Summary

  • AS267297 was still originating four contiguous IPv4 /24s on 15 July 2026. RIPEstat observed both AS52554 and AS52871 on paths to the block, but those logical adjacencies do not prove two physically independent fibres, entrances, power supplies or handoff sites.
  • Registro.br also records an active IPv6 /32 for Netuno. The accurate finding is therefore not that Netuno has no IPv6 resource, but that RIPEstat saw no IPv6 announcement from AS267297 at the research cut-off. The four IPv4 routes also had no visible validating ROA and were classified unknown, not invalid.
  • Core3 has a current Camaçari sales presence and appears in a Neoenergia-hosted municipality list, while one customer account says Netuno service migrated to Core3. Those signals do not erase the legal boundary: Core3's CNPJ, AS270592 and 177.8.128.0/22 are distinct from Netuno's CNPJ, AS267297 and 45.232.248.0/22.
  • The strongest conclusion is medium-grade evidence for a live Netuno routing edge and weak evidence for the present physical access estate. Current route geometry, OLT and radio inventory, subscriber load, upstream commit, pole title, backup-power runtime, spare stock, crew coverage and tested restoration remain undisclosed.

Four routes survived the storefront

The most durable public part of Netuno is not a shopfront, plan page or corporate history. It is a set of routing announcements. Registro.br assigns 45.232.248.0/22 to NETUNO DO BRASIL TELECOM LTDA, giving the company 1,024 IPv4 addresses from 45.232.248.0 through 45.232.251.255. Rather than announcing only that aggregate, AS267297 presented the space as four equal routes: 45.232.248.0/24, 45.232.249.0/24, 45.232.250.0/24 and 45.232.251.0/24. RIPEstat's announced-prefix history observed all four continuously across the first half of July 2026.

At the 15 July cut-off, RIPEstat's routing-status view reported all 1,024 IPv4 addresses visible to all 326 of its observing IPv4 peers. Its earliest observation for one of the routes was 24 March 2018, four days after the registry date. This is strong evidence that a router somewhere was still originating Netuno's address space and that the routes propagated broadly through the global control plane. It is not evidence that every historical Netuno subscriber remained connected, that any given Camaçari address was serviceable, or that the access network had been maintained under the same ownership since 2018.

The contrast is unusually sharp because the public-facing identity has decayed around the live routes. The registry's reverse-DNS delegations still name ns1.netuno2.net.br and ns2.netuno2.net.br for each of the four /24s. Registro.br's recorded checks for those servers were no longer healthy at the cut-off, and neither the .net.br name nor the netuno2.com.br website named in Netuno's PeeringDB record resolved during the review. A broken website and stale reverse DNS do not switch off BGP. They do, however, remove ordinary ways for customers, counterparties and abuse desks to identify the operator, inspect service terms or reach a current technical contact.

This produces the central operational question. Is AS267297 the edge of a still distinct Netuno access business, a residual routing domain carried inside another operator's network, or an address estate awaiting fuller migration? Public routing can establish that the edge exists. It cannot choose among those three physical and commercial explanations. That distinction matters because the party sending a prefix into BGP is not necessarily the party holding the pole agreement, dispatching the splicer, paying for a backhaul circuit or answering the customer when an optical signal disappears.

The registered company remains identifiable

Registro.br's AS267297 record ties the autonomous system to NETUNO DO BRASIL TELECOM LTDA, CNPJ 18.937.039/0001-03. The ASN and its address resources were registered on 20 March 2018. The same CNPJ appears in an earlier legal chapter under another name: an April 2014 Anatel act published in the Diário Oficial da União authorised ANDERSON DE SOUZA NESTOR EIRELI-ME to provide Serviço de Comunicação Multimídia on a nationwide and indefinite basis. The continuity of the CNPJ supports a corporate renaming or succession within the same registered person; it does not document a later transfer to Core3.

Anatel's current telecommunications-provider open-data file still contains Netuno's CNPJ. It identifies the company as an authorised provider, records fixed-broadband SCM activity dating to 2014 and a radio-link notification dating to 2016, and gives a current registered address in Barra da Tijuca, Rio de Janeiro. These are regulatory identity and permission records. A nationwide authorisation is permission to provide the service; it is not proof of a nationwide network. A radio-link notification is likewise not an inventory of active towers, channels or paths. The Rio address may be an administrative address and cannot be promoted into a network operations centre, point of presence or equipment site without additional evidence.

