Summary

  • 6 U.S.C. 681b prints a 72-hour covered-cyber-incident report and a 24-hour ransom-payment report, then hands the manner, form and effective dates of those paragraphs to a final rule.
  • On 18 November 2026 that rule sat at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Final Rule Stage, with a stakeholder meeting docketed for the following afternoon, against a statutory final-rule date of 4 October 2025.

Two numbers do all the public work, and they are worth reading in the original rather than in a slide. A covered entity that experiences a covered cyber incident must report it to the Agency "not later than 72 hours" after that entity itself reasonably believes the incident has occurred, and a covered entity that makes a ransom payment as the result of a ransomware attack must report the payment "not later than 24 hours" after the payment has been made. That is the operative text of 6 U.S.C. 681b, and a second official rendering prints both intervals identically (United States Code 2024 edition at GovInfo).

Read the anchors and a pattern appears. The 72 hours do not start when a monitoring vendor raises an alert, when a regulator telephones, or when a reporter publishes. They start inside the entity, at the moment its own reasonable belief crystallises — and the same subparagraph that imposes the duty also protects the entity from being pushed earlier, because the Director "may not require reporting under subparagraph (A) any earlier than 72 hours" after that belief. The clock is a ceiling on the entity and a floor beneath it at the same time.

The second clock is stranger, and more revealing. Under 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(2)(A) the trigger is not an incident at all but a transaction: the payment is made, and 24 hours begin. Subparagraph (a)(2)(B) then closes the obvious exit, providing that the ransom duty applies "even if the ransomware attack is not a covered cyber incident subject to the reporting requirements under paragraph (1)". An attack that fails the incident definition can still start the shorter clock, because the money moved.

Paragraph (a)(3) adds a third timing rule with no interval attached to it at all. An entity shall "promptly submit" updates or supplements when substantial new or different information becomes available, or when it makes a ransom payment after filing an incident report, "until such date that" the entity notifies the Agency that the incident "has concluded and has been fully mitigated and resolved". The reporting relationship does not close on a deadline. It closes on the entity's own declaration.

Then the section changes hands, and this is the part that decides whether any of the above is live. Paragraph (a)(6) provides that reports made under paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) "shall be made in the manner and form, and within the time period in the case of reports made under paragraph (3), prescribed in the final rule issued pursuant to subsection (b)". Paragraph (a)(7) goes further still: "Paragraphs (1) through (4) shall take effect on the dates prescribed in the final rule issued pursuant to subsection (b)." The intervals are printed in the statute. The switch that energises them is not.

Congress did not leave that switch undated. Subsection (b) required a notice of proposed rulemaking not later than 24 months after 15 March 2022, and a final rule not later than 18 months after the notice was published.

The notice arrived on 4 April 2024 as a proposed rule at 89 FR 23644, FR Doc. 2024-06526, pages 23644 to 23776, Docket No. CISA-2022-0010, RIN 1670-AA04, proposing 6 CFR Part 226 (Federal Register document, with the same issue rendered at GovInfo). Its printed DATES line closed comments "on or before June 3, 2024"; the docket extended that to 3 July 2024 at 89 FR 37141 and corrected proposed 6 CFR 226.2(b)(14)(iv) at 89 FR 47471. The proposal ran across twenty sections, 226.1 through 226.20, with 226.1 holding definitions and 226.2 stating which entities would be covered. I describe that coverage test as a proposal and do not quote it, because the proposed regulatory text was not read in full for this article.

Eighteen months from 4 April 2024 is 4 October 2025. That is my arithmetic, and the 2026 Unified Agenda's legal-deadline table prints the same date as 10/04/2025 (Unified Agenda entry for RIN 1670-AA04). The same table prints the statutory notice date as 03/15/2024, which the notice beat by twenty days: from 15 March 2024 to 4 April 2024 is twenty days, again my subtraction from printed dates.

