PDP WG Guidelines

What changed

The proposal moved from version 1.0 to version 2.0 while remaining under discussion. Version 2.0 changed the design from two to three staggered co-chairs with three-year terms, removed the in-person attendance requirement for co-chair candidates, clarified Resource Member and Designated Representative voting language, introduced consensus-first Number Council decisions, revised PPM chairing arrangements, clarified Board ratification and reasoned refusal procedures, limited the automatic petition route to periods without a duly constituted and operative Board, and added provisions on residual Board authority, fiduciary responsibility, and good-faith protection. Version 1.0 was archived and superseded; no adoption or rejection is recorded.

What the debate was really about

The documented issue was how to preserve continuity and community-side administration of the policy development process during governance disruption while retaining the AFRINIC Board's statutory, fiduciary, ratification, and residual authority. The proposal sought stronger procedural autonomy through co-chairs, a Number Council, appeal and recall mechanisms, consultations, and contingency procedures. The impact assessment emphasized that these mechanisms must remain consistent with the Bylaws and Board responsibilities. The supplied record does not establish participant-level debate or a community-authorized resolution.

Arguments that prevailed

• The continuity argument prevailed in the drafting changes: version 2.0 adopted three staggered co-chair seats, interim succession procedures, and revised PPM chairing arrangements.
• The accountability argument prevailed in the drafting changes: version 2.0 added reasoned Board refusals, expressly preserved residual Board statutory and fiduciary authority, and limited automatic fallback to the absence of an operative Board.
• The volunteer-protection argument prevailed in the drafting changes through the added good-faith protection provision, subject to exceptions for fraud, wilful misconduct, bad faith, and deliberate rule violations.
• The participation-eligibility clarification prevailed through explicit references to Resource Members and Designated Representatives and removal of the in-person attendance requirement for co-chair candidates.

Arguments that did not prevail

• The broader version 1.0 route permitting a petition after Board inability or unexplained refusal while a Board existed did not remain in version 2.0.
• The concept of unrestricted community-side autonomy did not prevail; version 2.0 retained Board ratification discretion and residual authority.
• No evidence establishes that any participant-level majority or minority argument prevailed, because no discussion messages or stance records were supplied.
• No argument can be treated as having produced a final policy outcome because the proposal remains under discussion and has no recorded adoption or rejection.

Decision vs debate

The policy is still Under Discussion. Version 1.0 is archived and superseded by version 2.0, dated 2026-09-07. No final consensus determination, Board ratification, refusal, adoption, rejection, or implementation is supplied. The recorded changes show drafting evolution, not a completed decision.

Participation concentration

The participation dataset contains zero messages, zero discussion participants, zero active days, zero stance participants, and zero stance transitions. The three counted participants are all formal actors, so observed participation is confined to the formal-actor layer. HHI, top-message shares, and effective participant values of zero are empty-corpus values and cannot demonstrate dispersed, equal, or low-concentration participation. The breadth, intensity, majority, minority, and stance distribution of any wider debate cannot be determined.

Chokepoint analysis

The proposed structure creates continuity through multiple offices and fallback procedures, but authority remains concentrated among a small set of co-chairs, Number Council members, and overlapping appeal and recall actors. The Appeal Committee also serves as the Recall Committee, and the Number Council can appoint interim co-chairs. Version 2 narrows the automatic petition route by allowing it only when no duly constituted and operative Board exists, while preserving Board ratification discretion and residual statutory authority. This reduces the prospect of bypassing an operative Board but leaves an unresolved hierarchy between final-and-binding committee or Number Council provisions and residual Board authority.

Uncertainties

• The zero-message dataset cannot establish whether debate was absent or outside the collected source coverage.
• The supplied facts do not identify every hash difference among the three version 1.0 observations as a substantive revision.
• The operational hierarchy between final-and-binding committee or Number Council decisions and residual Board authority remains unresolved.
• No participant identities, affiliations, geography, eligibility details, or stance transitions are supplied.
• The proposal's eventual consensus status, Board action, implementation, and practical effects are unknown.
• The legal and institutional assertions in the impact assessment are recorded positions and are not independently verified legal holdings in the supplied facts.