Summary
- ARIN's network object names Datadog, Inc. as registrant of 2607:4240::/32, and that object asserts no origin ASN whatsoever.
- RIPEstat returns an empty origin list for the exact /32 and zero of 311 IPv6 RIS peers seeing it; the /48s inside the block that are visible are originated by Google's and Amazon's ASNs, never by Datadog's.
- Datadog's own IP feed tells customers to permit 3.233.144.0/20, which sits inside an ARIN allocation registered to Amazon Data Services Northern Virginia.
- The IPv4 block that third-party aggregators attach to AS55031 was last seen in RIPE RIS on 25 November 2022, sixteen months and eight days before the ASN's current registration date.
The document with the name on it
Start with the record a reader would cite. ARIN's network object for 2607:4240::/32 carries handle NET6-2607-4240-1, net name DATADOG, type DIRECT ALLOCATION, status active, and a range that runs from 2607:4240:: to 2607:4240:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff. Its registration event is 2023-04-26T18:01:49-04:00; its last-changed event is 2026-10-05T18:37:17-04:00. The registrant is handle DATAD-16, Datadog, Inc., 620 8th Ave Floor 45, New York, NY 10018.
One field in that object matters more than the rest: arin_originas0_originautnums is an empty array. The network record does not name an ASN from which the block originates.
The organisation record for DATAD-16 puts the pieces beside each other. Its networks array contains exactly one network: this IPv6 /32. Its autnums array contains one ASN, AS55031, name DATADOG, status active, registration event 2024-04-02T06:40:10-04:00. The organisation itself is older than both, registered 2023-03-20T19:21:06-04:00 and last changed 2026-06-03T16:09:04-04:00.
So the order of events is: the company's ARIN entity in March 2023, the /32 a month later in April 2023, and the autonomous system number eleven months and seven days after that. My arithmetic, from the three printed dates. On the evidence of this response, one IPv6 block and one ASN are the whole of Datadog's registered address space in ARIN's own entity record, and there is no IPv4 network object in that array at all.
What the routing record answers
Now the second document, authored by an observatory rather than a registry. RIPEstat's routing-status query for the exact /32 returned status ok, data_call_status supported, query_time 2026-11-20T16:00:00. The origin list is empty. The first_seen and last_seen objects are empty. IPv6 visibility reads zero of 311 RIS peers; IPv4 visibility reads zero of zero, because the resource is a v6 prefix.
What the same response does contain are more-specific announcements inside the block: 2607:4240::/48 and 2607:4240:1::/48 originated by AS396982, then 2607:4240:10::/48 by AS16509, then 2607:4240:11::/48 by AS14618. A further run of /48s begins at 2607:4240:4000 and is originated by AS396982; a second run begins at 2607:4240:4040 and is originated by AS16509, with a single /48 in that run, 2607:4240:404a::/48, coming from AS14618. No more-specific in the returned set carries origin AS55031.
ARIN's autnum records name those three origins. AS396982 is registered as GOOGLE-CLOUD-PLATFORM, status active, registrant GOOGL-2, Google LLC, with object remarks stating that the ASN is used for Google Cloud Platform. AS16509 carries registrant AMAZON-4, Amazon.com, Inc. AS14618 carries registrant handle AMAZO-4 with remarks pointing readers to ec2.amazonaws.com for service details. The retrieved text for those last two objects was cut off before the end of the object, so the registrant handles and the remarks are what was read directly; the organisation string for AS16509 comes from the vCard that was visible, and for AS14618 it is corroborated by ARIN-derived mirrors rather than by the primary excerpt.
One more observatory reading closes the carriage question at the ASN level rather than the prefix level. RIPEstat's announced-prefixes query for AS55031 returned an empty prefixes array for the window 2026-11-06T16:00:00 to 2026-11-20T16:00:00, with an explicit note that the result excludes routes seen by fewer than 10 RIS full-feed peers.
The document the customer actually receives
Third author, third purpose. Datadog's IP range feed for its US1 site reports version 63, modified 2026-08-12T00:00:00. Nine service groups — agents, api, apm, global, logs, orchestrator, process, remote-configuration and synthetics-private-locations — list the same pair of prefixes: 3.233.144.0/20 and 2600:1f18:24e6:b900::/56. The synthetics group carries a long list labelled by cloud region, including 2607:4240:4000::/34, which is the only entry anywhere in the feed that sits inside Datadog's own /32. Webhooks list IPv4 prefixes only, and their IPv6 array is empty.