On 18 November 2026 the rule was still in review. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs docket for RIN 1670-AA04 prints "Stage of Rulemaking: Final Rule Stage" and lists a stakeholder meeting under Executive Order 12866 for 11/19/2026 01:30 PM — the afternoon after the observation date (OIRA EO 12866 meeting record). The agenda entry carries the same stage label and sets a final-rule target of 09/00/2026, a month that had already passed. Its abstract says the agency received significant public comments and is considering them and examining options for the rulemaking.

Two more records put dates on that stage. Trade reporting dated 11 November 2026 says the draft final rule went to the review office on 1 October 2026, was still pending there as of 11 November, had not been published in the Federal Register, and that the agency's 9 November form update did not change existing reporting requirements or implement the statute (MeriTalk) — trade press, and labelled as such. Law-firm commentary describes the same 1 October submission and states that the obligations will not take effect until the final rule is published and becomes effective (Steptoe). A second commentary, dated 8 October 2026, puts the review at up to 90 days or longer, publication possibly into early 2027, and an effective date likely at least 60 days after publication (Inside Privacy). The 90-day window and the 60-day expectation are commentary, not statutory commands.

Inside the five documents reviewed for the status question — the review-office docket, the agenda entry, the 11 November trade report and the two commentaries — I found no published or operative final rule as of 18 November 2026. Publication in the Federal Register between 11 and 18 November is not excluded: I did not review that register issue by issue.

The agency's own programme page says what is available in the meantime. Read as a search-result excerpt of that page on 18 November 2026 rather than as a full-page read, it states that covered cyber incident and ransomware payment reporting "will not be required until the CIRCIA final rule goes into effect", and that until then all entities are encouraged to share incident information voluntarily (CISA CIRCIA page). That is the agency describing its own instrument, and it matches the statute's architecture: a voluntary channel in front of a switch that has not closed.

Two provisions in the same section will matter when it does. Paragraph (a)(5)(B) exempts a covered entity already required by law, regulation or contract to report substantially similar information to another federal agency within a substantially similar timeframe, but provides that the exemption "shall take effect" only once an agency agreement and sharing mechanism is in place under 681g(a).

Paragraph (a)(5)(C) disapplies paragraphs (1) to (3) for functions the Director determines constitute critical infrastructure owned, operated or governed by multi-stakeholder organisations that develop, implement and enforce Domain Name System policy, naming the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority as examples. I read both provisions and characterise neither effect, because no agreement under 681g(a) and no such determination was located in the documents reviewed.

The same documents also print no reporting volume, no count of submissions, no filing total and no per-incident record for this regime. That bounds what the material says. It is not a finding about what exists.

This agency already carries five published BTW articles, and the comparison is the point of the piece. Searching our archive for "Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency" at a limit of 30 on 18 November 2026 returned five rows: a Cyber Safety Review Board briefing published on 12 November 2026, two September briefings on remediation deadlines for PaperCut and ScreenConnect, an August signal briefing on a LoadMaster remediation window, and a July research analysis on proving Log4Shell remediation. All five concern either a review body or an obligation to patch. None reads a statutory reporting clock, the statute's own rulemaking calendar, or the difference between a voluntary channel and an operative duty. The review board detects everything and compels no one; the remediation briefings measure how fast a vendor's customers must move. This piece measures something else: an interval with no operative trigger. The agency's own entry is here in our directory.

For a board, then, the question is not "what is our deadline". It is "has the switch closed, and on what date". The answer exists in exactly one place, and it is not the statute: it is the effective-date line of the final rule, which 6 U.S.C. 681b(a)(7) makes the only source of the date on which paragraphs (1) through (4) begin to run.

When that line is published, nothing about a company's estate, its vendors or its incident history will matter to the clock. The 72 hours will start at the entity's own reasonable belief, the 24 will start at the payment, and the file will stay open until the entity says the incident is fully mitigated and resolved. Until then the instrument sits there, printed and exact, with the breaker open — and the only honest reading of "72 hours" today is a number attached to a date the process has not yet set.