Summary

  • The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's cyber-incident report is due within four business days after the registrant determines the incident is material, and that determination must itself move without unreasonable delay after discovery.
  • Neither the operative text of Item 1.05 nor its four instructions requires the filer to print the date of that determination — and none requires it to date the Attorney General's written notice either. Three filings read here print arrival and incident dates, and not one states the day its own decision was made.

Start with the sentence that carries the whole regime. A registrant files an Item 1.05 report within four business days after it determines that it has experienced a material cybersecurity incident, and a determination that lands on a weekend or a Commission holiday moves the start to the next business day (Form 8-K, General Instruction B.1 and Item 1.05). The report must describe the material aspects of the incident's nature, scope and timing and its material impact or reasonably likely material impact, including financial condition and results of operations.

Then read the instruction that sits beneath the clock. The determination itself must be made without unreasonable delay after discovery of the incident. So the instrument's true timeline has two stages, and a reader outside the company can see neither of them. Discovery is not printed. The determination is not printed. What is printed is the filing date stamped by the EDGAR system.

This is not an accident of drafting that a later release fixed. The rule was adopted on 26 July 2023 and published at 88 FR 51896–51945 on 4 August 2023, with Form 8-K and Form 6-K incident disclosures beginning on the later of 90 days after Federal Register publication or 18 December 2023 and smaller reporting companies receiving an additional 180 days; the same release added Regulation S-K Item 106 for annual-report cyber disclosure (Release Nos. 33-11216; 34-97989, SEC press release 2023-139). The Commission built a disclosure duty around a judgment and left the judgment's date outside the form.

The one interruption the regime does describe is a genuinely external act, and it is worth stating precisely because it is the strongest counterweight in this piece. Item 1.05(c) permits delay only where the Attorney General of the United States determines that the disclosure required by Item 1.05(a) poses a substantial risk to national security or public safety and notifies the Commission of that determination in writing.

The delay runs for the period the Attorney General specifies, up to 30 days beyond the date the disclosure was otherwise required, extendable by up to 30 days and, in extraordinary circumstances, by a final period of up to 60 days; anything beyond that needs a Commission exemptive order.

The Department of Justice's own guidelines of 12 December 2023 make the sequence harder for a filer, not easier. The Attorney General must invoke the delay within the same four business days that govern the filing. The registrant seeks it by providing information to the FBI directly or through another federal agency. The written notice to the Commission specifies a period of up to 30 days and may cover only part of the information Item 1.05 requires, and the operative question is whether public disclosure threatens national security or public safety — not whether the incident does (DOJ delay guidelines).

The staff guidance closes the obvious loophole. Requesting a delay does not change the filing obligation. A delay is effective only if the Attorney General notifies the Commission in writing before the Form 8-K would otherwise be due. A declined request, an unanswered one, an expired delay or a lifted determination leaves a four-business-day obligation running from the determination, the expiry or the notification respectively, and the delay route creates no separate disclosure obligation about the delay itself (SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Exchange Act Form 8-K CDIs, section 104B).

That last point is where the two anchors meet, and where the record stops. The clock's ordinary start belongs to the registrant. The clock's interruption belongs to the Attorney General. Neither date appears as a required field. A reader holding a completed report can see that the report arrived; the reader cannot see when either clock began, and therefore cannot perform the only arithmetic the rule invites.

Three filings, read at their own addresses, show exactly how far the printed record goes.

AT&T Inc. filed on 12 July 2024 (primary document; filing date and period of report confirmed on the EDGAR filing detail page). Its narrative states that AT&T learned on 19 April 2024 that a threat actor claimed to have unlawfully accessed and copied call logs, that exfiltration took place between 14 and 25 April 2024 from a workspace on a third-party cloud platform, and that the Department of Justice determined on 9 May 2024 and again on 5 June 2024 that a delay in public disclosure was warranted under Item 1.05(c). The company states it is now timely filing the report. Its cover page prints a date of earliest event reported of 6 May 2024. The filing prints no determination date, no expiry of the granted delay and no count of days granted, and it attaches no Department of Justice correspondence — the sole exhibit is Exhibit 104, the cover-page XBRL. Those two Department of Justice dates are the filer's assertion about a third party's action, not a document reproduced in the filing.

The arithmetic that can be reconstructed from what is printed is therefore small and entirely about arrival. Eighty-four days separate the 19 April discovery date from the 12 July filing. Sixty-seven days separate the 6 May cover date from the filing. Thirty-seven days separate the second Department of Justice determination from the filing. The cover date itself sits seventeen days after discovery, and the filing never says what it marks. Not one of those quantities is the four business days.

DATA I/O CORP filed on 21 August 2025 with no delay mechanism anywhere in it (Form 8-K). Its cover prints 16 August 2025 — a Saturday — as the date of the earliest event reported, and the body uses the same 16 August 2025 date for the ransomware incident itself. So here the cover date is the occurrence date, and it cannot be read as a determination date at all. The filing arrived five calendar days later. It also states that the incident does not appear to have had a material impact as of the filing and could result in a future determination, while filing under an item whose trigger is materiality. The contradiction sits in the company's own sentences, and the document prints no date on which any determination was made.

CONDUENT INCORPORATED filed on 14 April 2025 (Form 8-K). Its cover prints 9 April 2025 as the date of the earliest event reported. Its body states that the company experienced an operational disruption and learned of unauthorized access on 13 January 2025, and describes recently learning the nature, scope and validity of the data exfiltrated along with material non-recurring expenses. The cover date sits 86 days after the detection date, and the document never states what the cover date marks. It says no determination date, does not use the words determined to be material, and references no delay. Reading 9 April 2025 as a materiality decision would be my inference, not the company's statement, and I do not make it.

So the pattern across three filings — one delay-route, two ordinary — is not that companies conceal a date. It is that the form never asks for one, so three different companies printed three different things on the same line, and in the one case where the external authority's dates do appear, they appear voluntarily, as explanation for a filing date, while the filer's own decision stays undated.

The control that follows is a field, not an allegation. Add one line to the Item 1.05 report: the date on which the registrant determined the incident was material, or, if a company resists dating its own judgment, the number of calendar days between discovery and filing. Either would let an outsider test the interval the rule actually imposes. The same field would make the delay route auditable without publishing anything the Department of Justice withholds, because a reader could see how long the ordinary interval ran before any interruption began. Nothing in the record reviewed here shows that any filer ran late.

On prior coverage: three queries against the existing-article index for this disclosure regime returned no rows, while the directory card for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission records ten existing articles. That discrepancy is a limit on my measurement, not evidence that nothing has been written about this regulator. The comparison I rely on is the shape of the question in adjacent work: my reading of the HHS breach register found an arrival date printed where a discovery anchor is collected on the form and omitted from the published row; my reading of the NRC Event Notification Report found reporting tiers running from the occurrence on a record that prints both endpoints; my reading of DOE-417 found four filing intervals in one sentence with only two limbs naming an anchor, both of them acts of the filer. Each asked who starts a clock. This one asks what a regime prints when the start belongs to the filer and the interruption belongs to another authority — and whether the published anchor is the one a stranger can verify or merely the one the regime can delegate.

Three filings were read; no census was performed, and every statement here about practice is confined to them.