almazcloud.network

At a glance

• Autonomous system numberLinked with AS210328, AS202425, AS201814, AS48693 +2High confidence
• Address blocks1 address block currently recordedHigh confidence

Basic information

• Display namealmazcloud.networkHigh confidence
• Directory categoryCompanyHigh confidence
• Last updatedJun 15, 2026High confidence

Locations

• Geography scopeUnavailableUnrated

What it does

• ColocationColocation provider, almazcloud.network's public recordHigh confidence
• IP transitIP transit provider, almazcloud.network's public recordHigh confidence
• Peering and IXPsPeering or exchange entity, almazcloud.network's public recordHigh confidence
• HostingHosting provider, almazcloud.network's public recordHigh confidence

Network identity

• Autonomous system numberAS210328High confidence
• Autonomous system numberAS202425High confidence
• Autonomous system numberAS201814High confidence
• Autonomous system numberAS48693High confidence
• Autonomous system numberAS12695High confidence
• Autonomous system numberAS205997High confidence

IP address resources

Other network resources

• Data centeralmazcloud.network ColocationHigh confidence
• Service platformalmazcloud.network IP transitHigh confidence
• Internet exchangealmazcloud.network peering/IXPHigh confidence
• Service platformalmazcloud.network HostingHigh confidence

Registry and related records

• Editorial contextA Price List Built on Peering It Cannot Show: Auditing almazcloud.network's Commercial Catalog Against AS210328's Measured Footprint, The operator behind the DIAMOND brand sells direct physical connections to some of the largest networks in Russia. Its own routing record lists no peers at all.Medium confidence
• Editorial contextThe Routing-Policy Swap Behind AS210328: What the August 2026 Registry Edit Changed — and What It Did Not, The autonomous system behind the almazcloud.network brand was edited once in August 2026 after nearly five years of registry stillness. The edit changed one line: who the network's routing policy names as its counterpart. What it did not change is more telling — the sponsoring organisation, the address space, and the observable routing footprint all stayed exactly where they were.Medium confidence
• Editorial contextAS210328 After the August 2026 Registry Edit: What Changed, and What Still Cannot Be Verified, On 21 August 2026 the RIPE routing-policy lines for AS210328 — the autonomous system registered to AO ALMAZ and marketed through almazcloud.network under the DIAMOND brand — were rewritten to name a new counterpart, AS48693. This briefing asks a narrower question than previous coverage: what does that edit actually tell a buyer, and what verifiable activity sits behind it?Medium confidence
• Editorial contextAS210328 Today: What the Live Record Shows — and Fails to Show — About AO ALMAZ's Cloud Network, On 30 September 2026, the autonomous system AS210328 — registered in the RIPE region to an organisation named AO ALMAZ and marketed through the website almazcloud.network under the DIAMOND brand — sits in a peculiar state: its live registry objects were recently modified, its routing footprint is small but observable, two of its three prefixes carry valid cryptographic origin protection, and the third remains without any ROA of its own. Around that live record, a ring of third-party databases still serves snapshots frozen in 2021, 2022 or later — each of them steering real purchase decisions. This report is a same-week execution check: it separates what the current public record verifies, what it contradicts, and what it simply cannot settle, beyond the identity-gap and mirror-divergence findings BTW has already published ([BTW directory entry](https://btw.media/en/directory/almazcloud-network)).Medium confidence
• Editorial contextThe Registry Says One Company, the Records Say Another: Inside AS210328's Identity Gap, Every network on the internet carries two identities. One lives in the routing system: an autonomous system number, a set of prefixes, a chain of business relationships that other networks can observe and measure. The other lives in a registry record: a legal organisation, a registration number, a named country. When those two identities point in different directions, the people who buy services from that network — and the people who must answer abuse complaints against it — are left without a reliable way to know who they are actually dealing with. This report examines AS210328, registered in the RIPE region to an organisation named AO ALMAZ under the brand almazcloud.network, where that second identity has stopped checking out.Medium confidence
• Editorial contextFour Databases, Four AlmazClouds: The Incompatible AS210328 a Buyer Meets in September 2026, Before a company buys transit, cloud capacity or BGP announcement services from almazcloud.network — the site through which the Moscow-region operator AO ALMAZ markets its DIAMOND-branded cloud products — its engineers will do what engineers always do: check the public record. On 29 September 2026 that check returns four incompatible answers about the same network, autonomous system AS210328, because the four independent databases that describe it were last refreshed in four different years. The divergence is not a dispute over the underlying registry data. It is a map of how long each kind of public record can go stale while still steering commercial decisions.Medium confidence
• Editorial contextThe Corroboration Ledger: What the Public Record Can — and Cannot — Confirm About almazcloud.network, Every network publishes a story about itself. The interesting question is never whether the story is flattering, but which parts of it independent records can confirm, which parts those records contradict, and which parts they simply leave unaddressed. AS210328 — the Russian autonomous system registered to AO ALMAZ and marketed through the website almazcloud.network under the brand DIAMOND — offers an unusually clean test case, because its commercial catalogue makes specific, priced, dated claims, and its routing footprint is small enough to be examined end to end. This report reconciles the two, claim by claim, as the public record stood on 29 September 2026.Medium confidence
• Editorial contextThe Four Days That Secured a Network: How AS210328 Acquired Its RPKI Cover in Late August 2026, Most networks build their routing-security posture years before anyone examines it. AS210328 — the Russian autonomous system registered to AO ALMAZ and marketed through almazcloud.network — appears to have done the opposite. Cryptographic records show that the network's RPKI coverage for its second prefix was created on 20 August 2026, roughly four and a half years after the autonomous system itself was allocated, within a single day of a registry policy change, and four days before a competitor's certificate over a disputed prefix was revoked. This report reconstructs that four-day window from primary registry and validation-console evidence, and asks what a network's own cryptographic timestamps can prove that its marketing pages cannot.Medium confidence

