Summary
- Entrust's posted SSL Baseline assurance report covers a 201-day Audit Period, 1 March 2025 to 17 September 2025, and Deloitte LLP signed it on 19 November 2025 — 63 days after the period closed.
- Public TLS issuance from Entrust root CAs stopped on 11 March 2025, so ten of the 201 attested days fall before the cessation and 191 fall on or after it, with the period ending on the date the company's own key-dates table prints as the end of read-only access.
- The TLS Baseline Requirements cap an audit period at one year and print no minimum, so the report is owed to the public within three months on a clock that starts when the auditee closes its books.
An assurance report carries three fields worth reading before the opinion: which organisation was audited, which days the report covers, and the day the practitioner signed it. Entrust's SSL Baseline report puts all three in its opening sentence. "We have been engaged, in a reasonable assurance engagement, to report on Entrust management's statement that for its Certification Authority (“CA”) operations at Ottawa, Ontario, Canada and Toronto, Ontario, Canada, throughout the period March 1, 2025 to September 17, 2025 (the “Period”) for its CAs as enumerated in Attachment A".
Read that sentence slowly, because four things sit inside it. The engagement is reasonable assurance, not a direct examination. What lies under the opinion is a statement written by the auditee. The operations are in Ottawa and Toronto. The in-scope CAs are not in the sentence at all — they are enumerated in an attachment. And the period runs 201 days: 31 in March, 30 in April, 31 in May, 30 in June, 31 in July, 31 in August, 17 in September. That day count is my arithmetic from the two printed dates; the report prints the dates and leaves the counting to whoever cares to do it.
Now put the period against the company's own calendar. Entrust's TLS Certificate Information Center states: "As of March 11, 2025, Entrust has stopped issuing public TLS certificates from Entrust root CAs. Entrust public TLS certificates issued before March 11, 2025, continue to be valid through their expiration dates." The same page runs a key-dates table: 12 May 2025, end of issuance for S/MIME and VMC certificates; 14 July 2025, migration of eStore retail customers to Sectigo; 8 September 2025, Entrust Certificate Services goes read-only for public trust certificates; 17 September 2025, end of read-only access; 18 September 2025, migration complete.
Line the two documents up and the attested period splits cleanly. Ten days separate 1 March from 11 March. The other 191 fall on or after the day public issuance from Entrust root CAs stopped — the 21 remaining days of March, then 30, 31, 30, 31, 31 and the 17 days of September. The period closes on 17 September 2025, which the company's table prints as the end of read-only access. "Migration complete" is printed as 18 September 2025, one day outside the attested window. Both dates are on the record. Neither needs tidying into the other.
None of that is a rule broken. It is what the instrument permits, and the scheme's own words explain why. The CA/Browser Forum's Audit Lifecycle reproduces the core of Section 8.1: "The period during which the CA issues Certificates SHALL be divided into an unbroken sequence of audit periods. An audit period MUST NOT exceed one year in duration." One sentence, one maximum. Then notice what no sentence says. Nothing in that reproduced text, and nothing across the eight documents I read on 18 November 2026, prints a minimum period length or a minimum number of audited days. The ceiling is real. The floor is not in the text. "Annual audit" therefore names a rhythm the ceiling allows, not a duty the scheme imposes.
Section 1.6.1 on the scheme's Baseline Requirements landing page settles what the dates on a report cover actually are: "Audit Period: In a period-of-time audit, the period between the first day (start) and the last day of operations (end) covered by the auditors in their engagement. (This is not the same as the period of time when the auditors are on-site at the CA.)" The period is the span of the auditee's operations, not the auditor's visit. That is exactly why it deserves to be read before the opinion — and why a phrase like "throughout the period" carries more weight than it appears to.
The publication clock is a separate instrument, and the auditee starts it too. The operative wording of Section 8.6 is reproduced by a structured mirror of Section 8.6 — an unofficial mirror, not a CA/Browser Forum publication, and labelled as a mirror here — which prints: "The CA MUST make its Audit Report publicly available no later than three months after the end of the audit period. In the event of a delay greater than three months, the CA SHALL provide an explanatory letter signed by the Qualified Auditor." The scheme's own SC31 change summary records what moved: the delivery rule from SHOULD to MUST, the explanatory letter from MAY to MUST.
Run those numbers on Entrust's report. Deloitte LLP, Chartered Professional Accountants, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, signed it on 19 November 2025 — 13 days left in September, 31 in October, 19 in November, so 63 days after the close. The three-month bound measures out to 17 December 2025, 91 days after the close, which leaves 28 days of headroom at 63. Both of those figures are my arithmetic from printed dates, not dates the report prints. No explanatory letter was required, and nothing here is late.
