Andrew Mouzoures

Andrew Mouzoures is the admin-c for AS210988 per RIPE NCC RDAP. Public evidence is a single registry record; no corporate affiliation, job title, or other identity confirmation exists. The person is a gatekeeper for the network's WHOIS data, making him a key dependency for routing security and abuse handling. Watch for registry changes and AS210988 BGP activity. The real organizational authority and the legal name of the ASN-holding entity are unknown.

Andrew Mouzoures

Andrew Mouzoures is the administrative contact for AS210988, a RIPE NCC registered autonomous system. Public evidence is limited to a single registry record, and his actual operational authority within the owning organization remains unverified.

Why It Matters

If his contact details become stale or are compromised, routing validation and abuse reporting for AS210988 may fail. This could lead to prolonged outages, routing leaks, or delayed incident response, directly affecting the reachability and security of the network.

What Sources Show

Andrew Mouzoures is the administrative contact for autonomous system AS210988, a RIPE NCC registered network. That registry role does not reveal his full authority, but it does give him control over critical contact and routing information.

Because the admin-c can modify WHOIS records and influence how the network responds to abuse and operational queries, this single human contact point becomes a dependency for anyone who relies on AS210988’s connectivity and security.

The RIPE NCC RDAP record (AM2111-RIPE) lists Andrew Mouzoures as the admin-c for AS210988. In that position he can update the autonomous system’s registration details, manage associated route entities, and serve as the official recipient of abuse reports. No other roles—such as technical contact or zone contact—are visible in the registry, which may indicate a lean operational team or incomplete record-keeping.

Public evidence for Andrew Mouzoures stops at the RIPE NCC registry. No corporate website, PeeringDB profile, social media presence, or employment record links him to the organization that actually owns AS210988. The legal name of that organization and his formal job title remain unknown. Without additional sources, his real decision-making authority or technical expertise cannot be verified.

A single outdated email address or wrong physical address in the registry can break the chain of trust for BGP routing. If an abuse notification cannot reach him, peers may null-route the network’s prefixes or impose stricter filtering. Inaccurate contact data also makes it harder for law enforcement or security researchers to engage the organization during incidents, slowing down takedowns and exposing downstream customers to prolonged attacks.

Observers should monitor the administrative contact field for AS210988. If Andrew Mouzoures is replaced without a public explanation, it could signal a change in network ownership, a staffing shake-up, or a security compromise. Routing activity from AS210988—especially unexpected BGP announcements or prefix hijacks—can reveal whether the person responsible for registry data is also managing day-to-day network operations.

The public registry shows a contact handle, not a biography. Andrew Mouzoures might be a junior network administrator following orders, or a senior manager with executive authority. He may not even be the person who handles abuse; some organizations list a generic role account but use a different internal contact.

Future evidence from PeeringDB entries, company filings, or direct interviews would be needed to determine his actual reach and the true structure behind AS210988.

Finally, the public WHOIS record exposes his mailing address and likely an email address. That visibility makes him a target for spam, phishing, and social engineering. A compromised admin-c account could allow an attacker to alter the registry record, redirect traffic, or impersonate the network. Regular checks on the accuracy and integrity of the contact details are a cheap but effective defense.

Operating Surface

He holds the RIPE NCC handle AM2111-RIPE as admin-c for AS210988. In that capacity he can update WHOIS entries and act as the official contact for operational and abuse queries, making him a key dependency for the network's public identity.

The admin-c role places him as a gatekeeper for the network's registry data. Any change in his contact status, or in AS210988's routing behavior, could signal operational shifts, security incidents, or asset transfers that affect internet routing stability.

Watchpoints

Andrew Mouzoures acts as a single point of failure for the public registry identity of AS210988. If he is unresponsive or his contact data is wrong, the network’s routing security and abuse mitigation may weaken. Tracking his registry role changes provides an early indicator of operational shifts for the ASN.

Monitor RIPE NCC registry for changes to the admin-c field of AS210988. Watch BGP announcements from AS210988 for leaks or new originations. Verify contact data freshness quarterly.

The legal name of the organization that owns AS210988. Andrew Mouzoures’s employment contract, position title, and reporting structure. PeeringDB or corporate website that would confirm his public role. Historical abuse responsiveness data.

Sources

• Registry RDAP / WHOIS record - public-source identity and registry context for Andrew Mouzoures.