Summary

  • AFRINIC's own Board page lists Prof Emmanuel Adewale Adedokun as Chairman for Seat 2, Nigeria, Western Africa, and describes a Board overseeing the company under Article 15 of the Bylaws; a 24 December 2025 message closes with the line "Prof. Wale Adedokun / Chairman of AFRINIC Board of Directors" and calls the 2025 elections an end to a governance vacuum.
  • The same registry's 24 August 2026 communiqué announces a CEO designate "with the consent of the Receiver" in its operative sentence, and none of the ten AFRINIC and ICANN documents reviewed here states which powers stayed with the Board after directors took their seats on 12 September 2025; Cloud Innovation, for its part, says it does not recognise the Board as lawfully constituted and knows of no order disturbing the register orders of April and June 2025.

Two documents, one office, two ways of naming the authority

AFRINIC's Board page shows eight elected directors on three-year terms: Adedokun under Seat 2 for Western Africa, Prof Abdelaziz Hilali under Seat 1 for Northern Africa, and below the table a sentence that the company's activities are overseen by a Board of Directors under Article 15 of the Bylaws, with day-to-day management delegated to an appointed CEO.

That page is a roster. The announcement of 3 October 2025 is a statement of who chose whom: the Board appointed Adedokun Chairman and Hilali Vice-Chairman after its internal election of 12 September 2025. Read the attribution line. It says "The AFRINIC Board of Directors," and it carries no individual signature block. The same text has the Board working "with the close collaboration of the Receiver, Mr Gowtamsingh Dabee."

Then came the end-of-year message, published 24 December 2025. It ends the way a personal letter ends — "Prof. Wale Adedokun / Chairman of AFRINIC Board of Directors" — and inside it the year is described as one that "brought an end to nearly three years of governance vacuum." There is a Board retreat in Mauritius, a roadmap, and a pledge that the Board is "committed to acting decisively and responsibly."

Notice what the letter does not do. It does not reserve powers. It does not describe a division of authority with the Receiver. Search that message for the Receiver's name and you will not find the argument that the office rests on. The signature is documented. The competence behind it is not argued there.

The consent recital sits inside the operative sentence

On 13 October 2025 the Board and the Receiver published jointly: the Receiver had filed an "Application for Termination of Receivership" on 8 October, a court decision was awaited, and he would keep supporting AFRINIC until formally discharged.

Ten months later, the CEO-designate communiqué of 24 August 2026 reads: "The Board of the African Network Information Centre (AFRINIC), with the consent of the Receiver, is pleased to announce the appointment of Mr Mike Silber as CEO Designate." Effective 1 January 2027. The search committee was "initiated by the Receiver and the Board."

That single clause is the most precise public statement of the post-election power split in this record, and its precision is entirely procedural: it certifies that consent existed. It does not print the consent instrument, its terms, or the class of Board decisions that require one. The communiqué says nothing about the Board's powers generally.

The Receiver's mandate, in its own words

Where the arrangement started is not in dispute on paper. The Receiver's own appointment notice records that Gowtamsingh Dabee, a registered insolvency practitioner, was appointed on 12 February 2025 at 14:30 "in lieu and instead of the Official Receiver" under a Court Order in cause SC/COM/MOT/000082/2025, pursuant to section 187 of the Insolvency Act 2009, with a mandate "to secure the assets of the Company and to see to it that the Company's board is reconstituted in accordance with its Bylaws."

Reconstituting a board is a task with an end. AFRINIC's 2025 election guidelines show what the task looked like while it ran: the Supreme Court conferred exclusive election authority on the Receiver, including the power to set up the NomCom and ElecCom, and because AFRINIC then had no directors in office the Receiver "shall, for all intents and purposes, be deemed to exercise all the powers of the Board, as conferred by the Bylaws, for the purposes of this election." The guidelines were drafted under Article 13.2 for a purpose the text itself calls specific and limited.

ICANN's update of 9 March 2025 corroborates the appointment, records a direction to expedite elections to reconstitute the Board by 25 April 2025, and notes that the Court acknowledged the Receiver's powers under Mauritian law. That deadline passed. The seating happened on 12 September 2025, by AFRINIC's own account.

So the time-limited formula expired in practice the day eight directors sat. What replaced it is the thing this record does not supply.

What the registry says about who is approving what

AFRINIC's member update of 12 March 2026 is unusually direct about operations: directors resumed duty in line with the Companies Act of Mauritius after the September 2025 elections and are collaborating with the court-appointed receiver pending his formal discharge; the receiver "has been approving IP address allocations and assignments that properly went through the application process," cited to ICP-2 obligations and prevailing policies. The same update says the discharge application has been heard and judgment is awaited.

