Summary

  • AFRINIC's second consultation on its proposed amended Constitution opened on 4 August and closes on 21 August 2026 at 23:59 UTC; the draft is not operative.
  • The current Constitution already tells members present to settle an unprovided-for election issue by consensus and makes the resolution a precedent.
  • The draft's material change is a fallback vote when consensus cannot satisfactorily resolve the issue; either outcome would enter the Election Guidelines for future elections.
  • Consensus first, a member decision, general-meeting voting rules where applicable, minutes and an expressly independent Election Committee are real safeguards.
  • Article 10.2 itself does not identify the voting threshold, eligible member classes, ballot method, immediate reasoned record, appeal, stay, ratification deadline or a way to reverse a bad precedent.

An exception at one election could write the rule for the next

The new power in AFRINIC's draft Constitution fits into three sentences. Its effect could last for years.

Article 10.2 addresses a problem that no rulebook can avoid: an issue arises during an election and the Constitution says nothing about it. The operative 2020 text requires the members present to resolve the issue collectively and by consensus. Their resolution then becomes a precedent and an integral part of the Election Guidelines.

The draft published for consultation on 4 August preserves that sequence but adds an escape hatch. Members present must first seek consensus. If they cannot reach a consensus that “satisfactorily” resolves the issue, a vote may be taken. The determination, whether reached by consensus or vote, becomes precedent and must be incorporated into future Election Guidelines.

That distinction matters. AFRINIC is not proposing the precedent mechanism for the first time. It is proposing to let a vote create the precedent when consensus fails. No such fallback is reported as used, because the text remains a proposal.

The clause says who is in the room, not who is in the electorate

The draft defines “Member” broadly: Registered Members, Resource Members and Associate Members. Elsewhere it says Associate Members have no voting rights unless the Constitution expressly grants them. Article 7 gives members a role in electing directors, while other corporate resolutions are expressly reserved to Registered Members and Resource Members in good standing.

Article 10.2 merely says “members present”. It does not say which member categories may cast this particular contingency vote. Nor does it call the determination an Ordinary Resolution, which the draft defines as a simple majority of eligible members voting, or a Special Resolution requiring 75 per cent.

Article 12 supplies useful rules when a Members' Meeting is held under Article 11. It permits voice, hands, paper, electronic or another fair and verifiable method; a poll gives one vote to each eligible member; the chair has no casting vote. It also prescribes a general-meeting quorum. Yet Article 10.2 does not cross-reference those provisions or say that its vote can occur only at an AGMM or SGMM.

If the contingency appears during a different election setting, the reader cannot tell from Article 10.2 alone whether the same franchise, quorum and ballot rules follow it. If the provisions are meant to apply, a cross-reference would remove the doubt. If a special electorate is intended, it must be named.

A vote becomes durable before its reasons become visible

The draft requires accurate minutes of AGMMs and SGMMs, later approval by members and publication after approval, subject to lawful redaction. That is a real record-keeping safeguard where the contingency occurs inside one of those meetings.

It is not the same as an immediate Article 10.2 record. The clause does not require the issue to be stated in writing, identify the evidence considered, publish reasons and a tally, record abstentions or dissent, or set a deadline for inserting the decision into the Election Guidelines. It also does not say how narrowly a later election must read the precedent.

A hurried answer to a narrow technical fault could therefore be cited as a general rule. The text supplies no expiry date, post-election ratification, distinguishing test or express reversal mechanism. Consensus language does not cure that. A small group can reach consensus, and a disciplined majority can win a vote.

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Further reading