Summary
- France and Germany want the next MSS 2 GHz selection procedure to include objectively justified, non-discriminatory, proportionate and transparent wholesale access.
- They also want an adequate part of the band secured for IRIS² D2D services, turning spectrum allocation into both a sovereignty instrument and a market-access negotiation.
- The joint position is influential because the two governments can coordinate in forthcoming European negotiations, but it is not a binding EU allocation decision.
The most consequential part of the new Franco-German space position is not a satellite specification. It is a proposed bargain over entry to a scarce frequency band. France and Germany want the MSS 2 GHz selection process to preserve capacity for IRIS² while requiring the selection design to offer wholesale access on fair and transparent terms.
That combination makes the band a control surface. Whoever receives spectrum gains the practical ability to support services that reach compatible devices from space. The conditions attached to that access will influence whether the market develops around a narrow group of spectrum holders or gives other operators a credible route to buy capacity and compete downstream.
Wholesale terms can redistribute leverage
The bilateral statement says the selection procedure should offer wholesale access under conditions that are objectively justified, non-discriminatory, proportionate and transparent. Those words matter because a wholesale obligation can separate control of the frequency right from control of every customer relationship built on top of it.
In principle, an operator without its own allocation could negotiate for capacity instead of being excluded from the band. That can widen the commercial field for service providers, satellite operators and connectivity partners. It can also limit the ability of a primary rights holder to make access conditional on surrendering the downstream relationship.
But the statement leaves the decisive commercial details open. It does not define eligible wholesale buyers, minimum capacity, pricing, service quality, coverage, enforcement or the treatment of congestion. A formal right to negotiate would be much weaker than an access regime with measurable obligations and an effective remedy. The next documents will therefore determine whether wholesale access becomes a competitive route or a carefully worded promise.
A reservation inside an open-market promise
Paris and Berlin also say that an adequate portion of the MSS 2 GHz band should be secured for IRIS² D2D services and made explicit in the proposed regulation. That is a different intervention from the wholesale condition. It gives a European public-interest programme a protected claim on a strategic input before the rest of the commercial contest is settled.
The two positions are not necessarily contradictory. The same statement backs a commercial approach to IRIS², private investment, competition and public-private partnership. A protected spectrum position could give IRIS² enough certainty to develop services, while wholesale conditions could prevent that protection from closing the wider market.
The tension will sit in the implementation. A larger reservation can strengthen the programme’s operating certainty but reduce the capacity immediately contestable by other users. Strong wholesale duties can open access but may affect how bidders value the primary rights. The allocation design must decide who carries investment risk, who receives priority when capacity is tight and how public-service goals coexist with commercial demand.
Why Franco-German alignment matters
The statement describes satellite communications as inherently pan-European and argues for more harmonisation, while also recognising member-state powers, particularly in security and defence. That makes bilateral alignment valuable: France and Germany are not merely comparing national plans but coordinating a position for a market that crosses national borders.
Their shared stance can narrow the range of outcomes they will support in European negotiations. It also gives other governments, institutions and potential bidders a clearer signal about the terms the two countries regard as politically acceptable: room for IRIS², open commercial participation and a wholesale route governed by transparent conditions.
Influence is not the same as legal effect. The communiqué records the position of two governments and calls for the IRIS² spectrum point to appear in a proposed regulation. It does not itself allocate frequencies, select an operator, set wholesale prices or bind the European Union. Other member states and EU institutions still have roles in shaping any regulation and selection framework, while international coordination of radio spectrum remains anchored in the ITU system cited by the statement.
What to watch next
The first test is whether the proposed regulation carries a specific reservation for IRIS² or leaves the amount and timing to a later procedure. The second is whether wholesale access acquires operational detail: pricing principles, capacity commitments, quality standards, non-discrimination tests and enforcement.
The bidder response will reveal another part of the bargain. Applicants may accept access duties if the primary rights still support an investable business case; they may resist if obligations are broad and the protected portion is large. Meanwhile, downstream providers will need to judge whether the wholesale offer gives them enough control over product design, service assurance and customer ownership to justify entry.
For now, France and Germany have moved the debate from a simple question of who wins spectrum to a harder one: how control of that spectrum should be shared. That is why the agreement matters before it becomes law. It establishes the negotiating architecture around scarcity, sovereign capacity and market access, while leaving the economically decisive terms unresolved.