The registry record itself contains another sign of asymmetric maintenance. Its administrative contact changed in September 2025, while the technical and abuse contact entries were last changed in August 2021. That does not prove that operational contacts are unattended. It does show why current, working public channels matter: registry timestamps reveal who updated a record, not whether a local field team, customer desk or 24-hour network desk can be reached now.

Netuno's historical commercial footprint is clearer in Bahia. A December 2018 Camaçari Notícias promotion advertised Netuno plans from 3 to 20 megabits per second and claimed support from Monday through Sunday. That publication anchors the Netuno2 name, a local telephone number and a Camaçari-facing consumer offer at that date. It does not establish that the old number, hours, tariffs or service footprint remained current eight years later. The comparison with today's retail speeds is still informative: it shows how much the local market's advertised access rates have moved while Netuno's own public customer identity has faded.

The last public access count stops in 2021

Anatel's fixed-broadband access data provide the strongest evidence that the company once had a real access estate rather than only an ASN. Rows for Netuno's CNPJ appear in Camaçari and Itaparica across the historical files. They identify fibre-to-the-home access, contracted rate and customer type at municipality level. In the January-to-April 2021 records, for example, the Camaçari row for natural-person FTTH customers at 5 megabits per second rose from 2,047 to 2,078 reported accesses. Itaparica carried several natural-person FTTH tiers, including 10 and 15 megabits per second, alongside smaller faster tiers.

These records are valuable but narrower than they first appear. Anatel designed the post-2020 collection to distinguish contracted speed, access medium, technology and urban or rural location, as its consultation on the collection explains. The rows are provider declarations grouped by month, municipality, company identity and service attributes. They are not pole maps, audited optical port counts or acceptance tests. A subscriber row says that a provider reported an access; it does not expose the feeder fibre, splitter, OLT, backhaul circuit or power site behind that access.

The more consequential fact is the break in the series. Netuno-matched rows are present through April 2021 but were not found under its CNPJ or name in the 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 or January-to-May 2026 files reviewed for this article. No matching row was found under Core3's CNPJ or name in those later access files either. That is a genuine reporting gap, not permission to write the customer base down to zero. Accesses might have been moved to another reporting entity, aggregated under a related company, omitted, corrected under a different identifier or discontinued. The public files alone do not decide which.

The gap places a hard limit on current scale claims. The 2021 counts cannot be carried forward as a 2026 subscriber total. They cannot show churn, migration completion, inactive ports, wholesale customers or concentration by splitter. They also cannot tell whether the four routed /24s serve those same households today. What they do prove is more modest and more useful: Netuno's CNPJ historically reported thousands of FTTH accesses in two Bahia municipalities, and the public trail for those accesses later becomes discontinuous just as the Core3 identity becomes the more visible local retail brand.

Core3 is evidence of local continuity, not a synonym for Netuno

Core3's current Camaçari page sells fibre plans, lists neighbourhoods, offers address qualification and identifies a branch on Avenida Eixo Urbano Central. Its units page places Camaçari among a wider group of branches that includes Feira de Santana, Vitória da Conquista, Salinas da Margarida, Itaparica and Campinas. A Neoenergia-hosted municipality/provider list names CORE3 TECNOLOGIA and NEW CORE TECNOLOGIA E INFORMATICA in Camaçari. Together these are persuasive evidence that Core3 has a current commercial and pole-use context in the municipality.

They are not a deed of transfer. Registro.br identifies Core3's AS270592 under new core tecnologia e informatica eirelli, CNPJ 11.860.817/0001-56. That company received 177.8.128.0/22 and 2804:6e5c::/32 in April 2020. Netuno's AS267297 remains under CNPJ 18.937.039/0001-03 with 45.232.248.0/22 and a different IPv6 /32. The two sets of identifiers coexist in the public registry. They should be treated as separate legal and routing boundaries unless a contract, corporate filing or signed operational statement says how they are joined.

Their visible routing edges differ too. RIPEstat's status for AS270592 saw Core3's /22 and four component /24s in July 2026, with one observed upstream-side neighbour. Its neighbour view named AS61714. Registro.br identifies AS61714 as SUPERCORE TECNOLOGIA E INFORMATICA EIRELLI, CNPJ 28.382.672/0001-28. Netuno, by contrast, remained visible through AS52554 and AS52871. If Core3 had simply absorbed Netuno into one routing edge, the public view did not make that consolidation obvious.