Source basis

• public registry sourcealmazcloud.network's public recordHigh confidence
• public webRIPEstat public routing recordHigh confidence

How to read these connections

• Address compositionThe visible prefix footprint is IPv6-only with 1 announced prefixes.Medium confidence

Related research

• Primary articleA Price List Built on Peering It Cannot Show: Auditing almazcloud.network's Commercial Catalog Against AS210328's Measured FootprintHigh confidence
• Primary articleThe Routing-Policy Swap Behind AS210328: What the August 2026 Registry Edit Changed — and What It Did NotHigh confidence
• Primary articleAS210328 After the August 2026 Registry Edit: What Changed, and What Still Cannot Be VerifiedHigh confidence
• Primary articleAS210328 Today: What the Live Record Shows — and Fails to Show — About AO ALMAZ's Cloud NetworkHigh confidence
• Primary articleThe Registry Says One Company, the Records Say Another: Inside AS210328's Identity GapHigh confidence
• Primary articleFour Databases, Four AlmazClouds: The Incompatible AS210328 a Buyer Meets in September 2026High confidence
• Primary articleThe Corroboration Ledger: What the Public Record Can — and Cannot — Confirm About almazcloud.networkHigh confidence
• Primary articleThe Four Days That Secured a Network: How AS210328 Acquired Its RPKI Cover in Late August 2026High confidence
• Primary articleAlmazCloud After the August Revisions: What AS210328's Current Record Shows — and What It Still Refuses to SettleHigh confidence
• Primary articleAlmazCloud's Commercial Story Meets the Routing Record: What AS210328 Can Actually SellHigh confidence
• Primary articleAlmazCloud's AS210328: What the Routing Record Now Shows — and What It Still Doesn'tHigh confidence
• Primary articleAlmazCloud’s AS210328: The Operating Chain Still Has to Be DemonstratedHigh confidence
• Primary articleAlmazCloud’s AS210328: The Operating Chain Still Has to Be DemonstratedHigh confidence
• Primary articleAlmazCloud’s AS210328: The Operating Footprint Still Has to Be ShownHigh confidence
• Primary articleAlmazCloud’s AS210328: The Operating Footprint Still Has to Be ShownHigh confidence
• Primary articleAlmazCloud’s AS210328: What the Public Record Can—and Cannot—VerifyHigh confidence
• Primary articleAS210328 After Registration: The Missing Link Between Network Identity and Cloud ServiceHigh confidence
• Primary articleAlmazCloud’s ASN Is Registered. What Can Be Shown as Operating?High confidence