Summary

  • The Agreement Establishing the Smart Africa Alliance, signed in Kigali on 10 November 2021 and gazetted by Rwanda on 25 April 2023, contains a non-interference clause, an Article XI dispute-settlement ladder and a Council-of-Ministers gate for sovereignty matters — and no retrieved provision that mentions AFRINIC or delegates registry-governance competence. 4
  • Every documented Smart Africa action on AFRINIC — the 14 June 2025 candidate slate, the appeals that contributed to the annulment of the June elections, the 23 July 2025 crisis statement and the 13 September 2025 welcome of the new board — is grounded instead in an internal board resolution, Board/XI/April/2023/8, and in public statements. 1 2 3
  • The practical authority invoked around AFRINIC comes from a different layer entirely: Mauritius company-law measures under Section 230 of the Companies Act, a judicial inspector and a temporary suspension of legal proceedings — acts of the host state, not of the alliance. 1
  • A parallel continental instrument does exist, but it is not Smart Africa's: an African Telecommunications Union ministerial declaration, adopted under Algerian chairmanship, mandates the ATU to monitor AFRINIC and report to the next AU Summit. 6

A treaty with no registry clause

Start with the founding instrument, because every other document in this story invokes authority that has to trace back to it somewhere. The Agreement Establishing the Smart Africa Alliance was signed in Kigali on 10 November 2021 and gazetted by Rwanda's Ministry of Justice in a special Official Gazette of 25 April 2023. Its preamble lineage runs through the 2013 Smart Africa Manifesto, endorsed by the African Union Assembly in January 2014, and through ITU resolutions — including Resolution 75 (Rev. Buenos Aires, 2017), which records the AU's endorsement of the Manifesto and the Alliance as its implementation framework. 5

The operative text is built for inter-state coordination. It contains a clause preserving the independence, integrity and sovereignty of Member States and prohibiting the organisation from interfering in matters essentially within their domestic jurisdiction. Disputes over the Agreement's interpretation or application follow a ladder in Article XI: negotiation first; if that fails, a mediation committee set up by the Board Chairperson; if mediation fails, the matter goes to Member States, which decide by a two-thirds majority with the disputing parties excluded from voting. The Council of Ministers is designated as the only competent organ to take decisions regarding sovereignty matters concerning Member States. The Agreement enters into force upon ratification by at least five Member States, with the host state, Rwanda, as depositary. 4

What the retrieved text does not contain is any provision mentioning AFRINIC, internet-number resources, or the governance of any external registry. There is no clause authorising the Alliance to intervene in a Mauritius-hosted technical body, to endorse candidates for another organisation's board, or to recognise or withhold recognition of another institution's electoral outcomes. On the instrument map, the treaty is silent on the registry.

What Smart Africa actually did, and on what basis

The record of engagement is nonetheless extensive, and each act is documented in Smart Africa's own publications.

On 14 June 2025, Smart Africa published a press release from Kigali in which it and a coalition of community actors endorsed eight named candidates — organised by seat and region — for the AFRINIC Board elections held online from 16 to 23 June 2025, describing the effort as strengthening Africa's digital sovereignty. 2

In a statement dated Kigali, 23 July 2025, Smart Africa set out its crisis posture: it cites its Board — made up of Heads of State, Government, Private Sector and International Organizations — and resolution Board/XI/April/2023/8 as its mandate; frames the AFRINIC crisis as a threat to Africa's digital sovereignty; references litigation attributed mainly to Cloud Innovation Ltd., a Seychelles-registered company; and states that the June 2025 elections were annulled after appeals, including Smart Africa's own appeal to the Government of Mauritius. The same statement recognises Mauritius's measures to avert immediate liquidation: the invocation of Section 230 of the Companies Act to declare AFRINIC a "Declared Company", the appointment of a judicial inspector, and a temporary suspension of legal proceedings. It also records an 18 July 2025 Ministerial Meeting, an ad hoc committee with international legal experts drafting reform proposals and a transitional legal framework, and seven principles — including a reserved right to withhold recognition of outcomes it deems tainted by fraud or illegality and to activate a transitional governance mechanism. 1 12

On 13 September 2025, Smart Africa acknowledged the results of the 10–12 September 2025 AFRINIC Board elections, in which seven of the eight coalition-endorsed candidates were elected, and stated that it is advancing the CAIGA process — the Council of African Internet Governance Authorities — "in line with the orientations already endorsed by Smart Africa Member States." 3 Its blueprint materials describe CAIGA as a framework for strengthening Africa's voice in global internet governance, developed in the context of AFRINIC reform discussions. 10 11 7

So the legal basis chain, as documented, is: statements (14 June, 23 July, 13 September 2025) resting on a resolution of the Alliance's own Board (Board/XI/April/2023/8). The resolution's text itself was not retrieved; its scope is asserted only in Smart Africa's 23 July statement. 1

Three layers, one framing

This is where the provision-level reading pays off. The instruments sort into three distinct layers:

Coordination. The statements, the candidate slate, the appeal to Mauritius, the welcome of election results and the CAIGA agenda are persuasive, non-binding acts. They commit no treaty party to anything and bind AFRINIC to nothing. They are the layer in which nearly all of Smart Africa's documented AFRINIC conduct sits.