There is nevertheless a meaningful informal signal. In a 2024 Reclame Aqui complaint addressed to Core3, a customer on Vera Cruz island wrote that they had bought service from Netuno and that it migrated to Core3. The account is consistent with Core3's present branch footprint, which includes Itaparica, and with the disappearance of later Netuno access rows. It may describe a real customer migration. It cannot prove a corporate acquisition, a universal migration, ownership of every cable, assumption of the Netuno ASN, or the date and terms of any transaction. One customer's wording is not an asset schedule.

The distinction is not pedantry. A retail brand can take over billing and support while another company retains address resources. A group company can operate backbone routers while a local company owns drops and pole contracts. Assets can be leased, sold, shared or left in place under transitional agreements. An ASN can remain active for legacy customers after a commercial migration. Each arrangement creates a different answer to a fault: who may enter a site, who holds the upstream contract, who can authorise a splice, and who must tell customers what failed.

The IX.br Feira de Santana connection page supplies a useful physical example of why identities cannot be casually merged. It identifies a Core3 exchange attachment point in Feira de Santana and associates the site with Supercore. A November 2025 IX.br status notice recorded an electrical failure affecting the Core3 PIX there. That is concrete evidence of a Core3/Supercore physical exchange location and a real power event in Feira de Santana. It is not evidence about Netuno's equipment, Camaçari's access plant, AS267297's handoff location or a shared power domain. Even a closely related group name cannot transport facility evidence from one ASN and city to another.

Four /24s are routing capacity, not access capacity

The four Netuno routes contain 1,024 IPv4 addresses. That is a finite addressing resource, but it is not 1,024 customers and it has no direct conversion into gigabits per second. A household may use a public address, share one through carrier-grade network address translation, receive several addresses, or connect only through private addressing. Routers, servers and management interfaces may also consume addresses. Without assignment and translation data, the sold and free portions of the block are unknown.

Splitting a /22 into four /24s can give an operator more routing control. Individual routes can be attached to communities, originated from different locations, filtered or shifted during engineering work. It can also preserve visibility because /24 is commonly accepted as the longest broadly propagated IPv4 prefix. But four announcements do not prove four access regions, four routers, four upstream circuits or four failure domains. RIPEstat's BGP state for 45.232.248.0/24 and the equivalent state for 45.232.251.0/24 exposed paths ending through both visible neighbours. The same pattern on separated ends of the block supports common upstream propagation, not physical separation.

Nor do Core3's retail rates answer the capacity question. Its current combination-plan page presents downstream tiers from 50 to 600 megabits per second, with lower stated upload rates, and says installation depends on address availability. Those are product ceilings at a customer interface. They do not disclose OLT uplink rates, passive optical split ratios, backbone utilisation, transit commits, busy-hour demand or headroom after a failure. Adding advertised customer rates would exaggerate required simultaneous load; treating one high retail tier as aggregate capacity would understate it.

No public evidence reviewed here gives Netuno's installed OLT ports, active optical lines, fibre strand count, radio sectors, tower channels, aggregation interfaces or backhaul rates. No public evidence gives sold or reserved transport, spare ports, hot spares or a threshold at which the operator stops accepting orders. The four /24s are therefore best understood as live logical inventory. The physical and commercial capacity behind them remains unmeasured.

Netuno has IPv6 space, but no visible IPv6 route

The common shorthand that AS267297 has “zero IPv6” is incomplete. Registro.br records 2804:4b50::/32 as an active Netuno allocation made on the same date as the IPv4 block. A /32 is ample provider address space for building a customer addressing plan. At the 15 July cut-off, however, RIPEstat saw zero IPv6 prefixes from AS267297 and visibility at zero of 322 observing IPv6 peers.

The defensible statement is thus: Netuno has an allocated IPv6 resource but no publicly visible IPv6 origin in the observed routing view. The gap may reflect an unimplemented rollout, a withdrawn route, use behind another origin, a private test or incomplete observation. It cannot establish that no customer anywhere has IPv6, but it supplies no evidence of globally reachable Netuno-origin IPv6 either.

