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Primary Domain

Routing Security

Within the Primary Domain facet, Routing Security intelligence groups reporting by primary domain so readers can follow a focused area of internet infrastructure, governance, connectivity markets, or digital capital. The page brings together related articles, public evidence, institutions, companies, people, regional exposure, operating dependencies, and market context that may otherwise sit across separate category pages. It explains the domain, the likely actor class, the market or governance context, and the source material readers should use when comparing signals. Operators, analysts, and governance readers can see how the same domain appears across events, profiles, market shifts, public-source evidence, regional dependencies, and longer-cycle infrastructure decisions over time.

Abstract text-free editorial schematic: a single rectangular block of light passing vertically through four stacked semi-transparent lattice planes, representing the registry, BGP, IRR and RPKI control planes over the AS210973 prefix 149.62.35.0/24

Europe and Middle East Cloud Services

The fourth prefix: DATAMATIX's 149.62.35.0/24 and the gap between owning a block and controlling a route

The fourth prefix: DATAMATIX's 149.62.35.0/24 and the gap between owning a block and controlling a route intelligence summary explains the development, the public evidence available to readers, the organisations involved, the regional context, market exposure, and the…

Sep 30, 2026
Abstract network diagram with three prefix rows, two validated and one revoked

Story

The Corroboration Ledger: What the Public Record Can — and Cannot — Confirm About almazcloud.network

The Corroboration Ledger: What the Public Record Can — and Cannot — Confirm About almazcloud.network intelligence summary explains the development, the public evidence available to readers, the organisations involved, the regional context, market exposure, and the infrastructure…

Sep 29, 2026
Dark, empty network operations room with a vacant console; a large abstract routing table of plain luminous bars dissolving into blackness from left to right while a single green line still glows; a ring of six parabolic dish antennas on short pylons stands in the open foreground facing a dim city skyline at dusk.

Europe and Middle East Regional ISP

AS210837: The Routing Record ROYA Left Behind — Who Controlled a Vanishing Network Footprint

AS210837: The Routing Record ROYA Left Behind — Who Controlled a Vanishing Network Footprint intelligence summary explains the development, the public evidence available to readers, the organisations involved, the regional context, market exposure, and the infrastructure…

Sep 26, 2026
A sealed software-update capsule follows a blue route beside an amber diversion while a terminal prints one blank local receipt.

Story

LACNIC’s BGP Case Counts 368 Route Peers. The Vendor Could Not Produce a Definitive Installation List.

LACNIC’s latest routing-security case is unusually rich in network evidence and unusually poor in application evidence. The route, certificate and attack window can be reconstructed in detail; the vendor still cannot say which installations accepted the malicious update. That gap…

Sep 12, 2026
Three network domains are joined by brass gateways and a luminous path, while a final tenant endpoint remains unlit.

IETF

The Route Carried a Domain Path. The Tenant Still Needed Proof: RFC 10039

RFC 10039 arrives with a practical answer to a dangerous ambiguity: when tenant reachability is re-originated between EVPN and IPVPN domains, redundant gateways need a way to recognize that a route has come back. Its new D-PATH attribute records the declared domain sequence and…

Sep 9, 2026
Mirrored packet paths fit one stateful firewall while several hidden network origins converge behind the same service-shaped source token and a finite session reservoir fills below.

CASE FILE

The Firewall Matched the Return Flow. The Source Still Was Not an Identity

A new SPRING working-group draft proposes a neat repair for a stubborn SRv6 middlebox problem: put the service SID in the outer source address so the two directions form the pair a stateful firewall expects. The packet may then pass. What the address proves, however, has changed.…

Sep 7, 2026