Summary

  • Section 9(2) bars a manufacturer from making a relevant connectable product available in the United Kingdom unless it is accompanied by a statement of compliance, or by a summary of one in a form and with the information the Secretary of State specifies in regulations.
  • The duties that follow a suspected failure carry no unit of time at all; the one period the retained text states exactly is ten years of records kept by the manufacturer, and the daily penalty of up to £20,000 starts only when a payment period stated in a penalty notice runs out.

The slip taped to the box

Start with the object a buyer actually meets. Under section 9(2) of the Act, the manufacturer may not make a relevant connectable product available in the United Kingdom unless it is accompanied by a statement of compliance, or by a summary of that statement in such form, and containing such information, as is specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

That is the gate. Not a test, not a laboratory, not a stamp. An accompaniment duty: the product may not travel without a document, and the document is the manufacturer's own.

The summary limb is the part worth pausing on, because it is where a regulator could still put substance. Section 9(2)(b) hands the Secretary of State power to fix the form of the summary and the information it must carry. Whether that power was used to require anything beyond a declaration — a named standard, a version, a test result, a date — is not visible in the section itself, and the regulations that would answer the question were not read for this article. What the Act's own text does show is that the operator of the gate writes the pass.

Who the duty belongs to

Section 8 attaches the security obligation to a manufacturer of a relevant connectable product, and only when condition A or B is met. Condition A is intention or awareness: the manufacturer intends the product to be a UK consumer connectable product, or is aware, or ought to be aware, that it will be. Condition B is the retrospective case — the product is a UK consumer connectable product and condition A was met when the manufacturer made it available.

Both limbs are states of mind and commercial intention, not observable properties of a device. A manufacturer that never intended a UK market and had no reason to know of one falls outside the duty. That is a sensible scope for a statute; it is also a reminder that the perimeter of the regime is drawn in a company's own assessment of its own plans.

The Act separately defines who a relevant person is. On the Act's contents rendering, section 7(2) reads: “Relevant person”, in relation to a relevant connectable product, means any of the following — a manufacturer of the product, an importer of the product, a distributor of the product. The definitions that give those three words their edges sit in subsections (3) to (5), which were not read here, so this article does not tell you where a marketplace seller or a rebadger lands. It does tell you that the statute contemplates three parties in a chain, and that only one of them is given the compliance document duty in the provision read.

Two clocks with no unit, and one that says ten years

The response duties are where the instrument gets interesting, because they are written without a measure.

After a product is made available, if the manufacturer becomes aware of a possible failure, section 10(2) requires it to take all reasonable steps to investigate whether there is a compliance failure. Not within fourteen days. Not within thirty. All reasonable steps.

Then section 11(2): the manufacturer must, as soon as is practicable, take all reasonable steps to prevent the product from being made available to customers in the United Kingdom where it has not already been, and to remedy the compliance failure. As soon as is practicable is a standard, not a deadline; it has no denominator, and no published record in the provisions read turns it into one.

Then section 11(3): the manufacturer must notify the persons listed in subsection (4) of the compliance failure as soon as possible. Subsection (4) was not read, so the addressees are unknown here — that gap matters, and it is stated rather than papered over.

And then the only interval in the retained text with a number attached. Section 12(1) requires the manufacturer to maintain a record of investigations carried out in relation to a compliance failure or suspected compliance failure, and of any compliance failures relating to the product. Section 12(4) requires such a record to be retained for a period of 10 years beginning with the day on which the record is made.

Ten years. Written down, exact, and owed by the party the duties bind. Set that beside “as soon as practicable” and you have the shape of the regime in a sentence: the state is precise about the file it may one day want to see, and deliberately elastic about the speed of the conduct that would generate it. Elastic is not automatically wrong — reasonable-steps standards survive contact with real supply chains better than stopwatches do — but it does mean the timing of a remedy is judged after the fact, by the party that did the remedying, unless someone else asks.

The correction: the regulator does get told

Here the text forced me off a convenient thesis, and the correction belongs in the open.

The obvious story about a self-declared gate is that nobody outside the company ever learns of a failure. The Act's retained provisions do not support that. Section 11(3) puts a notification duty on the manufacturer. Section 13(2) requires an authorised representative to contact the manufacturer about a compliance failure or potential compliance failure as soon as possible, and section 13(3) requires that representative to notify the enforcement authority as soon as possible after contacting, or attempting to contact, the manufacturer. There is a route in. It runs through the manufacturer's own conclusion that something has failed, and in the representative's case through a chain of attempted contact — but it exists, and any article claiming the regulator hears nothing would be wrong.

The real asymmetry is narrower and harder to argue with. A duty to notify an enforcement authority is not a duty to notify a buyer. Across the retained text of sections 7(2), 8, 9, 10(2), 11(2) and (3), 12, 13(2) and (3), 36, 37 and 38, examined on 17 November 2026, no provision requires the publication of a statement of compliance, of a list of compliant products, of a compliance failure, or of a penalty. That is a finding about those provisions and nothing wider — the enforcement-notice sections were not read in this run, and nothing here says the Act as a whole is silent.