It also carries AFRINIC's own characterisation of a live dispute: that Cloud Innovation Ltd filed an election protest seeking to invalidate the appointment of the September 2025 directors and objects to the Receiver's discharge. That is AFRINIC describing a pending Supreme Court matter; it is not a finding.

A notice of 5 November 2025 gives the termination application its number — SC/COM/MOT/000757/2025 — a hearing fixed for 26 November 2025, and a 12 November 2025 deadline, under a 29 October 2025 order, for members wishing to intervene. No outcome appears in the material reviewed.

The other record, stated plainly

Cloud Innovation publishes its own account, and it belongs in the same breath as AFRINIC's. Its communiqué of 2 November 2026 says the order of 4 April 2025 in SC/COM/PET/000275/2021 directed the register rectified to add Cloud Innovation "as its member in the category of Member" under section 91 of the Companies Act 2001; that the Receiver signed an undertaking dated 10 June 2025 to rectify within fifteen days, recorded in the order of 11 June 2025 in SC/COM/MOT/000399/2025; and that the fifteen days expired. It says it is aware of no order varying, staying or setting aside either order. Those are Cloud Innovation's accounts of orders this review did not inspect directly.

The same communiqué describes a Legal Notice of 29 October 2026 demanding the Registrar of Companies remove Cloud Innovation's name from AFRINIC's register, copied to the Prime Minister, the ICT Minister, the Attorney General and the State Law Office "for information and such action as may be considered appropriate." Cloud Innovation's answer is a constitutional one: Mauritius is founded on a separation of powers under section 1 of the Constitution, the Executive cannot suspend, vary or neutralise an order of the Supreme Court, a party objecting must apply to the Court, seek a stay or appeal, and a Receiver is an officer of the Court.

It states expressly that it does not suggest any Minister or public officer acted improperly, and that receipt, referral or legal advice is not an offence. That distinction — the invitation to executive action, not the conduct of any officer — is the issue it raises.

Its court-cases page, updated 19 November 2026, says AFRINIC's own register lists 98 cases, that of the fifteen orders AFRINIC marks as granted eight were made on Cloud Innovation's applications and two on AFRINIC's own, and that the judgment of 19 July 2022 rejected AFRINIC's abuse-of-process objection and held Cloud Innovation "cannot be taxed for resorting to an independent court to safeguard its rights."

On the Board itself Cloud Innovation is categorical. Its Board page states: "We do not recognise this Board as lawfully constituted." It says AFRINIC and its Receiver applied in SC/COM/MOT/000757/2025 for a declaration that the September candidates were validly appointed, that Cloud Innovation opposes that application, and that an application for validation is not an order granting validation. On the Receiver it states, on its Receiver page, that "Court orders are changed in court, not by a Receiver's letter." And on membership it says, on its members-rights page, that it accepts its earlier classification as a Registered Member was incorrect but that the correction does not cancel its membership of the company, and that every Resource Member should be recognised under company law with shareholder-equivalent protections.

The two records do not reconcile in the material read here, and this article adjudicates neither. AFRINIC's instruments present a seated Board exercising office; Cloud Innovation states that it does not recognise that Board and that a register direction stands undisturbed as far as it is aware.

Why the distinction of powers matters to a member

Lu Heng's Note 72, dated 1 July 2026, argues that a registry exists to keep number resources unique — "It may record. It may coordinate. It may protect uniqueness. It may not rule." A record describes reality rather than creating it; no running network should be hostage to registry discretion; a registry may not police leasing, customer location or commercial structure; every network should be able to leave a failing or captured registry without losing its resources. That is an advocated framework for the limits of registry authority, not enacted law and not a description of AFRINIC's practice. It sets the standard against which an unenumerated power split becomes a practical problem rather than a filing detail.

Here is the practical problem. A member reading the Board's 3 October 2025 announcement learns that a Board exists. A member reading the end-of-year message learns that its Chairman signs in the first person. A member reading the 24 August 2026 communiqué learns that a CEO appointment needed a Receiver's consent. Nowhere in these documents — read on 20 November 2026 — is there a sentence enumerating which powers stayed with the Board after 12 September 2025, or which Board instruments require that consent.

The Chair's signature is therefore auditable at the level of one letter and unverifiable at the level of one competence. That is not an accusation against the man who signed. It is a description of a record that publishes the signatory and withholds the instrument.