Contract. The founding Agreement creates obligations among Member States, governed by Article XI's ladder and the Council-of-Ministers gate. This layer contains no registry competence at all.

Public authority. The measures with actual coercive force over AFRINIC — Section 230 declared-company status, the judicial inspector, the suspension of proceedings — derive from Mauritius company law and its courts, not from the alliance treaty. Smart Africa's July statement recognises them; it did not create them. 1

The accountability question follows directly. When a coordination-layer actor borrows the language of sovereignty and recognises public-authority measures, the public record can read as if a mandate exists where none is written. Smart Africa's own engagement in the June elections — a candidate slate and an appeal to the host government that preceded the annulment — was an act of influence in another institution's member-based process, carried out under an internal board resolution whose text is not public in the retained record. 1 2

The counter-position, and the parallel instrument

This reading is contested. AF* (afstar.org) issued a statement on CAIGA and the AFRINIC reforms that disputes the coalition narrative, framing the 7-of-8 election result as evidence of member caution about political influence rather than a coalition success. 7

And the only continental decision instrument found in the retained record that engages the receivership directly is not Smart Africa's. An African Telecommunications Union-organised extraordinary ministerial meeting, chaired by Algeria's Minister of Post and Telecommunications Hon. Sid Ali Zerrouki, adopted a Ministerial Declaration on Sustaining AFRINIC's Operations and Safeguarding Africa's Internet Stability, calling on the court-appointed Official Receiver to conduct transparent and timely elections and mandating the ATU to monitor developments and report to the next AU Summit; Smart Africa participated. 6 A ministerial declaration of a separate ITU-sector union is a different instrument class from a Smart Africa board resolution — and notably, the ATU route runs through the AU, the institutional family the founding Agreement actually serves.

ICANN's side of the ledger is also documented: a blog post of 18 November 2025 on its commitment to the Africa community, a 24 November 2025 correspondence letter from Erik Lindqvist to Dammak in ICANN's archive, and a public Medium inquiry by Amin Dayekh about joint work between ICANN and Smart Africa. 8 9 16

What the gap means

None of this makes Smart Africa's AFRINIC conduct illegitimate. Alliances routinely act beyond their founding texts; boards pass resolutions; coalitions endorse candidates. But it does mean the accountability chain is narrower than the rhetoric: no treaty provision, no member-state decision under Article XI, no Council-of-Ministers sovereignty ruling stands behind the alliance's registry posture — only a board resolution whose text is not public and a series of statements.

The declared uncertainties are correspondingly concrete: the resolution's scope is asserted, not retrieved; the "50+ lawsuits mainly by Cloud Innovation" figure is an assertion inside a public statement, not an adjudicated fact; and whether CAIGA is an alliance organ, a project vehicle or a separate legal entity is not established by the retained sources. The next verifiable step would be publication of Board/XI/April/2023/8 itself, or a member-state decision instrument engaging the registry question — either would close the gap this article documents.

AFRINIC's own materials — its 2025 board-election page and its member update on organisational stability and ongoing legal challenges — are reported here as claims by the institutions involved, not as controlling authority over the alliance's mandate. 13 15

References

[1] https://smartafrica.org/smart-africa-statement-on-the-coordinated-continental-response-safeguarding-africas-digital-sovereignty/ [2] https://smartafrica.org/press-release-community-endorsed-candidates-for-afrinic-board-elections-2025/ [3] https://smartafrica.org/smart-africa-welcomes-afrinic-election-results-and-reaffirms-commitment-to-collaborative-reforms/ [4] https://minijust.gov.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/Minijust/Official_Gazettes_2/_______2023_Official_Gazettes/___April/OG_n___Special_of_25.04.2023_Smart_Africa_Alliance.pdf [5] https://www.itu.int/net4/ITU-D/CDS/Resolutions/Resolution-75-Rev-Buenos-Aires-2017.pdf [6] https://www.itedgenews.africa/african-ict-ministers-unite-to-protect-afrinic-amid-legal-crisis-threatening-digital-sovereignty/ [7] https://afstar.org/updates/af-statement-on-council-of-african-internet-governance-authorities-caiga-and-afrinic-reforms/ [8] https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/icanns-commitment-to-the-africa-community-18-11-2025-en [9] https://itp.cdn.icann.org/en/files/correspondence/lindqvist-to-dammak-24-11-2025-en.pdf [10] https://smartafrica.org/strengthening-africas-voice-in-global-internet-governance-the-blueprint-and-the-emergence-of-caiga/ [11] https://techreviewafrica.com/news/2840/smart-africa-hosts-high-level-forum-on-afrinic-reforms-and-caiga-framework-development [12] https://techafricanews.com/2025/07/24/smart-africa-calls-for-coordinated-continental-action-to-protect-africas-digital-sovereignty/ [13] https://afrinic.net/board-election-2025 [14] https://lists.afrinic.net/pipermail/rpd/2025/014531.html [15] https://afrinic.net/afrinic-member-update-organisational-stability-and-ongoing-legal-challenges [16] https://medium.com/@AminDayekh/inquiry-about-the-joint-work-icann-smart-africa-99a74903804c