Summary

  • The 2018 domestic MTR decision remains on the NCC’s register, while its 2026 study has reached a scheduled draft-final-report review stage in the public calendar.
  • Subscriber shares cannot reveal the direction or volume of calls between networks. The cost model must make its network, traffic, asymmetry and transition assumptions visible before anyone can infer who gains or whether retail prices change.

A wholesale receipt behind an ordinary call

A customer sees a dialled number, a call duration and perhaps a charge on a monthly statement. The caller does not see the separate wholesale transaction that appears when the call crosses to another mobile network. The originating operator must reach the customer’s network; the receiving network controls completion to that customer. The termination rate is the regulated price used for that wholesale service.

That definition matters because a mobile termination rate is not a retail voice tariff. It does not tell a subscriber what an on-net or off-net call costs, and it does not automatically set a data plan. It changes the economics between operators. For any pair of networks, the gross transfer depends on the rate and on how many minutes travel in each direction. A single published rate therefore cannot show which operator is a net payer. The traffic matrix is just as important as the per-minute figure.

The NCC’s 2018 determination makes the control point explicit: each operator has a monopoly over calls terminated to customers on its own network. That is why the regulator can treat termination as a distinct wholesale market even when operators compete for retail subscribers. It is also why a cost model can change competitive incentives without rewriting a retail price list.

The 2018 benchmark is a model, not an invoice

The domestic determination issued on 1 June 2018 took effect on 1 July. It set ₦3.90 per minute for generic 2G/3G/4G operators and ₦4.70 for new LTE entrants. The same instrument says the rates remain binding until reviewed. It also bars an effective per-minute rate below the determined amount, with a separate provision for clearing-house discounts. The NCC’s current determinations page still lists that 2018 decision; it separately lists international voice termination, including a 2022 amended determination.

The 2018 numbers did not come from reading each operator’s accounts and assigning its actual costs to every call. The decision describes a hybrid, forward-looking model using long-run incremental cost plus a markup for joint and common costs. It built two representative cases: a generic 2G/3G/4G operator and a new LTE entrant. The determination says the modelled network does not perfectly mirror any one company. It also says traffic density—not total traffic—is the principal driver of unit cost.

Those choices explain why the next study is a decision about a benchmark. A model must decide what an efficient Nigerian network looks like, how much coverage and capacity it needs, how traffic is distributed, which shared costs belong in termination and what evidence supports a separate new-entrant category. A representative model can restrain the tendency of each company to claim its own costs as the industry standard. But the benchmark can also miss real differences if its density, technology or utilization assumptions are wrong.

Subscriber share cannot settle the bill

The NCC’s July 2026 operator table reports 51.76% of active mobile connections for MTN, 34.26% for Airtel, 12.13% for Globacom and 1.85% for T2. These figures describe subscriber connections. They are not measurements of inter-network calling minutes, traffic direction, busy-hour demand, revenue or net settlement positions.

That distinction is the heart of the review. A large customer base may receive many calls, place many calls, or both. A smaller operator’s settlement position depends on actual traffic to and from each other network, not just its subscriber count. The 2018 determination’s emphasis on density points to a second problem: a national average can obscure the cost difference between a dense urban network and a lower-density footprint. Neither the public operator split nor total mobile subscriptions supplies the missing denominator.

The NCC’s 2026 notice says the KPMG study will assess cost and operational characteristics across origination, transit, conveyance and termination. It names network, traffic, operational and financial parameters as inputs for a robust cost model. A forum scheduled for 16 June was intended to explain the study’s scope, methodology, work plan and data templates and give stakeholders a chance to comment. The Commission’s calendar later lists a review of the draft final report for 29 August.

Those are process milestones, not a rate announcement. The calendar entry does not prove the review took place, and the public sources checked for this article do not disclose the draft model, its operator data or its recommendation. The NCC’s determinations register still lists the 2018 domestic MTR as of its 5 October update. No claim about a new rate, symmetry or implementation date is supportable from that record.

What the next determination must make legible

The first question is the reference network. The study needs to explain how it turns operator submissions into an efficient network model and how it accounts for Nigerian coverage, utilization, traffic density and technology. A high subscriber share is not a cost parameter by itself. Nor is the lowest cost observed in one dense market automatically a fair national benchmark.

The second question is whether the old two-class asymmetry should persist. A higher termination rate for a new entrant can compensate for lower scale, but it can also weaken incentives to improve utilization if eligibility lasts too long or uses a poor proxy for costs. A symmetric rate may reduce classification disputes, yet it can understate structural cost differences. The right test is not whether large or small operators prefer a design; it is whether measured, efficient costs justify the class and whether its definition has a review date.

Third, the decision must say what happens to clearing-house discounts, minimum effective rates and existing agreements. If the rate changes but associated settlement rules do not, operators may face a new headline number with old frictions. Finally, a transparent effective date and transition path matter to wholesale contracts, retail plans and investment forecasts. None of these consequences can be inferred from a consultant’s study title.

The public-interest test is therefore broader than “cheaper calls.” A rate that is too high can increase the cost of buying reach from rival networks; a rate that is too low can remove legitimate recovery for efficient termination and distort investment. Either direction can have second-order effects on smaller networks, call completion, retail competition and future network deployment. The NCC must show which trade-off it is choosing and what evidence would cause it to revisit the choice.

Sources