That distinction matters to failure and migration planning. IPv6 can reduce dependence on scarce public IPv4 and remove some address-sharing complexity, but only when prefixes are routed, delegated, filtered and supported through customer equipment and operations. An allocation sitting in the registry adds no usable path by itself. To demonstrate current service, the operator would need a visible origin or another documented routing arrangement, reverse DNS, customer delegation practice and measurements from the served footprint.

The IPv4 routes also lack a visible cryptographic routing authorisation. RIPEstat's validation queries for 45.232.248.0/24, 45.232.249.0/24, 45.232.250.0/24 and 45.232.251.0/24 returned unknown. That means no validating route-origin authorisation was found; it does not mean the routes were invalid or hijacked. Creating and maintaining an appropriate authorisation would make the intended origin easier for networks using route-origin validation to verify.

Two observed neighbours are not two independent fibres

RIPEstat's AS267297 neighbour view found two upstream-side neighbours and no observed downstream-side neighbour: AS52554 and AS52871. Registro.br identifies AS52554 as S. A. da Silva Junior and AS52871 as TASCOM TELECOMUNICAÇÕES LTDA. BGP paths to Netuno's prefixes were visible through each. This supports two logical ways for external observers to learn the four routes.

It does not establish dual-homed physical resilience. The two sessions could terminate on one Netuno router. They could arrive over fibres in the same cable, duct or pole corridor. One supplier could resell the other. Both could depend on one metro transport provider, one building entrance, one rack, one breaker, one battery bank or one regional span. Even when the commercial contracts are independent, the physical routes may converge before reaching the customer footprint.

The reverse can also be true: an operator may have physically diverse transport that appears behind only one autonomous-system neighbour because the supplier provides both circuits. Public BGP is an indispensable view of routing policy, but it does not reveal patch panels, circuit IDs or trench geometry. Calling AS52554 and AS52871 “two upstreams” is reasonable at the control-plane level. Calling them “two independent routes” requires circuit and facility evidence that is not public here.

The resilience test therefore has at least five layers. First, are there two contracted circuits with usable capacity after either one fails? Second, do they enter the served network at different sites or at least different protected entrances? Third, do they avoid the same poles, ducts, bridges and regional carrier spans? Fourth, do the terminating routers, switches and optical equipment avoid a single power and cooling domain? Fifth, has traffic actually failed over under load within a measured interval? The current BGP view answers none of these completely.

It does reveal a useful failure boundary. If one neighbour withdraws Netuno's routes while the other continues to propagate them, global reachability may survive, subject to local policy and capacity. If both disappear because of a common physical or power fault, all four /24s could vanish together. If BGP remains visible while a feeder fibre, OLT or customer drop fails, global monitors may show a healthy ASN while households are offline. Route health and access health must therefore be observed separately.

No listed IXP is a qualified absence

Netuno's PeeringDB entry reports no exchange or facility presence and was last updated in July 2022. The current IX.br Salvador entity list did not include AS267297 at the cut-off. Taken together, these are good evidence that Netuno has no publicly listed IXP attachment in those two prominent records. They are not proof that Netuno has never peered privately, used a remote port, bought partial transit, reached content caches through an upstream or participated under another disclosed arrangement.

AS52871 appears on the Salvador list. That does not make Netuno an IX.br entity. A route learned from a supplier that has an exchange port is still a transit or other bilateral relationship from Netuno's perspective unless Netuno's own port, virtual circuit and peering sessions are documented. The supplier may hand down routes or traffic benefits, but Netuno does not inherit the supplier's entity status.

IX.br's Bahia connection information explains that a network can connect at a physical attachment point or use a paid connection provider. This makes several undisclosed architectures possible. Public absence should therefore be described narrowly: there is no visible Netuno listing, facility or entity port. It raises questions about latency, content localisation, transit cost and failure dependence, but it cannot settle them without traffic, contract and session data.

For a regional ISP, the economic effect can be material. More local exchange of traffic may reduce paid upstream volume and shorten some paths; it may also add port, transport, equipment and operating costs. An exchange connection that reaches the same facility and power domain as an existing upstream may improve route choice without improving physical survivability. The relevant question is not whether an IXP badge exists, but which traffic can move where, at what committed and peak rate, after a particular component fails.