The documentation that publishes this feed is one sentence long on the subject of what the list is: Get a list of IP prefixes belonging to Datadog. It documents one endpoint per site — US1, US3, US5, EU, AP1, AP2, UK1, US1-FED, US2-FED — so the same claim is made nine times over. The feed itself carries no registry-holder field, no RDAP handle and no entity reference. It says the prefixes belong to Datadog and stops.
Now test the first prefix on the list against the registry. ARIN's lookup for 3.233.144.0 does not return a Datadog object. It returns the enclosing network NET-3-224-0-0-1, 3.224.0.0/12, net name AMAZON-IAD, type ALLOCATION, status active, registered 2018-12-18T16:56:54-05:00. The registrant is ADSN-1, Amazon Data Services Northern Virginia, and the abuse contact on the block is Amazon Web Services, LLC. No Datadog entity appears anywhere in that response.
Two consequences, both narrow. Of the shared pair that most of the feed's service groups use, neither family sits inside 2607:4240::/32; the IPv4 one sits inside a /12 that ARIN registers to an Amazon entity, and the IPv6 one lies outside Datadog's own block. And the /34 the feed does take from its own block is one quarter of a /32 — my arithmetic from the prefix length, since no document prints the division — so the operational slice is four times smaller than the registered one.
Why the registry cannot answer the routing question
There is a reason the network object's origin-AS array is empty, and it is not a Datadog fact. ARIN retired the optional Origin AS field on 28 July 2025 under policy ARIN-2021-8 and removed it from its directory services, directing readers to RPKI or the Internet Routing Registry instead.
That decision is the most useful thing in this whole chain, because it tells you what each document can and cannot be asked. A network object is a custody record: who holds the right to a range, in whose name, since when. It is not, and since July 2025 is not even optionally, a statement about who announces the range. The registry layer narrowed itself to uniqueness on purpose.
The block that carried this ASN
The IPv4 block that third-party aggregators attach to AS55031 rounds out the picture, and it is worth reading at the observatory rather than at the aggregator. RIPEstat's routing-status for 64.129.50.0/24 returns an empty origin list today, with zero of 321 IPv4 RIS peers seeing it. Its first_seen entry records origin 4323 on 2006-04-26T16:00:00; its last_seen entry records origin 55031 on 2022-11-25T16:00:00. The only less-specific is 64.128.0.0/15 under origin 3549, and there are no more-specifics.
ARIN's lookup for 64.129.50.0 returns the covering network NET-64-128-0-0-1, the range 64.128.0.0 to 64.129.255.255, net name TWTC-NETBLK-11, type DIRECT ALLOCATION, registrant LPL-141, Level 3 Parent, LLC.
Put the dates side by side and the attribution problem becomes arithmetic: from 25 November 2022 to the ASN's registration event on 2 April 2024 is sixteen months and eight days, and to the /32's registration on 26 April 2023 is five months and one day. Those intervals are mine, computed from printed dates. Any page that presents 64.129.50.0/24 as Datadog's prefix is placing a sighting from 2022 beside a registrant from 2024.
What the company says
Datadog's own Form 10-K for the year ended 31 December 2025 describes outsourcing substantially all of the infrastructure relating to its cloud solution to third-party hosting services, and reliance on third-party providers of cloud-based infrastructure to host its products. The passages retrieved name no hosting provider.
That single disclosure dissolves the apparent contradiction in everything above. An outsourced platform registers an identifier in its own name, publishes the addresses its services actually use, and lets other registrants' ASNs carry the packets. The three documents are not disagreeing about one fact. They are three different facts.
What a reader can and cannot conclude
State the reading limits once, beside the claims they qualify. RIS visibility is sampled and thresholded: zero peers means no full-feed peer above the stated floor saw the prefix in the window, not that no router anywhere carries it. The exact /32 returned no first_seen or last_seen, so this record cannot date any past announcement of it. ARIN answered the /20 and /24 lookups with enclosing allocations, which does not exclude a more-specific object registered under another handle. The 10-K was read as an excerpt, not the full filing.
And no RPKI state was read for the /32 or any /48 inside it, so whether the registration authorises any of those routes is an open question this chain cannot close.
Which leaves the phrase itself. Belonging to is doing three jobs at once here — what an entity is registrant of, what a network announces, and what a vendor's services use — and only the first two have an institution standing behind them. The company's directory entry in BTW's own record describes the ASN association; the association is real, and it is an identity, not a route.
A buyer can read all three documents in an afternoon. What they will find is a company that holds an address block of its own, announces nothing under it that RIPE's collectors can see at the published threshold, and hands firewalls a list whose first entry belongs, in the registry sense, to an Amazon entity. The registry record survives a change of hosting provider. The route does not survive anything at all.
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