Rogers

On July 8, 2022, a maintenance change in Rogers' IP core removed a policy filter from distribution routers. The CRTC-commissioned technical assessment says the change allowed full BGP routing tables to be redistributed into OSPF, overloading core routers until wireless, wireline, business, emergency-call, and public-alert connectivity failed across Canada. Redundant equipment did not contain the event because the same unsafe route state reached the common core. Engineers then lost remote management access through infrastructure that depended on that core. The incident turned a configuration line into a national continuity test: could the operator bound route volume, isolate change risk, preserve independent control access, and prove that repairs worked in the running network?

What happened: Strategic investment to strengthen balance sheet Rogers Communications, one of Canada’s largest telecommunications companies, has secured a CAD $7bn equity investment from Blackstone and a consortium of major Canadian pension funds. The deal is designed to reduce Rogers’ debt and unde…