The physical map stops at municipality level

The best-supported service geography is historical Netuno activity in Camaçari and Itaparica, followed by current Core3 commercial activity in those areas. IBGE describes Camaçari as a municipality of 785.421 square kilometres, with 300,372 residents in the 2022 census and an estimated 321,636 in 2025. A network serving it can face a much wider physical task than a compact city-centre branch suggests. Dense urban streets, outlying settlements, industrial land and the coast can demand different feeder, pole, duct and repair arrangements.

Core3's Camaçari page lists multiple neighbourhoods, but a marketing list is not an address-level coverage polygon. It does not reveal which blocks are built, which premises pass an optical power test, where fixed wireless may fill gaps, or whether separate neighbourhoods share one feeder. The branch address is a customer contact point; nothing on the page establishes an OLT, core router, battery or spare store at that address.

A second temptation is to read Core3's branch list as regional topology. Camaçari and Itaparica appearing in one commercial portfolio does not demonstrate a direct inter-city link, a shared core or a protected path between them. Traffic could converge through Feira de Santana, Salvador, a wholesale carrier or another undisclosed point; the public pages do not say. Historical FTTH classifications prove fibre at the access-medium level for reported customers, but they do not prove fibre end to end through every backhaul segment.

Netuno's old radio-link notification leaves open the possibility that radio once served access or transport, without proving that any such link remains installed. Circuit records, facility demarcations and optical or radio path evidence would be needed to choose among those architectures. Until then, even a line connecting two confirmed service municipalities would be an invented route. The honest physical picture is discontinuous: named markets and broad infrastructure relationships separated by unknown transport.

The Neoenergia-hosted list is likewise municipality-level evidence. It connects Core3's legal name with Camaçari's pole-use environment, but it gives no pole identifiers, attachment count, cable ownership, route, term or transfer history. Anatel's 2025–2026 pole-contract collection page underscores the importance of this missing layer: providers using shared utility poles were required to submit contract information so the regulator could update a positive register. The public page explains the collection; it does not show a Netuno-to-Core3 asset transfer or map either company's plant.

No verified public linework was located for Netuno's feeder fibres, distribution fibres, drops, ducts, pole sequence, radio links or backhaul. No point of presence, OLT cabinet, tower, antenna azimuth, handoff site or diverse building entrance can be placed on a map from the reviewed evidence. IP geolocation would not cure the problem: an address prefix can be registered, routed or geolocated to a city while its router and customer paths sit elsewhere.

The responsible map is therefore a set of bounded facts, not invented lines: municipality-level historical service, a current retail branch, a current pole-use signal, separate ASNs and logical neighbour relationships.

Poles, power and repair labour define usable service

In a fibre access network, much of the outside plant is passive. Fibre cable, splice closures and passive splitters do not need electricity along every metre. Service still depends on power at both ends: the operator's OLT and aggregation equipment need power, and the customer's optical terminal and router need household power. Any active street cabinet, radio relay or tower adds another powered point. A clean BGP announcement can continue while one of these local elements is dark.

Pole dependence turns ordinary streets into a shared failure surface. A vehicle strike, utility work, construction cut, tree contact, fire, overloaded attachment or poorly dressed cable can damage one drop or a feeder serving many premises. If two nominally separate fibres share the same poles, their contractual diversity does not survive that common cut. Camaçari's exact Netuno or Core3 routes are not public, so neither common-corridor exposure nor a protective ring can be claimed.

Power resilience is similarly undisclosed. There is no public inventory of batteries, generators, automatic transfer switches, fuel, runtime or load tests for Netuno's sites. The AS remains visible, which proves that the origin path was powered at observation time. It does not prove that Camaçari's access equipment has equivalent backup, that all four /24s originate from more than one powered site, or that customer access survives a regional outage. Core3's Feira PIX power incident demonstrates that a named facility can fail electrically, but it cannot be used as a proxy measurement for Camaçari.

Repair labour is the final conversion from installed plant to usable capacity. A spare fibre and an alternate path help only if technicians can identify the fault, gain safe access, authorise a switch or splice, and restore service before batteries expire. The 2018 Netuno promotion claimed seven-day support, while Core3's present pages stress human assistance and installation. Neither publication gives current Netuno headcount, after-hours coverage, vehicles, splicers, test sets, spare cable, replacement optics, dispatch time or mean restoration time.