But within the machinery that decides whether a box may be sold, the document stays in the channel, the record stays in the drawer, and the person holding both is the person the duties bind.

The price, and the moment the meter starts

The money is not the soft part. Section 36(1) allows the Secretary of State to give a penalty notice where satisfied on the balance of probabilities that a person has failed to comply with a relevant duty. Balance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt: a civil standard applied by a department.

Section 36(5) then adds a second limb to the notice: in addition to the fixed penalty, a further daily penalty of a specified amount not exceeding £20,000, for each day for which the relevant breach continues after the end of the period specified for payment of the fixed penalty.

Read that trigger carefully, because it is the most consequential sentence in the whole instrument. The daily meter does not start when the breach starts. It starts when the payment period in the notice runs out — an event created by the regulator's own paperwork, not by the manufacturer's conduct.

Section 37(1) requires the amount to be one the Secretary of State considers appropriate and proportionate to the breach, and section 37(2) requires two matters to be taken into account among others: the effects of the breach, and any action taken to remedy it or mitigate its effects. Remedial action is therefore priced into the penalty rather than assumed by it.

Section 38(1) sets the ceiling, and it is a two-limbed one: the relevant maximum is the greater of £10 million and 4 per cent of the person's qualifying worldwide revenue for the person's most recent complete accounting period. Section 38(5) fixes £10 million where the person has no accounting period. The definition of qualifying worldwide revenue sits elsewhere in section 38, which was not read beyond those two subsections.

A piece of arithmetic of my own makes the ceiling legible: £10,000,000 ÷ 0.04 = £250,000,000. Below a quarter of a billion pounds of qualifying worldwide revenue, the percentage limb is worth less than the flat sum, and the flat sum is the ceiling that binds. For a large share of the companies that make consumer connected devices, then, the number in the statute is £10 million — a fixed figure that does not move with the size of the business, the size of the market or the size of the harm.

The daily rate deserves the same treatment. £20,000 × 365 = £7,300,000. A full year of the maximum daily penalty, before any fixed penalty, is still less than the floor of the ceiling. The daily limb is a pressure device that makes a notice impossible to ignore; it is not where the deterrent sits.

What an outsider can check

Put the four artefacts side by side. The statement of compliance, or its summary, is written by the manufacturer. The investigation record is kept by the manufacturer for ten years. The notification under section 11(3) goes to addressees the retained text does not name, and is triggered by the manufacturer's own assessment. The daily penalty starts from a date the regulator writes into its own notice.

None of that is dishonest. It is a disclosure regime, and disclosure regimes are cheap: no inspection corps, no accredited laboratories to appoint, no queue of products waiting for a stamp. The trade is that the evidential value of the gate is the accuracy of a claim, not a verified property of an object, and the claim is unrebutted until somebody with authority decides to test it.

What would change the classification is easy to name, and none of it requires new powers. If the regulations fixed the summary's contents to include a named standard and a version, a buyer or a competitor could compare two boxes. If any public list of statements or failures existed, a distributor could check a supplier before stocking. If a single response duty carried a stated unit — days, or hours from a defined trigger — the elasticity would become measurable, and the ten-year record would have something to be checked against.

And if the payment period that starts the daily meter were published alongside the notice, the timing of the state's own escalation would be visible rather than internal.

What this article does not tell you is equally specific. The security requirements themselves live in the 2023 regulations on security requirements for relevant connectable products, which were not read: two attempts to retrieve that instrument and the importer and distributor duties failed at the provider on 17 November 2026, so nothing here describes what the three requirements are, which products are excluded, or when they came into force. Section 6, which gives the statutory meaning of a statement of compliance, and sections 14 to 16, the importer and distributor duties, were not read either.

No penalty notice, compliance notice, stop notice, recall notice or enforcement statistic was obtained, and no real statement of compliance was inspected. Nothing in this article is evidence that any manufacturer has done anything wrong.

On this desk, the coverage position is a measurement rather than a claim of firsts. A search of the archive on 17 November 2026 for the regime's own name, Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure, returned no rows. The directory entry for the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology records twelve earlier articles — calls for evidence on telecoms security review scope, the 2G sunset and elevator alarms, subsea-cable sensing and its security screening, the telecoms resilience charter, AI incident reporting, skills and local labour in public contracts, and one advisory-group membership record — and, on the titles and excerpts visible, none of them reads the statement-of-compliance mechanism, the security requirements or the penalty structure. The Act's own text, it should be said plainly, names the Secretary of State and an enforcement authority; it does not name a department, and neither does this article.

A gate that fits in the box is a real achievement in regulatory design. It is also a gate whose key is cut by the party it admits. Britain has chosen speed, low cost and supply-chain reach over independent verification, and written a ten-year memory into the same statute — which is exactly the bargain a serious regulator makes when it intends to check later. The unanswered question is who, outside the company, will ever know it is time to look.