Summary

  • Lu Heng's Note 72, dated 1 July 2026, asserts rights belonging to the operator of a running network. In ARIN's manual and RIPE NCC's own instruments the same subject matter surfaces as duties on the holder and as procedural clocks held inside registry discretion.
  • Across the ten documents read for this piece on 20 November 2026, no clause grants a holder the right to leave a registry with its number resources, and RIPE NCC's Standard Service Agreement states that registration of those resources "does not constitute property".

There is a particular kind of loneliness in arguing from a principle that the other party has already answered, in writing, in a document nobody reads. Lu Heng's Note 72 is an argued framework, published on his own site with a date of 1 July 2026. It is not a policy, not a submission to a consultation, not a court filing. It carries eleven numbered headings, from "The Right to Uniqueness" through to "The Right to Running-Code Primacy", and it speaks in the voice of a network that is already carrying traffic.

That voice is the point. The framework makes claims on behalf of the operator whose addresses are already embedded in customer routes, and it makes them in four sentences worth memorising:

"Every operator has the right to have registry records reflect operational, legal, and market reality. A registry record describes reality. It does not create it."

"No running network should be made hostage to registry discretion. Where resources are already operationally embedded, interruption is not administration. It is coercion."

"The registry may verify that a transfer does not break the Internet. It may not decide whether the transfer deserves to exist."

"Every network has the right to leave a failing, captured, conflicted, or abusive registry without losing its number resources."

Four claims: accuracy, continuity, transfer, exit. The rest of this piece does one thing only. It takes each claim to the instrument that binds a holder and prints what that instrument says instead.

Accuracy belongs to the party being recorded

The nearest thing to an accuracy obligation in the ARIN manual is section 12, Resource Review. Its first paragraph runs: "ARIN may review the current usage of any resources maintained in the ARIN database. The organization shall cooperate with any request from ARIN for reasonable related documentation."

Read the grammar. The registry holds a permission ("may review"); the holder carries an obligation ("shall cooperate"). Nowhere in that paragraph does the registry commit to keeping the holder's record accurate in the sense Note 72 means.

Other provisions push the same way. NRPM 4.2.3.7.1 requires that every IPv4 reassignment or reallocation of a /29 or more "shall be registered via SWIP or a directory services system which meets the standards set forth in section 3.2". ARIN's operational transfer page states it more plainly still: "All resource holders are responsible for proper record maintenance with ARIN."

The RIPE side is blunter. ripe-826 section 4.0 provides that only registered allocations and assignments are considered valid. A holder whose block is not in the database does not have a record problem. It has a resource problem.

So Note 72's Article II is not refuted by any of this. It is displaced. The framework says a record describes reality and does not create it. The operative texts say the record decides whether the reality counts, and that the work of keeping the record true belongs to the party whose network depends on it.

A clock is not a right against interruption

Article III is the sharpest sentence in the document, and the least answered. No running network should be made hostage to registry discretion; interruption of embedded resources "is not administration. It is coercion."

What the instruments offer is time. NRPM 12.6 provides: "Except in cases of fraud, or violations of policy, an organization shall be given a minimum of six months to effect a return." That is a real floor. It is also six months measured from a finding the registry itself makes, with two categories — fraud and policy violation — in which the floor does not apply at all. NRPM 12.5 supplies the consequence: if the organisation does not return resources voluntarily, "ARIN may revoke any resources issued by ARIN". The manual adds, in 12.8, that it creates no additional authority to revoke legacy address space. That is a limitation worth having, and it is a limitation on a power, not a protection against its exercise.

RIPE NCC's Standard Service Agreement is structured the same way. Article 9.3 entitles the RIPE NCC to terminate where a member fails to meet its obligations "and does not remedy such failure within the period specified in the RIPE NCC procedural document" on closure of an LIR. Article 9.5 then requires the member to stop using the services and to "cooperate with the deregistration" of the resources registered to it. Article 6.3 allows suspension and deregistration for non-compliance with policies and procedures.