The labour boundary is especially important during a brand or operator transition. A customer may call Core3 while the affected prefix remains Netuno's. The field cable may sit under one pole agreement, the OLT under another company's invoice and the upstream session under a third contract. Unless escalation rights are explicit, each organisation can observe only part of the failure. Public identity decay then becomes operational rather than cosmetic: stale domains and unclear responsibility slow the path from complaint to the person permitted to change the network.

Anatel's May 2026 discussion of irregular pole use and worker safety described pole formalisation and labour obligations as live sector issues. That national context does not accuse Netuno or Core3 of a breach. It explains why a realistic resilience assessment must ask about contracts, safe work and field capacity, not merely count advertised routes.

The failure paths separate into different blast radii

The smallest common failure is inside one premise. Loss of mains power, a damaged drop, a failed optical terminal, a misconfigured router or poor indoor Wi-Fi can isolate one household while Netuno's BGP and every upstream remain normal. Core3's advertised Wi-Fi and installation features address the customer experience, but they do not reveal optical levels, drop quality or backup power. The affected users are the people and devices behind that one access: remote work, messaging, education, entertainment, payment terminals and connected security systems can all disappear from the same local fault.

The next layer is the passive distribution tree. A damaged closure or distribution cable can affect a cluster of premises. A feeder cut or splitter failure can affect a much larger group attached to one OLT port. Without splitter ratios, port maps or strand routes, there is no defensible number for that group. Historical subscriber totals cannot supply it because customer counts are not topology. Restoration depends on accurate records, access to the pole or chamber, spare fibre and a crew able to splice and test under safe conditions.

An OLT, aggregation switch or local site failure expands the blast radius again. If the site loses power after its battery expires, customers can retain light on passive plant but lose the active endpoint. A software fault or failed line card may isolate one interface; a chassis, uplink or breaker failure may affect several. Public evidence gives no Netuno equipment inventory, failover pair, dual feed, spare card or backup runtime. The absence of such evidence does not mean no protection exists. It means the capacity usable during this failure cannot be calculated.

A regional transport fault can leave local optics apparently healthy while removing internet reachability. If Netuno has physically separate links to AS52554 and AS52871 with sufficient spare commit, one may carry traffic when the other fails. If the links share a carrier span, entrance, router or power source, both can fail together. BGP observation proves that both neighbours propagated routes at the cut-off. It gives no guarantee that the surviving path can carry the failed path's traffic without congestion, packet loss or policy limits.

A control-plane error creates another pattern. An incorrect filter, route leak, session reset or origin mistake can withdraw one or all /24s even while fibres and power remain intact. The four separate routes offer policy granularity, but they also create four entities that must be consistently maintained. The absence of visible route-origin authorisations removes one public verification layer. Stale reverse DNS can add mail-delivery, reputation and troubleshooting friction without causing the route withdrawal itself.

The most difficult failure is an ownership boundary. Suppose a customer has a Core3 bill, an old Netuno drop, an address from AS267297 and transport through one of Netuno's observed neighbours. The first company can test the customer account; another may control the OLT; another may own the prefix; another may hold the pole or backhaul agreement. A fault ticket can stall even when every organisation is technically competent because no public evidence shows who has authority at each handoff.

The unverified customer report of migration makes this scenario plausible enough to investigate, not factual enough to assert as the current architecture.

An older 2020 Netuno complaint from Camaçari alleged repeated instability on a 15-megabit service. It is one unaudited account and cannot establish a systemic outage rate, root cause or present performance. Its limited value is to identify the customer-visible symptom that proper evidence would need to explain: recurring loss can arise from a drop, shared access segment, power, congestion, transport or support delay. Settling it would require time-stamped alarms, ticket records, optical tests and route measurements, none of which the complaint supplies.

For local shops, schools, clinics and municipal services, these layers matter differently. A single-premise fault interrupts one operation. A feeder or OLT fault can affect a neighbourhood. A regional transport or common-power fault can affect much of the served footprint. A routing withdrawal can make all users behind the announced space unreachable even if access light remains on. The public evidence confirms historical residential and business-type accesses but gives no current customer census, so the number of affected people must remain unquantified.

