Primary Domain
Routing Security
Within the Primary Domain facet, Routing Security intelligence groups reporting by primary domain so readers can follow a focused area of internet infrastructure, governance, connectivity markets, or digital capital. The page brings together related articles, public evidence, institutions, companies, people, regional exposure, operating dependencies, and market context that may otherwise sit across separate category pages. It explains the domain, the likely actor class, the market or governance context, and the source material readers should use when comparing signals. Operators, analysts, and governance readers can see how the same domain appears across events, profiles, market shifts, public-source evidence, regional dependencies, and longer-cycle infrastructure decisions over time.
CASE FILE
The YouTube Hijack Case File: A Settled Story Without a Readable Record
The most familiar routing failure in internet history is usually told as if it were closed. In this review the page that should carry its own record returned no readable text at all, and the two documents that did return text describe a collection platform and an authorisation…
Story
AS24940’s RPKI Snapshot: 91 Routes, 63 Matches, 49 Broader Permissions
AS24940’s RPKI Snapshot: 91 Routes, 63 Matches, 49 Broader Permissions intelligence summary explains the development, the public evidence available to readers, the organisations involved, the regional context, market exposure, and the infrastructure consequences that may follow.…
Asia-Pacific Cloud Services
Thanh Trang Cloud Computing and Technology Company Limited: an RPKI-valid route that does not belong to the company
A Vietnamese cloud-computing company owns an autonomous-system number, an IPv4 /23 and an IPv6 /48. None of that routing is its own: the only route that reaches the internet from its address space is announced, and cryptographically protected, by a different operator entirely.
CASE FILE
When the registry cannot be read: DFINFRA, AS210860 and the broken verification chain
When the registry cannot be read: DFINFRA, AS210860 and the broken verification chain intelligence summary explains the development, the public evidence available to readers, the organisations involved, the regional context, market exposure, and the infrastructure consequences…
Europe and Middle East Cloud Services
The fourth prefix: DATAMATIX's 149.62.35.0/24 and the gap between owning a block and controlling a route
The fourth prefix: DATAMATIX's 149.62.35.0/24 and the gap between owning a block and controlling a route intelligence summary explains the development, the public evidence available to readers, the organisations involved, the regional context, market exposure, and the…
Story
The Corroboration Ledger: What the Public Record Can — and Cannot — Confirm About almazcloud.network
The Corroboration Ledger: What the Public Record Can — and Cannot — Confirm About almazcloud.network intelligence summary explains the development, the public evidence available to readers, the organisations involved, the regional context, market exposure, and the infrastructure…
Europe and Middle East Regional ISP
AS210837: The Routing Record ROYA Left Behind — Who Controlled a Vanishing Network Footprint
AS210837: The Routing Record ROYA Left Behind — Who Controlled a Vanishing Network Footprint intelligence summary explains the development, the public evidence available to readers, the organisations involved, the regional context, market exposure, and the infrastructure…
Story
LACNIC’s BGP Case Counts 368 Route Peers. The Vendor Could Not Produce a Definitive Installation List.
LACNIC’s latest routing-security case is unusually rich in network evidence and unusually poor in application evidence. The route, certificate and attack window can be reconstructed in detail; the vendor still cannot say which installations accepted the malicious update. That gap…
IETF
The Route Carried a Domain Path. The Tenant Still Needed Proof: RFC 10039
RFC 10039 arrives with a practical answer to a dangerous ambiguity: when tenant reachability is re-originated between EVPN and IPVPN domains, redundant gateways need a way to recognize that a route has come back. Its new D-PATH attribute records the declared domain sequence and…
CASE FILE
The Firewall Matched the Return Flow. The Source Still Was Not an Identity
A new SPRING working-group draft proposes a neat repair for a stubborn SRv6 middlebox problem: put the service SID in the outer source address so the two directions form the pair a stateful firewall expects. The packet may then pass. What the address proves, however, has changed.…