable Corporation. Does not prove: real‑time route origination or current traffic volume. Economic importance: supports the idea that AS45622 sits within a wider Sky/SKYCable routing family.
Source name: MySky “SKY‑Converge” page. URL:https://www.mysky.com.ph/sky-converge. Source type: official company page. Evidence provided: Sky will use Converge FTTH to upgrade services; Converge has a large FTTH port and fiber footprint; upgrade is phased by area; customers stay on the same fees for now. Does not prove: AS45622 involvement or exact provincial coverage. Economic importance: identifies the current network refresh model and supplier dependence.
Source name: ABS‑CBN corporate release on Sky‑Converge. URL:https://corporate.abs-cbn.com/newsroom/news-releases/2024/7/22/sky-cable-converge-fiber-network?lang=en. Source type: official corporate release. Evidence provided: Converge deal, port utilization rationale, Converge’s network scale, Sky’s transformation plan, financial discipline. Does not prove: contract economics, revenue sharing, or customer conversion rates. Economic importance: explains why Converge benefits from wholesale utilization and why Sky needs a capex‑light upgrade path.
Source name: Converge/Sky joint statement. URL:https://corporate.convergeict.com/newsroom/joint-statement-of-converge-ict-solutions-inc-and-sky-cable-corp. Source type: official company statement. Evidence provided: the Converge‑Sky commercial agreement remained fully in effect on June 26, 2026, despite a news report of its termination. Does not prove: long‑term renewal, lender terms, or absence of operational friction. Economic importance: partnership continuity is now a primary risk variable for Sky’s broadband value.
Source name: MySky upgrade page. URL:https://www.mysky.com.ph/upgrade-skycable. Source type: official customer‑facing page. Evidence provided: traditional Sky cable plans are being discontinued in the covered transition, Sky TruFiber/IPTV migration, free upgrade only for active subscribers with no outstanding balance, legacy network decommissioning, Sky remains the service provider and biller after upgrade. Does not prove: that the same conditions apply nationwide or specifically to AS45622. Economic importance: shows switching costs, payment filtering, account control, and decommissioning pressure.
Source name: MySky SKY Fiber plan page. URL:https://www.mysky.com.ph/skyfiber. Source type: official retail plan page. Evidence provided: current baseline retail pricing / speeds and 30%‑guaranteed throughput language for select Metro Manila areas. Does not prove: provincial pricing or AS45622 product offering. Economic importance: establishes the price‑pressure benchmark against which regional and local ISPs compete.
Source name: ABS‑CBN 2024 quarterly report. URL:https://data-corporate.abs-cbn.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2025/07/23020520/Quarterly-Report-as-of-September-30-2024_Final.pdf. Source type: SEC/financial report. Evidence provided: Cable TV and broadband revenue decline, subscriber loss explanation, EBITDA, net loss, sales commissions, contract liabilities, security deposits, debt repayment schedule. Does not prove: standalone SkyBroadband Provincial Network finances. Economic importance: shows the stressed but cash‑generative access economics of the broadband segment.
Source name: ABS‑CBN 2025 earnings release and Philstar report. URLs:https://corporate.abs-cbn.com/newsroom/news-releases/2026/4/24/abs-cbns-content-revenues-hit-p12-59b-narrows-losses-in-2025?lang=enandhttps://www.philstar.com/business/2026/04/21/2522354/abs-cbn-trims-losses-debts-2025-profit-return-nears. Source type: official corporate release and business press. Evidence provided: 2025 Cable TV and broadband revenue dropped 39% to ₱3.27 billion; segment losses narrowed; Sky Cable debt declined after refinancing. Does not prove: customer‑level churn, ARPU, or migration success. Economic importance: shows balance‑sheet pressure and why external FTTH capacity matters.
Source name: GMA News articles on the PLDT‑Sky transaction. URLs:https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/money/companies/895536/sky-cable-announces-final-broadcast-sign-off-on-feb-26-2024/story/andhttps://www.gmanetwork.com/news/money/companies/898264/sale-of-sky-cable-to-pldt-canceled/story/. Source type: business/industry news. Evidence provided: PLDT’s ₱6.75 billion acquisition attempt, PCC approval context, planned cable shutdown, subsequent deal cancellation, Sky Fiber continuity statement. Does not prove: current ownership of AS45622 or post‑cancellation strategy terms. Economic importance: demonstrates strategic volatility and the perceived value of Sky’s broadband assets/customers.