Retail economics cannot be separated from restoration economics

Regional broadband prices buy more than a headline rate. They have to support pole rent, power, upstream transit, equipment replacement, customer installation, billing, support and field repair. Core3's current Camaçari offers range from entry-level service to 600 megabits per second and bundle installation or entertainment features. Those prices show the competitive offer confronting any remaining Netuno-branded business. They do not show the margin available for redundant backhaul, stocked optics, backup batteries or an after-hours crew.

The address inventory creates a second economic pressure. Netuno's 1,024 IPv4 addresses are valuable but limited. Address sharing can extend them at the cost of more translation state, troubleshooting complexity and reduced inbound reachability. The unannounced IPv6 /32 represents a possible route away from that scarcity, but only after deployment spending and customer support. A registered allocation without a visible route neither adds customer capacity nor reduces transit cost.

Transit and exchange choices create a third trade-off. Two observed upstream-side neighbours may improve policy choice and failure tolerance, but contracts and circuits cost money. A direct or remote IXP connection may reduce some paid traffic, yet it also needs transport, equipment and operating attention. The current record gives no commit rates, prices, traffic mix or utilisation, so it cannot say whether Netuno is congested or whether an exchange port would pay back. It can say that the visible edge relies on upstream propagation and has no public IXP listing of its own.

Local labour is not a discretionary add-on to these calculations. A network can be fully installed and lit but commercially unusable if faults wait days for diagnosis or access. Conversely, a small team with good records, spares and authority can restore a modest network quickly. Marketing claims about human support are promises at the interface; restoration records would show the actual capacity. No current Netuno service-level statement, dispatch measure or restoration distribution was located.

What would resolve the boundary

The evidence gap is concrete enough to close. A current statement signed by the relevant companies could identify whether Core3 bought, leased, operates or merely markets any former Netuno access assets. Corporate filings or a redacted asset schedule could tie that statement to CNPJ 18.937.039/0001-03 and CNPJ 11.860.817/0001-56. Customer notices and invoices could show which legal provider assumed service obligations, without exposing personal data.

At the network edge, letters of authorisation, upstream contract summaries and router-location disclosures could explain why AS267297 remains separate. Circuit records could show whether AS52554 and AS52871 arrive over independent carriers, entrances, equipment and power. A controlled failover result could state the traffic moved, the remaining usable capacity and the convergence interval. None of this requires publishing sensitive configurations or exact customer paths.

For the access estate, municipality-level pole agreements can identify the contracting company, date and broad quantity without releasing vulnerable pole coordinates. A statement of feeder and distribution ownership, OLT count by municipality, active versus spare port range, and whether radio access remains in service would establish scope. Route-diversity claims need a protected-ring or independent-corridor statement corroborated by a carrier or utility, not a line drawn from BGP.

Power disclosure can also remain bounded: site classes, battery design runtime, generator coverage, test frequency and the fraction of customers behind each class would be more useful than a list of addresses. Field resilience can be described through staffed hours, on-call coverage, stocked repair materials and restoration percentiles. Current Anatel access reporting under the responsible CNPJ would reconnect the historical customer series without requiring subscriber identities.

Finally, an IPv6 announcement and route-origin authorisations for the four IPv4 /24s would improve the public routing picture directly. Working technical, abuse and web contacts would make the responsible operator easier to reach. These are not substitutes for fibre and power evidence, but they would align Netuno's public identity with the network that is already visible.

A live edge with an unresolved physical operator

AS267297 is not a dead autonomous system. Its four /24s were globally visible, both AS52554 and AS52871 appeared on paths, and the underlying IPv4 and IPv6 resources remained registered to Netuno at the cut-off. That is enough to reject a simple claim that the network has disappeared.

It is not enough to describe a current Camaçari access network. Historical Anatel rows prove Netuno once reported substantial FTTH service. Core3's current branch, offers and pole-use signal prove a related local operating context. A customer's migration account links the names informally. The separate CNPJs, ASNs, prefixes and visible upstream structures prevent those pieces from becoming proof of one present operator or one transferred asset estate.

The final network evidence grade is therefore Medium: strong for the continued IPv4 routing edge, but weak for current physical ownership, installed capacity and failure resilience. Until the companies publish the handoff boundary, the most important fact about Netuno is the split itself. The internet can still find its four routes. A customer, carrier or field technician cannot use the public record to see who now controls the fibre at the other end.