What deserves a pause is the shape of the artefact. The scheme does not settle for a summary, a management assertion or a delay letter: it commands the Audit Report itself. Entrust published the whole thing — opinion, emphasis-of-matter section, Attachment A listing the in-scope root and issuing CAs — on its own website. When I began this piece I expected to find a letter standing in for a report. The scheme will not have that, and the correction sharpens the finding rather than softening it. The public gets the auditor's own document. The freedom sits in the period that document describes.
Look at what Section 8.6 requires the report to establish, and its character becomes clear.
It must state that it covers the systems and processes used to issue all certificates asserting the relevant policy identifiers, and it must carry the audited organisation's name, the auditor's name and address, the SHA-256 fingerprint of every in-scope root and subordinate CA including cross-certified ones, the audit criteria and version numbers, the CA policy documents and versions referenced, whether the audit was period-of-time or point-in-time, the Audit Period's start and end, the issue date, and ETSI-specific statements where they apply; an authoritative English version must be public, as a text-searchable PDF, with SHA-256 fingerprints in uppercase and no colons, spaces or line feeds.
Every item on that list identifies the artefact or fences its boundaries. Not one requires a finding about a particular month.
Three names sit in this story and no document I read merges them. This directory records Entrust Corporation as a United States company. The assurance report names Entrust Limited, for operations at Ottawa and Toronto. The certificates themselves carry the Entrust brand. A reader checking who was audited has to hold all three, and the corporate relationship between them is not stated in any of the eight documents read on 18 November 2026.
Two cessation dates also stand, each with its own carrier. The TLS information centre prints 11 March 2025 for the end of public TLS issuance from Entrust root CAs. The report's own retained text records 8 September 2025 as the discontinuation of other public-facing services, and the same page's table puts read-only mode at 8 September 2025. Two dates, two scopes, two documents.
The floor, such as it is, sits with parties other than the scheme. Mozilla Root Store Policy Version 3.1, effective 1 July 2026, requires CA operators to comply with the TLS Baseline Requirements and to operate under Sections 2.3 and 3.1.1 of the policy — and states that Mozilla may accept audits by auditors who do not meet the qualifications in Section 8.2 of the TLS Baseline Requirements, or refuse audits from auditors who do. Even the assessor's qualifications are a variable a root programme holds.
The official Version 2.3.1 PDF, dated 4 October 2026, supplies the numbering: Section 8.4 "Topics covered by assessment" at page 119, Section 8.5 "Actions taken as a result of deficiency" at page 120, Section 8.6 "Communication of results" at page 120. So there is a section for what happens after a deficiency. On 18 November 2026 I could name that heading and nothing beyond it, because the body of Section 8.5 was not in what I retrieved from the official 2.3.1 PDF.
Why read the instrument and not the drama? Prior coverage on this desk, measured on 18 November 2026: a literal archive search for "Entrust", limit 30, returned two published rows — a 26 August 2026 Case File research article on Chrome's trust limit and certificate-transparency timing, and a 7 February 2024 company profile of the Onfido acquisition. Neither reads an audit attestation, an audit period, an auditor's scope statement, or the clause that puts the report in the public record. That instrument-level reading is what this briefing adds.
For a board, a procurement team or a relying party, the sequence is short. Read the period's start and end before the opinion. Check the name of the organisation being audited against the name on your own contract. Check the issue date against the period's close, because the gap is measurable even when it is comfortable. Treat a short period as a question rather than a verdict.
The evidential boundary, once, and near the end. Across the eight documents read on 18 November 2026 — the assurance report PDF, the TLS information centre, the CA/Browser Forum Audit Lifecycle, the official 2.3.1 PDF's table of contents, the structured Section 8.6 mirror, the SC31 change summary, the Section 1.6.1 definitions page and Mozilla Root Store Policy 3.1 — none prints a minimum audit-period length, a minimum number of audited days, or a rule that a period may not close while a wind-down is under way.
The body of Section 8.6 in the scheme's own 2.3.1 PDF was not returned, so the three-month wording quoted here is the mirror's, corroborated by the scheme's own SC31 summary; the body of Section 8.5 was not read. No document among the eight states the corporate relationship between Entrust Corporation and Entrust Limited. No enforcement record, programme decision, supervisory action or additional attestation relating to this report was located among them.
Entrust's certificate-transparency landing page could not be read on 18 November 2026, so the link path from that page to the PDF is unconfirmed and the PDF's own address is cited instead. No first-party statement of the posting date was located; the issue date is known and the posting date is not. Nothing here asserts that any audit was adequate or inadequate.
Member Briefing
Read the full trend briefing
Members read the full briefing with the source notes behind every finding.
Strategic Circle
A daily briefing in your language, built from changes we have verified.
Join for USD 20/monthCancel anytime.
Members also get the full research library, a daily briefing on the networks they follow and the private forum.