Source name: Globe PSE disclosure on BayanTel. URL:https://edge.pse.com.ph/downloadHtml.do?file_id=154514. Source type: stock exchange disclosure. Evidence provided: Globe’s purchase of Bayantel shares raising its stake to 98.57%. Does not prove: direct ownership of Sky Cable or SkyBroadband Provincial Network. Economic importance: explains why Globe abuse handling can appear on an older BayanTel/Skyinet network resource trail.
Source name: Reddit InternetPH threads and TechPipino outage article. URLs:https://www.reddit.com/r/InternetPH/comments/1jk9anm/longtime_issue_with_sky_fiber/?tl=en,https://www.reddit.com/r/InternetPH/comments/1kakxt1/help_wala_pa_ring_internet_at_walang_mabigay_na/?tl=en,https://www.reddit.com/r/InternetPH/comments/1lq46u8/sky_internet/?tl=en, andhttps://techpipino.com/sky-fiber-service-meltdown/. Source type: unofficial customer chatter, forum evidence, low‑reliability tech blog. Evidence provided: anecdotal complaints about delayed Converge migration, no local cabinet/port, outages, billing disputes, support‑channel frustration, and claims about legacy‑infrastructure transition. Does not prove: representative failure rates, regulatory violations, or exact technical causes. Economic importance: functions as early‑warning intelligence on repair trust, migration friction, and attrition risk.
Monitoring Points
Monitor whether AS45622 starts originating IPv4 or IPv6 prefixes again, especially any return of 182.18.238.0/24 or other SKYBB-PH route entities into live BGP.
Track APNIC changes to ORG-SPN2-AP, MAINT-PH-SKYINET-INC, MAINT-PH-SKYBB, IRT-BAYANTEL-PH, and Sky abuse contacts; a move toward Converge, Sky Cable‑only contacts, or exclusively Globe handling would clarify control.
Monitor PeeringDB for new exchanges, facilities, traffic levels, or prefix counts under AS45622; any update would materially alter the dormant‑network interpretation.
Follow Sky’s area‑by‑area upgrade pages for expansion beyond Metro Manila, firm decommissioning dates, and explicit provincial schedules.
Monitor Converge disclosures around Sky wholesale revenue, port‑utilization benefits, customer migration numbers, contract‑renewal language, lender‑consent dependencies, or termination‑risk language.
Track ABS‑CBN/Sky segment revenue, subscriber decline, Sky Cable debt, and capex; the key signal is whether revenue stabilizes after the Converge migration or continues contracting despite cost‑cutting.
Monitor NTC and DTI complaint references involving Sky Fiber, Sky TruFiber, billing during outages, rebates, termination fees, or failure to provide complaint channels.
Follow social complaints by geography, not just volume; clustered reports of “no cabinet,” “no port,” “migration pending,” or “legacy decommissioned” in the same city or barangay are stronger signals than generic ISP anger.
Watch local ISP and cable‑operator marketing in former Sky areas; aggressive offers by small providers after Sky outages would indicate local share leakage.
Monitor Sky payment‑center changes, biller‑list removals, account‑number changes, and posting delays; payment friction is a direct predictor of involuntary churn and complaint escalation.
Monitor job postings and subcontractor notices for field technicians, fiber installers, NAP‑cabinet rollouts, HFC decommissioning, and customer‑migration crews; field‑labor intensity will reveal whether the migration is operationally funded.
Track customer reports on CGNAT, IPv6 availability, latency changes, and public‑IP changes post‑migration; these clues show whether Sky customers are truly moving to Converge’s network architecture.
Watch cable‑theft chatter and storm restoration separately from normal outage chatter; repeated “cable theft” explanations without evidence of restoration erode trust and accelerate switching.
Track fiber rollouts by PLDT, Globe, DITO, Converge, and local WISPs in the specific areas where Sky migration complaints cluster; the outside option is address‑level, not national.
Watch for revived acquisition rumors involving Sky Cable, Converge, PLDT, Globe, or financial investors; a buyer would be purchasing accounts, migration economics, and local access relationships more than AS45622 itself.