Every one of those provisions is a schedule. The period exists, the remedy window exists, the sequence exists. What does not exist anywhere in either document is the proposition Article III advances: that a running network's continuity outranks the registry's discretion to act. The clock is inside the discretion, not above it.

Exit is discretionary wherever it exists at all

Article VI draws a line between verification and permission: the registry may check that a transfer will not break the Internet; it may not decide whether the transfer deserves to exist. Article IX goes further, asserting a right to leave a failing registry without losing the number resources.

ARIN answers Article VI in a single clause. NRPM 8.1: "Number resources are nontransferable and are not assignable to any other organization unless ARIN has expressly and in writing approved a request for transfer. ARIN is tasked with making prudent decisions on whether to approve the transfer of number resources." Prudent decisions. That is the discretion Article VI says cannot exist, granted by name.

The conditions around it narrow the route further. NRPM 8.2 requires that the current registrant not be involved in any dispute as to the status of the resources, and that the recipient prove it acquired the assets using the resources or the entire registrant. NRPM 8.3 requires the source to be the current registered holder and free of dispute as to the status of those resources. NRPM 8.4 admits inter-regional movement only "via RIRs who agree to the transfer and share reciprocal, compatible needs-based policies" — one registry's willingness to assess, multiplied by two.

RIPE NCC's answers are parallel. ripe-807 section 2.0 permits a legitimate holder to transfer blocks, but allocated resources "may only" go to another RIPE NCC member, and section 2.2.1 blocks any transfer of scarce resources such as IPv4 for 24 months from receipt. Section 2.1 requires the transfer to appear in the RIPE Database and has the registry update the registration records to complete it. The operational page is candid about which party decides: "We authorise and process transfers of Internet number resources between networks". Authorise. Process.

And then the premise itself. SSA Article 10.2: "the registration of Internet Number Resources does not constitute property and the registration of Internet Number Resources in the name of the Member or a third party does not confer upon the Member or the third party any rights of ownership". The same clause notes that resources deregistered by the RIPE NCC "may be re-registered to another party according to the RIPE Policies".

That is the hinge of the whole comparison. Article IX asks for a right to leave with the resources. In the instrument that governs the holder, there is nothing owned to carry out. The resources are a registration, the registration is granted, and the transfer of the registration runs through the registry that granted it.

The register dispute is not the argument here

A reader who knows why this framework exists will expect the AFRINIC matter to arrive at this point. It arrives as a boundary, not as evidence.

The order in SC/COM/MOT/000399/2025, determined on 11 June 2025, settled the direction of Cloud Innovation's inclusion in AFRINIC's register of members and recorded AFRINIC's undertaking. Cloud Innovation is a company-law Member with the shareholder-equivalent protections available in a company limited by guarantee without share capital; correcting the director-specific Registered Member category does not cancel that membership. The issue the court decided is not retried before administrators or ministers, and any appeal, stay or variation belongs to a competent court.

That history explains the temperature of Note 72. It does not become a second argument in this piece, and this piece alleges no breach by any registry named above. The clause comparison stands on its own documents.

What a holder can still put in front of a registry

Honesty requires the other half. The instruments reviewed here are not lawless, and the framework is not describing a vacuum.

The six-month floor in NRPM 12.6 is a genuine protection, cheap to state and expensive to withdraw. NRPM 12.8's disclaimer of additional revocation authority over legacy space is another. RIPE NCC's transfer policies do move blocks between members, routinely, and section 2.1 commits the registry to updating the record so the new holder's position is visible. The registration-accuracy duties, though they fall on the holder, are at least written down and checkable.

What a holder cannot do, on the documents read here on 20 November 2026, is cite a clause granting exit with its resources, or a clause making continuity of an embedded network a limit on registry discretion rather than a variable inside it. The absence is scoped to these ten documents and this date. It is not a claim about every registry instrument in the world, and no instrument should be read as admitting it.

The consequence is narrower than the rhetoric and harder to answer. If the duties a network most needs are not in the instrument that binds it, then the framework's real work is not persuasion inside the registry. It is the construction of a document a holder could one day point to — and the open question is who would have to sign it.